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ABSTRACT 
 
The discipline of Critical Thinking is a methodology for the analysis and appraisal of 
natural language argument, commonly referred to as ‘real’ argument, a term 
intended to signify a contrast between the reasoning found in ordinary written or 
spoken texts, and the specialised constructions tailored by logicians to exemplify 
validity. There are, accordingly, two perspectives from which to view arguments: 
the arguer’s and the critic’s. From the critic’s perspective an argument is simply an 
object of appraisal. From the arguer’s perspective, however, an argument is more 
intimately associated with the act or practice of arguing or, as many commentators 
prefer to say, an argument is a product of the practice (of argumentation). There is 
hence an ambiguity between the act and object senses of ‘argument’, as well as a 
difference between object-senses themselves, depending on the perspective taken.  
 
For the traditional logician, an argument is a set of sentences or propositions, one 
of which is claimed, supposed, or intended, not necessarily in any active sense, to 
follow from the other(s). Such a conception facilitates assessment on the criterion 
of validity. Indeed, an argument can be defined as an object that is either valid or 
invalid. For the critic of ‘real’ argument, the object is what is propounded by a 
speaker or author, typically for persuasive purposes. Arguments from this 
perspective are not mere sets of arbitrarily designated propositions, but claims and 
inferences identified by the critic based on the interpretation and classification of 
actual texts.  
 
The aim of the thesis is to integrate these two conceptions of argument by 
identifying a point of intersection between the two perspectives: that is, to explain 
how the object of acts of argument can be seen to coincide with the objects of 
logical appraisal. I argue that the act of propounding an argument is essentially an 
assertive act, its object a complex proposition. It is more precise, however, to see 
propounding an argument as two mutually complementary acts, also assertives: 1) 
premising (or reason-giving) and 2) concluding (inferring). Premising is directly 
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assertive, its objects the premises themselves. Concluding, however, is more than 
just the assertion of a conclusion. If it were not, the argument would merely be a 
conjunction. What is asserted, in an act of concluding, is equivalent to a conditional 
formed from the conjunction of premises, (A), as antecedent, and the conclusion, 
(C), as consequent. What is asserted, then, in the whole act of propounding an 
argument, is the conjunctive proposition:  
(1) A and (if A then C) 
An assertive utterance of (1) commits the speaker to C by modus ponens. Hence, I 
propose, the act of argument (i.e., the propounding of an argument) is naturally 
deductive, and its object a deductive argument accordingly. By the same token its 
object (i.e., that which is propounded) corresponds with the ordered and indexed 
set designated by the logician as an object of appraisal. 
 
This account, I conclude, has important implications for critical thinking. It provides 
a theoretical basis, a groundwork, on which to develop a deductivist methodology 
for appraising natural-language arguments. Whilst I do not go into detail on the 
practical application of natural-language deductivism (NLD), I take the thesis to be 
an endorsement, and justification, for its implementation, and for a greater role 
within critical thinking for logic.  
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Introduction 
 
Perspectives 
Charles Hamblin (1970: 224) wrote: ‘The concept of an argument is quite basic to 
Logic, but seldom examined.’ There is clearly some truth in this observation; the 
notion of an argument is taken as primitive in logic. In Paul Tomassi’s words, 
argument is ‘the stuff of logic’, and the logician ‘someone who worries about 
arguments’ (Tomassi 1999: 2). But to worry about arguments is not necessarily to 
worry about what they are. The principal task in logic is to determine which 
arguments are valid and which are not, so that the real worry for the logician is 
whether the definition of validity is fit for the purpose of evaluating any putative 
argument that comes before it. To ensure this universal applicability, the fewer 
constraints that are put on the definition of an argument the better, for which 
reason Simpson (2008: 48) is content to say that ‘An argument is simply a collection 
of statements.’ It is not the everyday understanding of argument, but it suffices 
well enough as a bottom line for logic.  
 
There are other contexts, however, and other disciplines, for which argument is 
also ‘quite basic’, but in which it has a very different profile. One is Critical Thinking 
(CT).1 Critical thinking can be summed up as a methodology for identifying, 
analysing, and appraising natural-language arguments. This makes CT an 
appropriate starting point for this thesis. But I have a second, personal motive for 
adopting this perspective, namely a lengthy involvement in the teaching and 
assessing of CT, and consequent first-hand experience of the problems that 
conflicting conceptions of argument pose for a discipline that purports to be both 
rigorous and informal. However, the thesis is not about critical thinking as such; nor 
a defence of its tenets, which I refer to at numerous points in the thesis. On the 
                                                     
1
  I use the uppercase initials on this first occasion to signify that this is a reference to the discipline 
of CT and not critical thinking in general, i.e. thinking critically, which need not concern argument at 
all. Thereafter I use lowercase, as I do for ‘logic’. 
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contrary, despite its centrality to the discipline, the concept of argument, and the 
related concepts of assertion (claim, reason, etc.), are in my view seriously ill-
defined in the literature. This is not through lack of debate in the field so much as 
lack of consensus. Disagreement extends to the point where arguments are 
sometimes identified with texts, sometimes conceived of as abstract objects, 
sometimes illocutionary acts, sometimes products of disputation; sometimes a 
confusing hybrid of two or more of these.  
 
Assertion, too – though the subject of deep analysis in mainstream philosophy of 
logic and language – is given no comparable attention in critical thinking textbooks. 
‘Assertion’, ‘claim’, ‘statement’ – even ‘sentence’ – are often used more or less 
interchangeably to describe the components of arguments, the reasons and 
conclusion of which arguments are understood to consist. But used that way these 
terms introduce into the account a well-known ambiguity between an act-sense (of 
asserting, claiming, stating) and an object-sense (what is stated, etc.) This 
ambiguity inevitably rubs off on to ‘argument’ if an argument is defined in the 
standard way as a set of reasons and a conclusion. Reasons are given, and 
conclusions drawn, producing as it were arguments. (The idea of arguments as 
products of acts of argumentation is discussed in Chapter 4.) But from an 
alternative viewpoint, arguments are just the complex objects that we advance or 
propound when we argue, but whose constituent propositions – or ‘claims’ in the 
object sense – form arguments whether propounded or not. Which, out of these, is 
the argument? It is the principal question for this thesis to answer – and likewise 
for critical thinking to answer. In short, what is the object that we naturally call ‘an 
argument’; and how does it relate to the activity we call ‘argument’? 
 
We engage with arguments in two main ways: actively on the one hand, critically 
on the other. That is, we argue (and advance arguments), and we judge arguments 
that we encounter to be good or bad; to succeed or to fail. Logic, formal and 
informal, and critical thinking are all concerned with the evaluation of individual 
arguments and with developing a rigorous methodology for the purpose. How 
arguments are conceived of in that context is in part a reflection of the criterion or 
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criteria by which they are judged, which of course vary from one discipline to 
another. Formal (classical) logic, one could say, is single-minded in this respect: an 
argument is valid if and only if it only uses rules of inference that are truth-
preserving. That is why classical logic has no need of a fulsome definition: its 
objects of appraisal are just those that can be assessed for validity. But the 
orthodox view in critical thinking is that validity – or more specifically deductive 
validity – is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for due approval of an 
argument and that validity-aptness is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition 
for being an argument. There are good but invalid arguments, and bad but valid 
ones.2 Generally speaking, the procedure in CT involves judicious application of 
different criteria and different standards, dependent upon the kind of reasoning 
the target argument is perceived to display, and the purpose it is perceived to 
serve. The degree to which the standard of deductive validity is applicable within 
the expressly informal logic that CT espouses is a moot point. At one end of the 
spectrum there is some support for the approach known as natural language 
deductivism (NLD), which effectively measures all putative arguments against the 
standard of deductive soundness, and involves reconstructing arguments that do 
not have the surface-character of a deduction in a form that does.3 At the other 
extreme, deductive validity and/or soundness is rejected as a viable standard for 
appraisal of so-called ‘real’ (as opposed to artificial) argument. In between falls a 
plethora of approaches which recognise non-deductive arguments as warranting 
some form of qualified or graded approval, with or without deductive validity as 
one of the criteria.4 A survey of the literature indicates quite clearly that the 
orthodox approach in critical thinking and informal logic is the latter. Alec Fisher, in 
his book The Logic of Real Arguments, describes and advocates  
                                                     
2
 This is not to say that logicians equate ‘good’ with ‘valid’ or fail to acknowledge the difference 
between a mere premise and a reason to believe, or justification. The difference is in the focus of 
interest and motivation between classical and informal logics, not in perception of what an 
argument is.  
3
 For example, Groarke (1999) contra e.g. Govier (1987) and (Johnson 2000). 
4
 Thomas (1986: 122ff) rates arguments on the ‘degree of support’ given to the conclusion, which he 
grades from nil, through weak, moderate, and strong, to deductively valid at the top.  
10 
 
 
 
a method which draws on the insights and lessons of classical logic where these are 
helpful, but which is non-formal and reasonably efficient (both requirements exclude 
a method which requires us to translate arguments into the symbolism of classical 
logic). (Fisher 1988b: 128) 
Quite how the insights of classical logic can be ‘helpful’ without leading to a form of 
deductivism, is not clear. Logic is formal; that is its strength. ‘Informal logic’ avoids 
being an oxymoron only if construed as doing formal logic informally. True enough, 
it is not necessary to use symbolic language to represent the underlying form of an 
ordinary piece of reasoning. But if something aspiring to deductive validity cannot 
be detected in a putative argument, it is hard to see what makes it an argument. In 
what could be a testimonial for deductivism, Shand (2000: 14) has written 
All this points to my contention that the core idea of a good argument is deductive 
soundness, and that arguments are better the closer they get to being deductively 
sound. One starts with true premises and what would, if denied, form a 
contradiction with those premises ... In this deductive sense the conclusion follows 
from the premises: if these premises are true, then deductively this follows. I know 
of no other way in which conclusions truly follow from premises. 
 
The argument 
The line taken in this thesis proceeds eventually to a deductivist conclusion. In 
short, I take arguments to be the objects of acts of argument: the stating of 
premises and the drawing of conclusions. What are asserted are premises and what 
are inferred from the premises are conclusions. Conclusions are also asserted, only 
not, I contend, in the same straightforward way as premises. The asserting of a 
conclusion is not the same as the inferring of it. Premises and conclusions are 
objects of the related acts, but not (or not necessarily) their products, other than in 
the sense of being employed by the agent to perform the act. A text in which an 
argument is expressed is rightly attributable to its author as a product of his or her 
making. But the argument itself – that which a critic needs to extract from the text 
for appraisal – is quite abstract, and is defined by its form. It is also evaluated by its 
form, which at root is deductive form. Arguments purport to be valid, in the same 
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way that assertions purport to be true, and both are judged accordingly. Argument-
form is logical form, and logical form is at root deductive form. Critical thinking, if it 
is to live up to its claim to rigour and objectivity, ignores the deductive character of 
argument at its peril, a point to which I return, and for which I argue, in the last 
chapter, where I make a case for a modified NLD.  
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CHAPTER ONE:  Arguments  
 
1. The standard definition 
What then is an argument? According to Copi & Burgess-Jackson (1992: 12) the 
answer is: ‘a group of propositions of which one, the conclusion, is claimed to 
follow from the others, which are premises’ Copi calls this a logician’s definition.5 
However, it is more than this. Since it clearly captures the general everyday 
conception of argument as much as it does the technical, and is employed in 
informal as well as formal contexts, I shall refer to it as the standard definition. 
There are of course variations on the theme. In some versions the constituents of 
arguments are seen as ‘sentences’6 rather than propositions; in others ‘claims’7 or 
‘statements’,8 even ‘assertions’. None of these variants alters the central point that 
an argument is a complex structure whose elements divide into a set of (one or 
more) premises and a conclusion. Therefore, although the differences are by no 
means inconsequential, it is prudent simply to register them at this stage. Their 
significance will emerge in due course.   
 
The standard definition has a long pedigree. According to Sextus Empiricus, the 
Stoic logicians held that 
an argument is a complex of premises and a conclusion. What they call its premises 
are the propositions adopted by agreement for the establishment of a conclusion. A 
conclusion is the proposition established from the premises. For example, in ‘If it is 
                                                     
5
 In an earlier text Copi (1986: 6) writes: ‘An argument in the logician’s sense is any group of 
propositions of which one is claimed to follow from the others, which are regarded as providing 
support or grounds for the truth of that one. Of course, the word “argument” is often used in other 
senses, but in logic it has the sense just explained.’  
6
 E.g. Bergmann, Moor & Nelson (2004: 9), where an argument is defined as a set of sentences of 
which one is designated as the conclusion.  
7
 The use of ‘claim’ for the constituents of an argument is particularly prevalent in critical thinking 
textbooks, e.g., Bowell & Kemp (2002), Fisher (2001), Thomson (2009).  
8
 As noted above, Simpson (2008) settles for ‘statement’. However, he uses it interchangeably with 
‘sentence’, not on the grounds that the difference is philosophically unimportant, but that it does 
not impinge on the practice of logic.  
13 
 
 
 
day, it is light. But it is day. Therefore it is light’, ‘Therefore it is light’ is the 
conclusion, the rest are premises. (Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Book 2)9  
Here, as in Copi’s definition, an argument is effectively defined by its constituents 
and their relation to one another, in Sextus’ version establishment (of a conclusion 
by its premises). For the Stoics the constituents of an argument are assertibles, a 
subclass of self-complete sayables, which Susanne Bobzien (2003: 85) identifies 
‘very roughly’ with ‘meanings’.10 Accordingly, she writes: ‘Stoic logic falls into two 
main parts: the theory of arguments and the theory of assertibles, which are the 
components from which the arguments are built’ (ibid.). 
  
Assertibles differ from the other self-complete sayables in that they can be stated 
(asserted), and that they are true or false. Crucially, however, their self-
completeness implies that they need not be stated – they subsist independently of 
the act – in the same way that sayables in general subsist independently of being 
said. 11 This is despite the fact that for the Stoics the characteristic function of 
assertibles is to be asserted. So, whilst an assertible is taken to be self-subsistent, 
there is still more to asserting than just saying (uttering) the sentence that 
expresses the assertible, if only because an assertible can be stated in one context, 
and merely entertained hypothetically or suppositionally in another. (The example 
given is: ‘If Dio walks, then Dio moves’, which contains three assertibles, but only 
one assertion, namely the whole conditional. Neither ‘Dio walks’, nor ‘Dio moves’ is 
asserted in the process.12)  
 
Arguments (logoi), too, are a species of complete sayable, only not themselves 
assertibles, but formed of assertibles. Importantly for what follows they are, like 
assertibles, incorporeal, but at the same time they are not acts, beliefs, or 
                                                     
9
 In Long & Sedley (1987: 36). 
10
 Bobzien cites as evidence Diogenes Laertes: ‘What we say are things, which in fact are sayables’ 
(Lives of the Eminent Philosophers,VII: 57).  
11
 Bobzien (2003: 86). See also Frede (1974); Kneale & Kneale (1962, Chapter 3). 
12
 Geach (1965: 449) raises much the same point, only attributing it to Frege (Begriffsscrift, e.g. §§2, 
4). As Geach expresses it, ‘a proposition may occur in discourse now asserted, now unasserted, and 
yet be recognizably the same proposition […] I shall call this point about assertion the Frege point’. 
See further §33 below.  
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sentences (Bobzien 2003: 101–2). By that account they are objects (as opposed to 
acts): each a compound of premises and a conclusion.13 On the whole, in this thesis, 
I do not depart far from this view. It may be characteristic of an argument to be the 
object of an act of argument, just as it is characteristic of an assertible to be the 
object of an act of assertion. But unless either of these is an exclusive function, it is 
not a definition. For some x be the object of an act of assertion x must be 
assertible, but x does not become an assertible only when it is used to assert 
something, i.e. asserted. But if the act-object relation in respect of assertions and 
arguments is not one of mutual dependence – like agent and patient, lover and 
loved – then it is still important to the understanding of these concepts to say what 
the relation is.  
 
Returning to Copi we find a definition which certainly purports to identify the 
argument with an object, i.e. the set of propositions. If that were as far as it went, 
there would be no requirement to draw on anything suggestive of an act, but of 
course an argument is more than a mere set of propositions – at least on our 
ordinary conception of argument, which distinguishes between sets of propositions 
or sentences that are, and others that are not, arguments. The problem with the 
standard definition begins with the very division of its components into premises 
and conclusion. It is a problem Copi points out himself: ‘Thus’, he says, ‘“premiss” 
and “conclusion” are relative terms like “employer” and “employee”’ (Copi & 
Burgess-Jackson 1992: 6–7). Human beings do not divide into employers and 
employees independently of the particular employments under which they are 
related. A single individual, A, may be the employer of individual B, and the 
employee of C, without any change of personal identity. Likewise the domain of 
proposition (or sentence, or assertion, or claim) does not divide up into those that 
are premises and those that are conclusions. In a complex argument, the same 
sentence can be the intermediate conclusion of a sub-argument, and the premise 
                                                     
13
 It should be noted that for the Stoics an argument could not have fewer than two premises. 
Diogenes Laertius: ‘(An argument) consists of a premise or premises, an additional premise, and a 
conclusion. For example: “If it is day, it is light. But it is day. Therefore it is light.” For “If it is day, it is 
light” is the premise; “But it is day” is the additional premise’ (Lives of Eminent Philosophers, VII, 45). 
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to a further or main conclusion. There is nothing recognisable about ‘a conclusion’ 
or ‘a premise’ outside the context of the particular argument whose respective 
components they are. (Indeed, neither exists outside the context, except as an 
undifferentiated proposition or sentence.) So, on the more general level of 
definition, we understand the concepts of premises (P) and conclusion (C) via the 
concept of argument, or via the relation that holds between them in an argument, 
namely (as Copi says), following from, or (as Sextus) establishment of, C by P.  
 
Whether these relations are any more intelligible than the definiendum itself is 
debatable. Would the ‘following from’, of one proposition by another, have an 
intelligible meaning for someone not already familiar with the concept of argument 
and/or the activity of arguing? But even assuming that it would, there is a further 
and more pressing problem for the standard definition: a conclusion follows from 
premises only in a valid argument or, if preferred, a good argument.14 So if 
following from (or establishing, warranting, justifying, etc.), is the defining relation 
for the components of an argument, what are we to say is the defining relation in a 
bad (invalid) argument? Either there are no bad or invalid arguments, which is 
counter-intuitive, or there are arguments that lack the defining relation of following 
from, which is equally counter-intuitive since it permits any set of propositions to 
be an argument. The dilemma is simple enough to resolve, and Copi does so with 
the insertion of the single word ‘claimed’. So, the conclusion of an argument need 
not actually follow: what makes the set of propositions an argument is that the 
conclusion is claimed to follow. The same move can be made for any variant on the 
standard definition. So, for example, an argument can be understood as a set of 
propositions, sentences, etc., some of which are claimed to support (warrant, 
justify, establish) a further proposition, sentence; and so on.  
 
Introducing the idea that one constituent is only claimed to follow from the others 
solves the immediate problem of identifying bad arguments, but it comes at a price 
                                                     
14
 At this preliminary stage ‘valid argument’ has the informal sense of an argument whose 
conclusion does follow from the premise(s). That would be a necessary condition also of a ‘good’ 
argument (though not a sufficient one, since in a valid argument the premise(s) can still be false).    
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for the view than an argument can subsist independently of acts of argument. It 
cannot be denied that there are acts of argument. Concluding is an act of 
argument; so is producing evidence or giving reasons (premises) for a conclusion. 
Propounding, too, is an act of argument if what is propounded is an argument (in 
the object-sense). But the propounding is not the argument, nor the concluding the 
conclusion; and so on for the various components, as well as for the whole. But, to 
repeat, if we detach the object from the act in order to treat it as an independent 
entity, then what we are left with is a bare set of propositions, and with that the 
question of what makes it an argument at all. On the other hand, if we invoke a 
term like ‘claim’ we surely have to make some accommodation in the definition for 
the active sense of claiming, and for agency in the form of some claimer. 
Propositions don’t make claims themselves: they are claimed. But if an argument is 
defined by the relation of things being ‘claimed to follow’, one from another, then 
some explanation is needed as to how any argument could be held to subsist 
independently of a proponent.  
 
2. Whose claim? 
Douglas Walton (1990: 409–10), in a response to Copi’s definition, asks: ‘Claimed by 
whom? And regarded by whom? By the proponent of the argument, one would 
suppose.’15 
 
 The questions are pertinent, but the answer that Walton gives to them places a 
very literal interpretation on Copi’s definition. Given that Copi’s perspective on 
argument is logic, and Walton’s dialectic, it is almost certainly a more literal 
interpretation than Copi intended. Referring to the phrases ‘claimed to follow’ and 
‘regarded as providing support’ Walton writes: 
Evidently these phrases refer to a kind of stance or attitude taken up or conveyed by 
the proponent of the argument. To claim that a proposition is true and can be 
supported is to assert that proposition and commit oneself to its truth, implying a 
                                                     
15
 Here Walton actually cites the slightly expanded version of the definition in which Copi (1986: 6) 
adds that premises are ‘regarded as providing support or grounds for the truth of [the conclusion]’.  
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commitment to defending its truth, as alleged, against attacks or undermining of it 
by any potential opponent. In this sense, the term ‘claim’ tacitly presupposes an 
interactive (dialectical) framework of a proponent upholding a point of view and an 
opponent questioning that point of view. A claim is an upholding of some particular 
proposition that is potentially open to questioning (ibid.). 
But on what evidence do ‘these phrases’ refer to acts or attitudes or stances? There 
is no more evidence that a ‘claim’ refers to a stance than that it refers to the object 
of a stance, an object with respect to which a stance may (or may not) be taken. 
What is evident – i.e. from empirical observation about linguistic usage – is that the 
word ‘claim’ is ambiguous. Walton selects the sense in which, he says, ‘claim’ 
presupposes a dialectic framework; but the sense he selects is the one which is 
presupposed by a dialectic framework. In a different framework, we find different 
presuppositions. There is no requirement for the relations that logicians study to be 
claimed to hold by a proponent: they hold or they do not independently of whether 
they are claimed. To be sure, claiming is an act, similar to stating or asserting, and 
the noun ‘claim’ can be taken to mean an act in some contexts (although not 
perhaps as emphatic an act as assertion). But a claim can also be understood with 
the object sense of what is (but need not be) claimed – a claim for damages, for 
example, which can be pursued or not as the case may be. (Adapting the Stoic 
term, it could be dubbed a ‘claimable’.) The ambiguity of ‘claim’ can even be 
viewed as a convenience,16 and used with its ambiguity intact as a generic term for 
the components of an argument.17 Beall & Restall (2006: 35), in their defence of 
logical pluralism, co-opt the term for precisely this amenability: ‘Read our neutral 
term “claim” as picking out sentences, propositions, utterances, statements, or 
anything else you think might feature in the premises and conclusions of an 
argument.’ In a similar way the passive voice used in Copi’s ‘claimed to follow’, 
need not be taken so literally as to imply the intentional act of an agent. It may just 
as well be understood as implicit in the wording of a standard argument, conveyed 
                                                     
16
 Grice (1975: 380) remarks that ‘utterance’ has a ‘convenient act-object ambiguity’.  
17
 In most textbooks on critical thinking ‘claim’ is the generic term given for the premises and 
conclusions of an argument, with its act and object senses rarely if ever being differentiated.  
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by the meaning of the connectives conventionally used to indicate argument or 
inference: ‘therefore’, ‘so’, ‘since’ etc. If someone were to say, with intent to argue,  
(1) It’s dark and therefore it’s dangerous to be out 
he would not have to add anything more to these words to indicate that he was 
claiming the second to follow from the first, any more than he would need to add 
anything (such as ‘is true’) to indicate that he was claiming it was dark. The ‘claim’, 
in that sense, is in the standard meaning of the expression – not necessarily in the 
intention of the proponent, if indeed there is a proponent. I typed (1) out as an 
example of an argument form without intentionally proposing or propounding 
anything.18 Yet, looking back at it and reading it with its standard or default 
meaning, I could say that in (1) there is an implicit claim that the second clause 
follows from the first without its having to be implicit that it is someone’s claim. It is 
there to be claimed; a claimable. It is not that the sentence is making a claim itself, 
or about itself. A sentence cannot literally ‘do’ such things as claiming, or asserting. 
Even when we talk of sentences ‘expressing’ things it could be objected, if 
pedantically, that we are using the words loosely to mean what speakers do with 
sentences. However, what speakers can do with sentences is determined by what 
sentences conventionally mean, and it is a legitimate and well-understood 
shorthand to refer to this as what sentences ‘express’. In a similar way it is a 
legitimate shorthand to say that a sentence prefixed by ‘so’, ‘therefore’ etc., 
thereby ‘expresses’ a claim without any requirement for a speaker to have claimed 
it. Nonetheless, the ambiguity cannot be eradicated, and it is one of the premises 
of this thesis that a perspicuous answer to the question of what an argument is 
depends on its resolution (See §§29, 33 & 34). The notion of a claimable goes some 
way towards clarification. Along with Stoic assertibles, it has a parallel in     
McDowell’s disambiguation of the Fregean ‘Thought’: ‘The realm of sense (Sinn) 
contains thoughts in the sense of what can be thought (thinkables) as opposed to 
acts or episodes of thinking’ (McDowell 1994: 179). The ordinary word ‘thought’, 
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 Arguably I have no choice but to propose what the sentences standardly mean, regardless of any 
intent or otherwise.  
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like ‘claim’, has a glaring act-object ambiguity. Frege’s Gedanke, however, has the 
strictly object-sense, which is caught by ‘thinkable’. A thinkable need not be 
thought, but (trivially) only thinkables can be thought.   
 
3. Arguments and argument-claims 
Sainsbury (2001: 23–25) draws a distinction between arguments and what he calls 
‘argument-claims’. By his account an argument is something about which an 
argument-claim can be made, in particular (at least for the logician) a claim to the 
argument’s validity or otherwise. Sainsbury interprets the expression  
(2) A1, ... An ⊨ C  (or: A1, ... An ⊭ C) 
as:  
(3) “A1, ... An ; C” is valid, (or : “A1, ... An ; C” is not valid.) 
In the affirmative case, this is in the same spirit as saying that C follows from A1, ... 
An or that C is a consequence of A1, ... An. For if C follows (in this logician’s sense) 
from the rest of the complex, the complex is valid. The double turnstile is 
conventionally used for semantic consequence, the single turnstile for syntactic, so 
if one indicates a claim, presumably they both do, even if they make technically 
different claims. But the semicolon, as deployed in (3), is different. It, too, is 
metalinguistic, but whereas the turnstile is an indicator of actual logical 
consequence and can properly be used only of sequents that are valid in the right 
sorts of ways (viz., semantically valid or syntactically valid), the semi-colon is not. 
The semi-colon just means that the complex is an argument in the sense of being a 
set of sentences some of which are premises and another of which is a conclusion. 
Being a conclusion just means being a sentence that is to be evaluated as following, 
or not, from another set of formulas. The semi-colon isn’t an inference marker as 
such, it just marks a given list of formulas as something assessable as an argument, 
but without making any commitment about its validity nor any claim that the 
conclusion does follow from the premises.  
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So, in Sainsbury’s account, the subject of an argument-claim is the argument: 
(4) A1, ... An ; C 
The argument-claim, symbolically expressed by (2) – but paraphrased according to 
Sainsbury by (3) – is true if (4) is valid and false otherwise. By contrast (4) itself is 
neither true nor false, because it makes (expresses) no claim. That, Sainsbury 
observes, is the key difference between an argument claim, as he is using the term, 
and a (mere) argument. In the context of (3), where the claim is explicitly to the 
validity (or non-validity) of (4), this seems perfectly correct. It also accords with the 
notion of an argument as an object: something which can be propounded (but need 
not be), and distinct from what is done by a proponent. Sainsbury (2001: 24) firmly 
endorses this object-sense by casting the argument as an object of evaluation: 
‘something …. about which the question arises whether or not it is valid’. In that 
context the argument is not to be understood as claiming or asserting anything. To 
be assessable for validity, all that is necessary is that the set be such that one of its 
sentences has been designated a conclusion.19 On the classical conception of 
validity, an argument is valid if and only if the set consisting of the designated 
premises plus the negation of the designated conclusion is an inconsistent set. 
Alternatively we can say the argument is valid if and only if the conjunction 
consisting of all the premises and the negated conclusion is a logical falsehood. On 
these criteria it is not necessary for anything to be claimed in order for the 
evaluation to be made: the set is consistent or inconsistent, the conjunction true or 
false, regardless of any claim ‘made’ by it, or made on its behalf. If we are looking 
for the best expression of an argument in the object-sense, bedrock, so to speak, 
then (4) is it. However, all that has been said about the claim-to-follow found in 
expressions of argument, such as (1), will have to apply to claims of validity, such as 
(2). The notional author of each claim is different: of (1) it is the proponent of the 
argument, of (2) or (3) it is the critic (although, of course, the proponent can 
criticise his or her own argument). Sainsbury’s argument-claim is, as he says, true 
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 For precisely such a definition see Bergmann et al. (2004: 9): ‘An argument is a set of two or more 
sentences, one of which has been designated as the conclusion…’.  
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or false according to the validity or otherwise of the argument-object (4). But there 
is no requirement for it or its truth to be asserted (claimed) in order to have the 
sense that it has. It, too, is a claimable: a claim in that sense only. It is the same 
object whether claimed or not.   
 
Sainsbury’s distinction between arguments and argument-claims is fine within the 
context of evaluation. In that context the argument ‘A1, ... An ; C’ is rightly assigned 
to the role of object of the appraisal – a role, though, that is more apparent in the 
ordinary-language wording of (3) than the symbolic rendering of (2). The obscurity 
of (2), as Sainsbury explains, is that  
 “⊨”appears in the very place in which, in an expression of an argument in ordinary 
English, one would find a word like “so” or “therefore” or “hence”: a word to show 
that one has come to the conclusion that is being drawn from the previous 
propositions. This gives a tendency to confuse the role of “⊨” with that of 
conjunctions like “therefore”. But the roles are very different (ibid.).   
These roles, Sainsbury continues, differ on three counts. The first is grammatical: 
‘⊨’ (he says) ‘is a predicate, the sort of expression which can be used to assign a 
property to something’ (ibid.). It means ‘is valid’ when applied to the ordered and 
indexed pair ‘A1, ... An ; C’, whereas ‘therefore’ (he says) is a connective. We can say 
that some arguments are valid, but we cannot say that any argument is therefore 
(ibid.). The second is that something of the form ‘A1, ... An therefore C’ is, like (4), an 
argument about which something else of the form ‘A1, ... An ⊨ C’, is claimable. The 
third point – and in the context of later parts of the thesis the most interesting – is 
that when ‘in ordinary circumstances’20 someone actually propounds an argument 
by linking the premises and conclusion with ‘therefore’, he commits himself to the 
truth of the premises. To put it another way the proponent, if there is one, asserts 
the premises, whereas someone who claims that the resulting expression is valid, 
makes no such commitment, given that there are valid arguments with false 
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 Sainsbury uses this phrase to differentiate between arguments actually propounded in ordinary 
language, and arguments as inert objects of evaluation; but he makes little of the distinction. Cf. 
‘real argument’, as discussed shortly. 
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premises. For that reason the complete form of expression for advancing an 
argument (as opposed to simply considering it) is:  
(5) A1, ... An and therefore-C 
21 
Arguments are quite often expressed in this manner – for example: ‘It’s dark and so 
it’s dangerous to be out’. But with or without the ‘and’ it is assumed that a person 
advancing an argument means the reasons to be understood as true, for otherwise 
they would have no worth as reasons.22 To be sure, I can mention the same 
argument in the context of an evaluation (argument-claim) without asserting the 
premise(s). For instance I could say, with reference to my locality: ‘“It’s dark and so 
it’s dangerous to be out” is a valid argument, and would be a sound argument if 
said when it is in fact dark.’ But when an argument is used, it is purported to be 
sound, which requires that its premises are purported to be true. In an argument in 
use the premises (reasons) have the force of assertion.   
 
But clearly the proponent of an argument is committing himself to more than just 
the truth of the premises. There is a further commitment to the assertibility of the 
conclusion given the premises; that is, to the warrant that the premises give to the 
conclusion. This may sound very much like a commitment to the plain truth of the 
conclusion, so that when an argument is advanced the proponent also asserts the 
conclusion. In one sense this is so: the commitment to the truth of the reasons 
commits the proponent, eo ipso, to the truth of the conclusion. After all, the whole 
point of giving the reasons is to warrant the conclusion, and if the conclusion is not 
warranted by the given reasons – either because they are not all true or because 
the conclusion does not follow from them – the argument fails. The act of 
successful argument is an advance from the reasons, by valid inference, to a 
conclusion, so that if one is committed to the reasons he or she is thereby 
committed to the conclusion. However, there is another sense of ‘argument’ which 
stops short of commitment to the conclusion. That is the sense it has when we say 
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 ‘Therefore-C’ is hyphenated because I treat it as one claim. C is not itself merely asserted, when 
someone says: ‘P and therefore C’: what is asserted is that P and C given P. I return to this in §39.  
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  See below §§ 10–11 on the principle of charity, which underlies this ‘assumption’.   
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that such-and-such is an argument for such and such. If I say to someone: ‘This is 
my argument for C’, and then say just what that argument is, ‘this’ does not need 
to include C. ‘This’ refers to the reasons. If it were not complete without a prior or 
simultaneous commitment to C it would not be a sound argument for C, because it 
would fall short of establishing C. The argument must be capable of establishing C. 
When we express an argument it is true that we include the conclusion, in order to 
state what the argument is intended to establish, as in our example: 
(1) It’s dark (and) so it’s dangerous to be out. 
But asserting that it is dangerous is no part of establishing that it is dangerous. The 
argument is not:  
(6) It’s dark, and it’s dangerous to be out, and it follows that it’s 
dangerous to be out.  
I therefore take the latter sense of argument, viz. ‘argument for’, to have an 
important explanatory sense, since it reflects the move that we make when we 
argue – its starting point and the direction that it takes. What the proponent of an 
argument does is to assert reasons – and to assert them as reasons – for some C. In 
that sense the act of argument for C is complete without asserting C. That is not to 
deny that an argument must include or involve a conclusion. Clearly it does, but it 
does not require the active asserting of the conclusion in order to be an argument 
for that conclusion. (The importance of this point emerges later the thesis, and I 
return to it with additional argument at various points.)  
 
Of course the proponent might be lying when he asserts some or all of the 
premises, or simply mistaken in believing them to be true. Likewise he might be 
arguing fallaciously, with or without intent, when he uses the word ‘therefore’ to 
indicate that he is drawing a conclusion from the premises, not necessarily because 
the conclusion itself is false, but because its truth does not follow properly from the 
asserted premises. In short, what this means is that in a standardly expressed 
argument, one of the components is claimed to follow from the other(s), just as 
Copi says in his definition, but with the qualified meaning of ‘claimed’.  
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We can now come back to Walton’s question: ‘claimed by whom?’ and to his 
presumption that it is the proponent’s claim. Sure enough, the proponent does 
make a claim when he utters a complex sentence of the form: A1, ... An (and) 
therefore-C. In fact, as Sainsbury rightly points out, he makes two claims: first the 
conjunction of A1, ... An  and, second, that C follows from these claims. Being just 
claims, they need not be true, though they are claimed as true. One or more of the 
premises could be false; and, whether they are true or not, they might not give 
adequate grounds for the conclusion. What is claimed altogether is a conjunction, 
which, again, is why we should (or implicitly do) include ‘and’ along with ‘therefore’ 
or ‘so’. The compound claim is that A1, ... An and that therefore-C.  
 
But ‘claim’ is still ambiguous here. ‘To make a claim’ means to claim, to perform an 
act of claiming; but ‘the claim’ that is made in the process will generally be taken – 
if loosely – to mean what is claimed. (Much the same goes for ‘assertion’,23 with 
important implications later in the thesis.) This illustrates quite well what it means 
to say that the ambiguity is ‘convenient’: it allows us to refer to something as a 
claim without having to commit ourselves to an act of claiming and a claimer, yet at 
the same time to allude its claimability. Of course, in the pure object-sense of what 
is claimed or asserted, the object is a bare proposition. But it is the same object 
whether claimed or unclaimed, asserted or unasserted.24 This is not a convenience 
that can be indulged throughout a thesis which is expressly concerned with the 
relation, and likewise the distinction, between acts and objects (of argument and 
assertion). But accepting, for the time being, the accommodating sense of ‘claim’, 
we can say that the claims made by the proponent of an argument – if indeed the 
argument is propounded – are also made in the argument, whether it is 
propounded or not. That is to say, the claims are in the conventional meaning of 
the words. An expression with the form of (5) cannot be uttered assertively without 
                                                     
23
 However, disambiguation is easier for ‘assertion’ because the noun and verb forms are different. 
This will be important in later sections. Nonetheless, the act-object ambiguity of ‘assertion’ is little 
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Chapter 5 below.  
24
 See again Geach (1965) on ‘The Frege point’ (footnote 12, above).  
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the claims in question being made. That commits the speaker to the truth of the 
claimables that are its constituents, and that commitment is part of the meaning of 
the standard expression of an argument. We recognise a text as an argument if we 
recognise this commitment. So it is in this spirit that I take Copi’s definition of a 
conclusion as the member of the set that is ‘claimed to follow’ from other(s), 
and/or of a premise as one that is ‘regarded as providing support’. 
 
4. Claims and evaluations 
How then does the claim to follow from, in the standard definition, relate to 
Sainsbury’s notion of an argument-claim? The latter, which is signalled in the 
positive case by “⊨” and translated ‘…is valid’ (according to Sainsbury), is neither a 
claim by the proponent of an argument nor is it in the argument, in the sense just 
outlined. Sainsbury’s argument claim is a claim about an argument, as is crystal 
clear in the longhand version, (3). Moreover it is a very particular claim, a claim to 
the validity of a particularly ordered and indexed set of propositions. It would be 
more pertinent, perhaps, to call it a validity-claim, especially on the strength of (3). 
Validity or non-validity is not the only evaluative claim that can be made about an 
argument.25 Sainsbury makes a gesture towards generalising the notion by adding 
that arguments can also be assessed for persuasiveness, opening the door to a 
range of alternative criteria – elegance, perhaps, or succinctness – but he does not 
enlarge on the point. His concern is with logical appraisal, and his argument claim is 
a specifically logical appraisal. An argument may then be understood simply as any 
object which is either valid or invalid as, analogously, a declarative sentence is an 
expression that is either true or false.   
 
Put another way, argument can be identified simply as the domain of logic. Gillian 
Russell (2008: 593) observes that 
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bad arguments or non-arguments but where it is unclear which. To judge them invalid would imply 
that they were deemed to be arguments, but ‘non-valid’ allows their argument status to be 
undecided, and thus has relevance for ‘appraisal-first’ strategies. See §20 below.  
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the domain of logic might be thought of as a great collection of arguments to be 
divided into two exclusive and exhaustive subcollections, the valid and the invalid, 
and the task of the logician as that of dividing one from t’other.  
As the subject of an argument-claim, so conceived, the argument itself is the object 
of an evaluation, on the ‘dimension’ of (i.e. by the criterion of) validity.26 This, being 
both exclusive and exhaustive, goes a good way towards being a definition of 
‘argument’ – some might say the whole way. Its evident limitation is that under 
such a definition every conceivable finite and ordered set of declarative sentences 
will be the expression of an argument if a semicolon is placed between its ultimate 
and penultimate formulas. If it were offered as a definition of what people 
intuitively take an argument to be, an obvious objection would be that it does not 
discriminate between those sets of sentences or propositions that are invalid 
arguments and those that (intuitively speaking) are not arguments at all. As a 
logician’s definition, of course, this is not a limitation but a strength, and surely a 
necessary condition for completeness. A calculus could not be held to be complete 
if amongst sets of propositions there was a sizeable number that could not be 
classified as valid or invalid because it was unclear whether they really counted as 
arguments. Besides, as Gillian Russell goes on to say, logicians are not really 
interested in the question of what an argument is,27 as shown by the scant 
attention that is paid to it in most logic books (Copi’s included). Logicians, she says, 
tend to move on quickly to the business of argument-evaluation.  
 
Sainsbury makes it very clear that his validity-claim – (2) construed as (3) – is about 
a set of objects arbitrarily designated as arguments. It is hence a metalinguistic 
claim, similar to the way in which ‘is true’ is appended, in Tarski’s schema, to a 
quoted sentence rather than to the sentence itself. What we find quoted in the 
argument-claim is the reference to what is evaluated by the claim, namely: ‘A1, ... 
An ; C’. The argument-claim represented by (2) thus escapes any suspicion that it is 
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 Sainsbury may be following Searle in using the notion ‘dimension of assessment’. For example, 
Searle (1979: 12) writes: ‘All the members of the assertive class are assessable on the dimension of 
assessment that includes true and false.’  
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 ‘Logicians do not spend a lot of time on it, any more than mathematicians spend a lot of time 
worrying about what numbers are’ (Russell 2008: 593). 
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claiming something about itself, though it is claiming something about the 
sentences (or propositions) referred to in the claim – i.e. to all of A1, ... An, and to C.  
 
The claim alluded to in Copi’s definition of an argument is different, and more 
difficult to put a finger on. One way to contrast it with Sainsbury’s argument-claim 
is in terms of voice. The voice we ‘hear’ when we read (2) and (3) is the voice of a 
notional critic, an appraiser standing back from the argument. Using ‘voice’ in the 
grammatical sense, we say the verb ‘claim’ is active: it is in direct speech; the critic 
is asserting that the argument is valid or invalid. In the contrasting grammatical 
sense of ‘voice’, the claim that features in Copi’s definition is passive: it is claimed 
that one proposition follows from the others (in an argument). In the more 
ordinary sense it is the notional proponent’s voice, not the voice of a critic. If we 
transpose this claim into direct speech it can only be a claim that the conclusion 
does follow, the standard form of expression of that claim being (5) – ‘A1, ... An 
(and) therefore C’. What it cannot be is a claim that the conclusion does not follow 
from the premises. That is an option that applies only to the critical, evaluative 
claim: A1, ... An ⊭ C.  
 
The implication of this is that the claim attributed to an argument by the standard 
definition is a designatory claim; it assigns each of the constituent propositions the 
role of either conclusion or premise, and defines each by its putative relation to the 
other(s) in an expressed argument. In that respect nothing more is done than 
declare the complex an argument, which by convention is all and only what ‘ ; ’ 
means. Hence the object to which the standard definition refers is an object of 
evaluation on a par with (4). It is valid if what is claimed is true, and invalid if what 
is claimed is false. The reason why this might seem questionable is that claiming 
that one proposition follows from one or more others appears far more informative 
than the mere separation of the two sub-sets by a punctuation mark. That 
difference, however, is superficial. Just as (2) is construed as: ‘“P ; C” is valid’ 
(where P is a set of premises, and C a conclusion), ‘P ; C’ itself may be construed as: 
‘C is a conclusion and P its premise-set’, which is tantamount to: ‘C is claimed to 
follow from P’. The latter explicates the former, but basically the claims are 
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equivalent in meaning – i.e. that ‘P ; C’ is an argument. (We can now see, too, why 
the negation of (4) would not mean that C did not follow from P, but instead that C 
was not claimed to follow from P, or in other words that ‘P ; C’ was not an 
argument.)  
 
5. Acts of argument and their objects 
To recap briefly, an argument-claim, as Sainsbury defines it, is true or not according 
to whether the related object is valid or not. It is effectively an evaluation, one of 
two. The other, which is indicated by striking through the turnstile (⊭), is a claim 
that the argument is not valid – though still an argument. The object of the claim is 
a set of propositions separated into two subsets, one designated as premises and 
the other a conclusion. This we can call the argument-object, as opposed to the 
argument-claim. The argument-object makes no claim; the claim is made about it. If 
we were to think of the argument-claim as an act its agent would be an argument-
critic.  
 
An act of argument, by contrast, is the act of a proponent, and is performed when a 
reason (or number of reasons) is given for a conclusion. It might alternatively be 
thought that the act of argument is performed by drawing a conclusion from the 
reasons, but there is a problem with defining the act that way because a conclusion 
cannot be drawn without there being reasons from which to draw it. There is a 
sense of directionality in the procedure. It is true, as we have seen, that in a good 
argument the conclusion follows from the reasons, and that by the same token the 
reasons give grounds that warrant the drawing of the conclusion. If we think about 
what is going on when we argue from premises to a conclusion, we can envisage 
the agent reflecting on one or more propositions and concluding something from 
them. For example, I may see that the tide is going out and conclude that I will soon 
be able to reach a nearby island that might be unreachable at high tide. The act so-
described is inference, although under the same ambiguity that we find in ‘claim’ 
and ‘assertion’, the word ‘inference’ can also take the meaning of what is inferred. 
On one side of the ambiguity there is the inference I make (carry out) in concluding 
29 
 
 
 
that I can now get to the island. On the other there is the proposition that the 
island is currently reachable, which – despite how I came to know or believe it – is 
true or false by its own lights, and can be asserted or denied accordingly. I refer to 
it as ‘an inference’, even in the object-sense, because it is something I have come to 
by an act or process of inference; but what I have come to is an object, a 
proposition, that is not a product of my making. That is not to say that ‘inference’ 
and ‘proposition’ simply mean the same. Obviously an inference is a special kind of 
proposition – coloured, as it were, by the mental act or speech act whose object it 
is. Likewise inferring is a special kind of thinking or speaking. But the point to be 
emphasised here is that what is inferred is not a different object for being inferred.  
 
To think of inferences as products of acts of inference is consistent with a view 
(prevalent in the field of informal logic) that arguments are products of acts or 
processes of argumentation (e.g. Johnson (2000: 168) . It seems reasonable 
enough, in the context of an argument that is actually being put forward, to 
characterise the conclusion as a product, the output, say, of an act of inference, 
produced by being drawn from premises. By the same token we might want to 
define premises as products of acts of reason-giving for a conclusion. We talk quite 
naturally of people producing reasons to support a position. But although the 
characterisation of an argument as the product of a process might have some 
intuitive appeal, it does not account for the less intuitive but equally important 
object-sense. This is because an argument-object need not be produced by any act 
of argument in order to be an argument.28 
 
What is inferred in an act of argument is a claim, but only in the strict object-sense 
of something claimed – a claimable. The claim is an inference insofar as it is 
inferred. But there is also a purely referential sense of ‘what is inferred’ which is 
detached from any associated act of inferring. Take the claim that a certain island 
can be reached (at a given time and place). Its truth conditions are unaffected by 
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argument and the objects logicians designate as arguments for their purposes. See the next chapter.  
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whether or not it is inferred. Instead of inferring that the island could be reached, I 
might have seen with my own eyes that this was so without any thoughts about the 
tide, and asserted that it was so without any reference to the tide. Similarly I might 
have claimed or asserted that the tide was out without meaning it as a reason to 
conclude anything about the island. What I simply assert or claim, and what I give 
as a reason for the conclusion, is just that the tide is out. In giving it as a reason on 
one occasion, and as a plain assertion on another, I do not bring about any real or 
intrinsic change to it. The thing that is plainly asserted, and the thing itself that is 
given as a reason etc., are one and the same proposition. Yet clearly what we refer 
to as ‘an assertion’, ‘an inference’, or ‘a premise’ are not identical objects. It might 
be argued, therefore, that the admixture of an act of inferring – as opposed to an 
act of simply asserting – changes the object of the act in some way that is 
analogous to the change caused in, say, a copper pipe when it is bent. However, 
this is a crude analogy. A bent pipe is intrinsically different from a straight one – 
they possess different properties – and the acts of bending or straightening bring 
about the respective differences in a sense that I am denying to acts of asserting or 
inferring, etc. with respect to their objects. That is not to deny that something 
changes or emerges when a proposition is given as a reason or drawn as a 
conclusion – i.e. when an argument is advanced. But the independence of the 
object from any or all of these acts is not incompatible with this broader idea of 
change. 
 
One way to mark the distinction is to invoke the concept of Cambridge change, a 
term used by Geach (1969: 71–2) for a definition of change under which a thing 
changes if it has a certain property at one time, but not at another.29 Geach 
challenged the definition for being too generous, in including not only changes to 
intrinsic properties of an object – such as a person growing older or taller – but also 
to external, relational properties, such as a wife’s becoming a widow, or an item 
changing in price. The latter he called ‘mere’ Cambridge change, implying that an 
object undergoes genuine change only when it has an intrinsic property at one time 
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31 
 
 
 
but not at another (Weberman 1999: 139–40). Cleland (1990: 279) contrasts the 
merely relational change in a mother who is outgrown by her daughter (to become 
the shortest member of her family) with the ‘real’ change in the daughter by 
becoming taller herself. The qualifying use of ‘mere’ is important because there is 
clearly relational change in both instances, but in the daughter there is a discernible 
intrinsic change also. It is tempting to dismiss mere relational change as bogus 
change.30 That, however, is not the contention here. It seems clear that when a 
proposition is employed as a premise or drawn as a conclusion there is a change in 
one or more of its properties, albeit external to its properties as a bare proposition. 
For a start, it is now perceived as being part of an argument. But that is not to say 
that either the proposition, or the argument of which the proposition is a part, is 
thereby produced, or changed internally, by being so contextualised.  
 
So the question of whether it follows from the tide’s being out that the island can 
be reached can be asked and answered intelligibly without its having to be 
established that anyone has given the first as a reason or drawn the second as a 
conclusion. From the vantage point of the critic, the question is about claims, and 
the relation between them, in the wholly object-sense of what is claimed. In the 
case of a single claim or assertion, what is claimed or asserted is the same object as 
that which is evaluated as true or false. In the case of an argument the situation is 
obviously more complex, but it can be understood in a similar way. What is 
claimed, in an act of argument, is a relation between the components of the 
argument. In an act of evaluation that claim is judged true or false – true if the 
relation holds and false otherwise – and the argument is judged valid or non-valid 
accordingly. In short, the act of argument – i.e. propounding – and the act of 
evaluation have the same object. Because the object is evaluable whether or not it 
is the object of any actual practice or performance, we can derive a wholly object-
sense for ‘argument’. Talk of arguments as the ‘products of acts’, which is a hybrid 
concept, tends to compound rather than resolve the ambiguity. Of course it is the 
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 Weberman (1999: 140 and footnote) suggests that Geach’s (1969) examples (if not his explicit 
comments on the Cambridge definition) imply this view.   
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familiarity we have with the acts of arguing, and with texts expressing arguments, 
that informs our concept of argument. It is inconceivable that we could have the 
concept of an argument without the experience of performing and responding to 
argument-acts. But the object of an act of argument – what is propounded – is no 
more dependent for its validity or invalidity on its being the object of an act of 
propounding than an individual proposition is dependent for its truth or falsity on 
being the object of an act of asserting.   
 
6. Argument and assertion  
We arrive now at one of the central issues for the thesis: how do acts of argument 
relate to their objects? This question has already made an appearance in 
connection with Sainsbury’s distinction between the objects logicians assess for 
validity, and those which are expressed ‘in ordinary circumstances’. Since ‘ordinary 
circumstances’ are those in which an argument is actively put forward by an arguer, 
it can be assumed that the argument purports to be sound; that is, its premises are 
purported to be true, and the inference to the conclusion is purported to be valid. 
Asserting one or more claims as reasons for another claim commits the proponent 
to the truth of what is asserted, so that if he knowingly asserts something false as 
grounds for a conclusion, then obviously he is guilty of lying. But likewise if he 
knowingly gives as reasons claims that do not warrant the inference to the 
conclusion, he is also doing something rather like lying, even if the propositions 
themselves are true. 31   
 
The reasons for the twinning of assertion and argument in the title of the thesis 
should now be fairly obvious. Acts of argument, like acts of assertion, have objects: 
premises, conclusions, whole arguments, which are standardly expressed by means 
of declarative sentences, or compounds of them. Moreover the same commitment 
to truth applies to the component acts of argument as it does to claims and 
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 Lying, it should be noted, is a complex notion, involving more than the truth or falsity of an 
asserted proposition. Lying is a special case of asserting, and of the act-object relation vis-à-vis 
assertion. However, its special features do not affect the present point, and are outside the scope of 
this thesis.   
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assertions in general. Acts of argument are not so much like assertion as a species 
of assertion, as many commentators have observed. John Searle classifies deducing 
and concluding as assertives, differing from plainly asserting or stating by ‘the 
added feature that they mark certain relations between the assertive illocutionary 
act and the rest of the discourse or the context of utterance’ (Searle 1979: 13). 
Obviously, it is premises (reasons), given in the discourse, to which concluding and 
deducing mark a relation. It would seem to follow that an act of premising would 
conversely mark a relation to a conclusion or deduction, but Searle does not add 
this. Indeed he does not make reference to a specific speech-act of premising (or 
reason-giving) at all, possibly because the circularity of a mutual relation would 
undermine his classification of concluding. He may consider concluding to define 
premising (and premises), but not vice versa. On that presumption, the stating of a 
reason or premise would then be a plain assertive, and the special act of deducing 
or concluding would mark what was previously asserted as a premise.  
 
Hitchcock (2007), with reference to Searle’s taxonomy, also classifies the act of 
reason-giving as an assertive, and he expressly singles out reason-giving as the 
defining feature of argument (in all but the purely disputational sense):  
A simple argument is a sequence of three objects: a speech act c of any type 
concerning some proposition, an illative such as the word ‘since’ (in its inferential 
sense), and a set P of one or more assertives. (Hitchcock 2007: 107) 
It is interesting to note that Hitchcock appears to depart from Searle’s classification 
by not requiring concluding to be assertive, though it ‘concerns’ propositions. In 
one respect this is evidenced by the various non-standard ways in which we 
express arguments. An illative need not be succeeded invariably by a declarative 
sentence – for example: ‘The tide’s turned, so should we leave the island?’ But it is 
reasonable to suppose that however the conclusion of an argument is expressed, it 
could always be converted into a declarative sentence. Besides, Hitchcock’s real 
point is that, whilst inferences can take a variety of forms of expression, reason-
giving cannot: it is essentially assertive.  
 
34 
 
 
 
Brandom (1983) also sees an essential connection between the acts of asserting 
and concluding. Developing a point that he takes from the early writings of Frege,32 
he proposes that the key to a correct understanding of assertion lies in its relation 
to inference: 
That is, asserting is issuing an inference license. Since inferring is drawing a 
conclusion, such an inference license amounts to a warrant for further assertions, 
specifically assertions of those sentences which can appropriately be inferred from 
the sentence originally asserted. (Brandom 1983: 639) 
Hence, although the two philosophers would agree that the act of warranting a 
conclusion is characteristically assertive, they come to the view from different 
directions, and for different purposes, Hitchcock’s being to classify reason-giving 
Brandom’s to explain assertion. It might seem a step too far to say that warranting 
conclusions is the whole point and purpose of assertion. There are other ways to 
explain why we assert things, one of the most obvious being to convey information. 
Brandom observes this himself, though not in order to detract from his main 
contention. For the point and purpose of communicating information is no less in 
need of explaining than is assertion itself. The value of an item of information is in 
what we do with it, which can generally be understood in terms of what we infer 
from it, or how we act on it, which is a mark of what we infer from it. For present 
purposes all we need take from Brandom’s proposal is that warranting conclusions 
is a significant function of assertion, consistent with the commitment to truth that 
is associated with assertion. But it is certainly plausible that the strength of the 
commitment is at least partly explained by the role assertion plays in warranting 
inferences. We say that assertions are supposed, expected, meant, etc. to be true, 
placing the onus on the author of an assertion to be mindful of the truth. We also 
say that, from the point of view of the audience, assertions are generally trusted or 
counted on to be true. We say likewise that the premises of an argument, being 
assertions, are supposed to be true, and that the conclusion is supposed to follow 
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 ‘(W)hen the younger Frege glosses asserting as putting a sentence forward as true, the phrase has 
the sense of “putting the sentence forward as one from which it is appropriate to make inferences”.’ 
Brandom (1983: 639, citing various passages from Frege’s first logic published posthumously in 
Hermes (1979).  
35 
 
 
 
from them. Shand (2000: 20), in a definition with echoes of Copi’s, writes: ‘An 
argument is a set of propositions where one of the set (the conclusion), is supposed 
to follow from the others (the premises)’. Here ‘supposed’ takes the place of Copi’s 
‘claimed’, but the two words are not (or not necessarily) interchangeable. It is true 
that ‘C’ can be supposed to follow from ‘P’ in the sense of someone’s actually 
supposing it to do so. That, however, is not the only interpretation, nor the most 
natural one in the context. For ‘supposed’ also has the sense there of ‘ought’. If 
someone were to respond to an argument by saying: ‘A conclusion is supposed to 
follow from its premises’, it could have the implicature that the argument was 
defective. The notion of an argument as a complex in which a certain relation is 
supposed to obtain gives the impression of something inherently open to criticism; 
but no more so than one in which the same relation is claimed to hold. Whilst the 
two terms have different meanings, being supposed to  is implied by being 
claimed to , (though not the converse) given that in general a claim is supposed to 
be true.  
 
The view that acts of argument are essentially assertive is, I think, safe from 
objection. Premises are claimed, and therefore supposed to be true; conclusions 
are claimed – and therefore supposed – to follow from premises. It is true that 
some argument is more tentative than other argument but assertive force varies 
without ceasing to be assertive.33 Besides, if both claims are true, as claims are 
supposed to be, then the object-argument is sound, whatever level of assertive 
force or commitment the author happens to put behind them. The soundness of an 
argument is independent of any act of argument whose object it might be. The 
premises are true or false, and the inference valid or invalid, regardless of the 
delivery. To that extent, the argument is an object through and through, and from 
the logician’s point of view the act of argument is largely an irrelevance. However, 
there is one question that is not answered by reflecting on the object-sense of 
argument alone, and that is why it matters whether an argument is valid or invalid 
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 See Searle (1979: 412-13): ‘The degree of belief of commitment may approach or even reach zero, 
but it is clear [...] that hypothesizing that p and flatly stating that p are in the same line of business 
in a way that neither is like requesting.’ 
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– or indeed sound or unsound. It matters for the same reason that it matters 
whether an assertion is true or false, or to be more precise whether what is 
asserted, when an assertion is made, is true or false. It matters in both cases 
because if there is not a presumption that authors mean their assertions to be true 
and their arguments to be sound, rational discourse would founder.  
 
The parallels between assertion and argument are striking. Just as Brandom takes 
inference to provide an explanatory framework for asserting, I take assertion, in 
return, to throw light on argument, in particular on the relation between acts of 
argument and their objects. Evaluation, as we have seen, gives us a clear view of 
the argument-object. Assertion – it will be argued – provides insight on the act. I 
return to assertion itself in Chapter 5. Most importantly I consider the intersection 
of the two perspectives in Chapter 6.  
 
7. Propositions:  an endnote to the chapter 
At the outset of the chapter it was noted that the gist of the standard definition is 
not significantly altered by replacing ‘proposition’ with ‘sentence’, or with the 
neutral ‘claim’. The proposition is what is claimed or asserted; the sentence the 
means by which it is expressed. In this case what are claimed or asserted or 
expressed in sentences are just the elements of an argument, a premise or the 
conclusion. This is not to say that the differences between propositions, claims, and 
sentences are unimportant philosophically; only that the standard definition of an 
argument makes broadly the same point whichever of these terms it employs. The 
general point is that an argument is a set of elements, one of which, putatively, 
follows from the others. In line with Copi, I have referred to these elements as 
‘propositions’. However, Copi could as well have referred to the constituents of an 
argument as sentences. In some parts of his (1992), he clearly refers to sentences 
as propositions, for example when numbering the premises and conclusion in the 
text of a complex argument. At one point he quotes a passage beginning, 
‘Petersburg, too, was occupied by Federal troops’, which he uses to exemplify texts 
containing no argument. Copi’s explanation is as follows: ‘Here every proposition 
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contained in the paragraph is asserted, but no claim is made, either explicitly or 
implicitly, that any of them provides grounds or evidence for any other (Copi 1992: 
31). First, the contents of a paragraph are not propositions. ‘Petersburg, too, was 
occupied...’ is a sentence and so are those that follow in the passage that Copi 
quotes. Second, what is asserted – if it is asserted – is correctly identified as a 
proposition. It would strictly be imprecise to say that the sentence was asserted, 
though it often is said with the meaning that a sentence was uttered assertively, 
including being written down as an assertion. What is asserted is that Petersburg 
was occupied, which is not the written sentence. Third, neither propositions nor 
sentences make claims or assertions. Authors do these things by performing acts. 
Here and elsewhere in the book Copi allows this blurring of the distinction, 
intentionally or otherwise.  
 
Without constant, laborious qualification, it is difficult to maintain these 
distinctions with precision and consistency. My aim is to be as consistent as 
possible along the following lines: I take sentences to be the objects of utterances, 
inscriptions, etc. and propositions to be the objects of assertions, beliefs, etc., both 
on the basis of a proposition being understood as the meaning of a declarative 
sentence. Propositions have not always been distinguished from sentences in this 
way, nor is that definition universally accepted,34 but it has become quite usual in 
recent analytical philosophy.35 It would be odd to say we assert meanings, but it is 
perfectly cogent to say that we assert what sentences mean, for which I employ 
‘proposition’. We need, too, a term for the single meaning of what two people 
might both assert using different sentences, or the same sentences at different 
times. Token utterances of the same sentence might be said to have the meaning 
of the type sentence that the utterances have in common. But, as Gaskin (2008: 9) 
observes, ‘if distinct token sentences can mean the same, we cannot, on pain of 
breaching the logic of identity allow meanings to be token sentences’. Clearly two 
token sentences can have the same meaning: If I say ‘The tide is out’, and you say 
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 See e.g. Alston (1996: 17).  
35
 See Gaskin (2008: 8).  
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‘It’s low tide’ with the same thought in mind, then there is something that we are 
both asserting.  
 
As for ontological status, of meanings or of propositions, that question is not a 
central issue for this thesis. ‘There is a proposition that X asserted and Y denied’, or 
‘There are propositions that no one has affirmed or denied’ need not mean these 
things exist in any heavy sense. The way in which objects of certain acts are 
identified with propositions in this thesis may have realist overtones. However, a 
thoroughgoing realist conception of the objects in question is not a sine qua non for 
the argument as a whole. Premises and conclusions are objects of acts of 
argument, namely the giving (asserting) of premises and drawing of conclusions, 
and as such I refer to them as propositions. When it comes to interpreting 
arguments, however, it is sentences that we extract from texts and identify as 
premises or conclusions. Thus, inevitably, there will be some overlap in referring to 
the objects people assert and the objects others apprehend.  
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CHAPTER TWO:  Real argument and critical thinking  
 
A shadow fronted him tempestuously. 
“You shut up, you fat slug!” 
 There was a moment’s struggle and the glimmering conch jigged up and down.  
Ralph leapt to his feet. “Jack! Jack! You haven’t got the conch! Let him speak.”  
Jack’s face swam near him. “And you shut up! Who are you, anyway? Sitting 
there telling people what to do. You can’t hunt, you can’t sing—”  
“I’m chief. I was chosen.”  
“Why should choosing make any difference? Just giving orders that don’t make 
any sense—”  
“Piggy’s got the conch.” 
“That’s right—favour Piggy as you always do—”  
“Jack!”  
Jack’s voice sounded in bitter mimicry. “Jack! Jack!”  
“The rules!” shouted Ralph. “You’re breaking the rules!”  
“Who cares?” 
Ralph summoned his wits. “Because the rules are the only thing we’ve got!”  
But Jack was shouting against him. “Bollocks to the rules! We’re strong—we 
hunt! If there’s a beast, we’ll hunt it down! We’ll close in and beat and beat and 
beat—!”     
William Golding: Lord of the Flies 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Identifying argument 
The main skills taught and assessed under the heading of ‘critical thinking’ are 
analysis and evaluation of natural-language reasoning found in various sources.  
Our objective is to describe a systematic method for extracting an argument from its 
written context and for evaluating it. (Fisher 1988b: 128) 
The method which we describe applies to reasoning, or argument, as it actually 
occurs in natural language […]. We begin by describing how to recognise contexts in 
which reasoning is taking place [...]. We then describe how to uncover and display 
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the structure […]. Finally we explain how, as far as possible, to decide whether the 
reasoning is correct or not. (Fisher 1988b: 15)  
‘Reasoning’ in this context is not to be understood as synonymous with ‘argument’. 
We naturally and rightly think of reasoning as a larger domain than argument and 
as being more diverse, including, for example, explaining, problem-solving, and 
decision-making.36 These merge with argument, but range beyond it as well. 
Appearances to the contrary, Fisher is not saying here that we can identify an 
argument simply by recognising reasoning. The reasoning to be identified is the 
reasoning in the argument and we cannot recognise one without recognising the 
other. 
 
How do we recognise an argument? How, in other words, do we differentiate 
between sets of sentences or propositions that are, and others that are not, 
arguments? This question would naturally seem to be prior to any critical question, 
since we cannot analyse an argument, still less say whether the reasoning it 
embodies is good or correct, if we cannot first be sure that the object qualifies as 
an argument. (In general it cannot be said of any x, that x is a good F, if x is not an 
F.) Intuitively the logical procedure is: 1) identify, 2) analyse, 3) appraise. But when 
it comes to applying this procedure to natural-discourse contexts, it proves to be 
more easily said than done – and possibly the wrong procedure anyway (Ennis 
2001; Hamblin 1970). In this chapter we consider why this is so, and examine some 
of the implications this has for the methodology of CT.      
 
For formal logic, as already observed, there is no such issue. The central concept in 
logic is the consequence relation, and the question for the logician is whether or 
not that relation holds between one or more sentences, propositions, or claims,  
and another. According to Read (1995: 35): 
The aim of logic is to clarify what follows from what, to determine which are the 
valid consequences of a given set of premisses or assumptions. The consequence 
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 See Finocchiaro (2005: 22). 
41 
 
 
 
relation relates a set or collection of given propositions to those propositions or 
conclusions which correctly, or validly, follow from them. We can say that the 
premisses entail the conclusion; or that the conclusion validly follows from them; or 
that one may correctly infer the conclusion from the premisses.  
Prior to investigating whether the relation obtains or not, there is no need to make 
any differentiation between sentences which express premises and sentences 
which express a conclusion, because ultimately any sentence can wear either of 
these designations under evaluation. The evaluation casts them in these roles. As 
Read says in the extract, the premises are ‘given’ or they are ‘assumptions’. But 
here these words do not have the natural, active meaning of being given as 
reasons, or assumed to support the conclusion. The words can have those senses 
when arguments are considered as acts of argument, or transcripts of arguments, 
with actual or envisaged proponents, but as objects of evaluation – ‘given’ just has 
the meaning of ‘any’, and ‘assumption’ of anything that might be thought, whether 
or not it has any merit as a reason. Either way, there is no need to ask whether a 
given sentence or assumption is rightfully a premise in order to proceed with a 
further question of whether the set of which it is a member entails the given 
conclusion. In the mere asking what does (or does not) follow from a set of 
sentences, those sentences are assumed to be premises.37 Moreover, the question, 
‘what follows logically from what?’ is a question of argument form, not of content. 
Any simple sentence can be substituted for any other without affecting the validity 
of a complex whose form is valid. Therefore trivially any proposition will do as well 
as any other in an argument whose validity has yet to be assessed. Cutting to the 
chase, it could just be said that any set of sentences can be evaluated as an 
argument, and that is effectively where this discussion has been leading. It will be 
of importance, too, in Chapter 6.  
 
In acts of argument, however, and hence in arguments encountered in natural 
discourse, premises are not ‘given’ in the above neutral sense, nor are they 
‘assumptions’ just for the purposes of evaluation. They are actually given, i.e. 
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  Premises are sometime referred to as ‘assumptions’ across the board. See, e.g., Lemmon (1965).  
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claimed as reasons, and particular conclusions are actually claimed to follow from 
them. These claims are reflected in the standard form of expression that arguments 
take in English. It might seem a reasonable expectation therefore that we can 
distinguish arguments from non-arguments by the presence or absence of a 
consequence relation. However, since a given set of premises and conclusion need 
not be valid – that is, in a given collection of propositions there may be no 
consequence relation – we are back to the problem of identifying bad arguments, 
and to the need for a definition which recognises that the arguments are merely 
claims to consequence which may not be true. In a bad argument the claim is false, 
but it is still an argument. As noted in Chapter 1, this ‘claim’ is implicit in the 
standard wording of an argument, and marked by one of a range of markers such 
as ‘so’, ‘therefore’, ‘because’ or ‘since’.38 Can we not simply rely on these surface 
forms and features to indicate when reasoning or inference is taking place, and 
accordingly identify the argument whose reasoning it is? Finocchiaro (2005: 26) 
considers this a feasible starting point. 
The essential feature of all reasoning is the interrelating of individual thoughts in 
such a way that some follow from others, and that the normal linguistic expression 
of such interrelated thinking involves the use of particles like ‘because’, ‘therefore’, 
etc. However minimal this conception is, it allows the theory of reasoning to get 
started by suggesting that we try to understand and to evaluate those discourses 
having a high incidence of these logical particles. 
But any list of sentences or claims whatever may be designated an argument for 
the purpose of assessing whether or not a consequence relation holds, logical or 
otherwise. Symbolically, all it takes is a punctuation mark to indicate inference, 
and/or to separate a conclusion from its premises if, by stipulation or convention, 
the mark indicates what ‘therefore’, ‘so’, or ‘since’ mean in ordinary language. But, 
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 Normally, ‘therefore’, ‘so’, etc. are classed as adverbs, ‘because’ and ‘since’ as conjunctions. This 
just shows that inference can be indicated in natural language by more than one grammatical 
construction, one in which the reasons are prefixed, the other the conclusion.  Because the usual 
convention for formalising natural-language (NL) argument is to list the conclusion after or below 
the premise(s), the ‘so’ form tends to be the standard one – although it is worth noting that 
Hitchcock (2007: 107) apparently takes the view that ‘since’ is the more perspicuous. I, on the other 
hand, take the view that the standard form of NL argument is conjunctive  – P and so-C. 
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conversely, all it takes to indicate argument in a random set of sentences is to 
replace a punctuation mark with a conventional inference indicator. A lot of bad 
arguments can be composed in that way. They have the surface form of natural 
arguments, but are no more natural for that than the ‘made up example’ to which 
Fisher refers as the antithesis of his concept of ‘real’ argument (of which more 
shortly).      
 
Besides, not all uses of ‘therefore’, ‘so’, or ‘since’ have an illative sense. In many 
cases these words are found in the context of explanation which, although it is a 
form of reasoning, differs in kind from the reasoning in an argument. Take: ‘She 
was bored, so she left’, or ‘So did I’, or the line from the rock-song: ‘Since you’ve 
been gone, I can breathe for the first time.’ In the first of these the subject’s alleged 
boredom would explain why she left, but is no sort of warrant for concluding that 
she left. Nor is ‘so’ an illative in the second case, where it has the meaning of ‘also’ 
or ‘likewise’. The role of ‘since’ in the song is again neither explanatory nor illative, 
but relates to a lapse of time. It is not the connectives here that give meaning to 
the sentences, but the meaning of the sentences that determines the specific sense 
of the connectives. It would not be a relevant objection that the temporal ‘since’ 
and the causal or illative ‘since’ are different words – as are seitdem and da in 
German – and their sameness in English is merely an orthographic coincidence. The 
point here is that the words fail as indicators because they can indicate different 
things. ‘So’, ‘since’ etc. are recognisable as argument indicators only in an 
argument.  
 
Many expressed arguments have no explicit inference indicator. Recall example (1) 
from the previous chapter: 
(1) It’s dark, and so it’s dangerous to be out.  
The intended force of this would be retained if uttered as   
(1′) It’s dark; it’s dangerous to be out. 
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But without knowing its history or context it now becomes a matter of speculative 
interpretation whether the author was indeed arguing from the first sentence to 
the second. It would be bizarre to interpret it as the reverse, though not because of 
the order of the sentences. In general the order of sentences in a natural-language 
argument does not reliably indicate the logical order. (1’) could be rewritten 
(1′′) It’s dangerous to be out; it’s dark 
without being a different argument (if it is argument). But as far as linguistic form is 
concerned there are no cues by which to settle whether (1′) means the same as (1), 
or something else – say, a pair of unrelated claims. Alternatively the two sentences 
might themselves be understood as premises to an implicit warning not to go out.  
(2) It’s dark. It’s dangerous to be out. [So stay in.]  
9. Interpretation 
Theoretically speaking it can be asked of any list of sentences whether one of them 
is, or is not, a consequence of the others. Partitioning the list into premises and 
conclusion designates the list as an argument, and renders it apt for appraisal. We 
might say that it sets the complex up as a suitable object for appraisal as an 
argument. But that conception of an argument is both counter-intuitive and 
unrewarding for anyone who is looking for some difference between strings of 
sentences which can, and strings which cannot, be recognised as arguments ahead 
of being subjected to evaluation. Under the standard definition there is no such 
distinction. Any string can count as an argument, so long as it consists of 
declarative sentences, or expressions which can be recast as declarative.39 Any 
sentence can be claimed to follow from another or others. Logic could not get 
started if it were incumbent upon logicians to first sort sets of sentences into those 
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  Hitchcock (2007: 107) goes further that this and characterises a conclusion as any expression 
‘concerning’ a proposition. This is too vague and inclusive in my view. Clearly there are arguments 
that have rhetorical questions as conclusion. Some have commands: ‘She’s armed and dangerous so 
what are you waiting for: shoot her!’ If you ask what the speaker is inferring (from the premises) it is 
that the addressee should shoot without delay. In this respect the non-indicative sentences 
‘concern’ propositions by giving expression to them. But Hitchcock means it to be much more 
accommodating, stretching as far as attitudes, feelings, etc.  
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whose conclusions exhibited some actual purport or propensity to follow from 
their premises, whatever the signs of that might be. Besides, the question could not 
even be put without first identifying a conclusion; yet, by the standard definition, a 
conclusion is just a sentence that is claimed to follow from others. The circularity in 
that would nullify the distinction at the boundary between bad arguments and non-
arguments – indeed, between arguments and non-arguments full stop. The only 
hard line that can be drawn is between valid arguments and all other sets of 
declarative sentences, randomly selected or arbitrarily assembled. Yet, that said, 
language speakers have apparent confidence in their ability to identify reasoning 
and inference intuitively in natural discourse. Some combinations of sentences are 
seemingly recognisable as arguments; that is, some sentences in a given text are 
recognisable as reasons, others as conclusions.  
 
But what does it mean for a sentence (or its meaning) to be a reason, or to be a 
conclusion? Neither a reason nor a conclusion is a kind of sentence, except insofar 
as it is a declarative. In practice the identifying of some claims as reasons and 
others as conclusions seems to come down to a question of how ‘good’ an 
argument formed from those claims would be, if propounded. But there are clear 
problems with that qualitative yardstick. Not all collections of sentences, with one 
designated as the conclusion, are valid. That is obvious. But nor are some more 
valid than others – validity does not admit of degrees. Example (1), which was 
considered just now is certainly not valid. It does not have a valid form.40 It is no 
more valid than, say: 
(3) It’s dark; it’s Friday. 
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 It should be added that nor is (3) is any more invalid than (1). ‘Invalid’ is an apt evaluation for any 
argument that is not formally valid, but not for an expression that is not a valid argument just 
because it is not an argument. If we translate (3) into a sequent of standard propositional logic we 
get ‘P;Q’ (vel sim.), which is indeed formally invalid because it contains no logical operators and the 
premise is not the same as the conclusion. But it is the translation of (3), qua argument, that is 
invalid. Informally speaking, ‘invalid’ may be used of an argument that has a surface form that 
resembles a valid form, but is not valid. A fallacy, therefore, is a fallacious argument, (Hamblin 1970: 
224).This point becomes relevant to the discussion of the next example, (4). 
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Yet it seems safe to say that a typical audience would rate (1) as a ‘better’ 
contender for argument status than (3), possibly to the point of denying that (3) is 
an argument at all. Asked why (3) might not qualify as an argument, the obvious 
answer is that, as an argument, it would be a non-sequitur: it doesn’t follow from 
its being dark that it’s Friday. But if that measure is applied literally, (1) is also a 
non-sequitur, since the second sentence does not follow necessarily or invariably 
(or even typically) from the first, any more than it does in (3). Of course, the term 
‘non-sequitur’, used in a non-formal sense, need not mean a failure of logical 
consequence, but something more akin to lack of relevance or connectedness 
between the reason(s) and the conclusion. There is a fairly obvious connection in 
(1) between the first and second sentence, but in (3) there is none, or if there is it is 
obscure. Yet if we think of (1) and (3) as actual utterances, there would be no 
difficulty in thinking up possible scenarios under which its being dark could be a 
reason to infer that it was a Friday – a history of power-cuts on Friday nights, for 
example. What generally inclines us to see (1) as a better argument than (3) – and 
therefore as worthier of being accorded argument-status – is the greater normality 
of associating darkness with danger than with the day of the week. It is a fact that 
there are places in the world where the streets are more dangerous by night than 
by day; but there are few, if any, where it’s only dark on Fridays. Accordingly, a 
person chosen at random to consider both examples would be more likely to be 
persuaded that it was dangerous to be out than to be persuaded, on the same 
grounds, that it was Friday. By the same token, he or she would be more likely to 
deny that (3) was an argument than to deny that (1ˊ) was.   
 
What this suggests is that people naturally tend to recognise arguments more 
readily when they can interpret them as good arguments; and less readily, or not at 
all, if the arguments appear to be weak ones. A pair of sentences in succession, 
without any explicit connective, will tend to come across as an argument if either 
claim seems like a good reason to accede to the truth of the other; if not, then 
some other explanation is likely to be sought for their juxtaposition. If someone 
were to say: 
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(4) This tree is dying. The leaves are yellow.  
this could be taken as a pair of unrelated assertions. But assuming there were no 
contra-indications or special context, this would be an unlikely way for a typical 
audience of competent English speakers to take it.41 The most plausible 
interpretation would be that the second sentence was a reason for the first.42 This 
has nothing to do with logical form. (4) like (1) and (3) is neither valid nor strictly 
speaking invalid. Nor does it have to do with surface form: there is no inference-
indicator term; and the sentences follow in no conventional order indicative of 
argument. (The usual convention is for the conclusion to follow the premises, but 
(4) would commend itself as an argument no more nor less if the order were 
reversed.) Nor finally can the matter be settled on the basis of author-intention 
since the author is purely notional. All that can reliably be called upon is the normal 
expectation that when two or more claims are made in sequence there will be 
some relation between them. That is the norm; unrelated utterances are not the 
norm, and are puzzling to audiences when no obvious rationale can be seen for 
their juxtaposition. Even a lone assertion, made out of the blue, can leave its 
audience puzzled as to why it has been made at all. The natural response is: ‘So?’ – 
a word which ordinarily (without the question-mark) presages some conclusion.  
 
It is relevant, too, that conversational language has a range of expressions which, as 
it were, explain or excuse bare assertions. The speaker might say ‘apropos of 
nothing…’ to fend off the normal expectation that an assertion is apropos of 
something. What is significant is that there is a felt need to explain lone assertions. 
We look to adjacent assertions to provide the explanation, one being that one of 
the assertions is a reason for, or inference from, the other. If Brandom (1983: 639) 
is right about the primary function of asserting, then inference is arguably the most 
                                                     
41
  Such a special context would obtain if, for example, the speaker were to preface his remarks as 
follows: ‘Here are two facts: The tree is dying. The leaves are yellow.’  
42
 A marginally less appealing interpretation would be that the first was a reason for the second, 
making (4) an explanation rather than an argument.  Argument and explanation are very close in 
form and without explicit connectives a complex expression can be ambiguous between the two 
interpretations: ‘The tree is dying so the leaves are yellow’; or ‘The leaves are yellow so the tree is 
dying’. This is taken up in Chapter 5.       
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natural explanation. It would be why, conversely, natural-language arguments can 
be so freely expressed without explicit connectives. If an inferential relation 
between the propositions can be seen, and is the most natural assumption to make 
about their immediate proximity, there is no need for the author to make the 
relation explicit: audiences will do it for themselves. These empirical observations 
about linguistic behaviour lend some support to Brandom’s contention that 
asserting is characteristically a warrant for inference, since if that is so it would 
explain the linguistic behaviour.   
 
None of this, however, establishes that (4) is an argument. It is just a pair of 
sentences. All that is established is that where people see the makings of a good 
argument, with or without explicit linguistic indicators, there is an apparently 
natural instinct to recognise it as an argument. By the same token we tend to look 
for alternative interpretations for sets of sentences which can be construed only as 
bad arguments. Why? For an answer to that we should look to the principle of 
charity. The next section examines that principle and its implications. 
 
10. The principle of charity (1) 
In his Arguments about Arguments, Finocchiaro (2005: 92) separates critical 
thinking into two distinct tasks: ‘the reasoned interpretation ... and the reasoned 
evaluation of arguments’. This division seems perfectly reasonable. First we say 
what the argument is; second how good it is, giving justifications for both 
judgements. But even very simple examples can have more than one possible 
interpretation, some under which they are judged to succeed, others to fail. In such 
circumstances, the evaluation will go hand in hand with the way the text is 
construed. Take the following example: 
(5) These banknotes are forgeries. They all have the same serial number.  
Why should we interpret this in one way rather than another? In the textbooks the 
procedure appears deceptively straightforward: specimen (5) is presumed to be an 
argument consisting of two claims, the first being the conclusion and the second 
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the premise. It appears to be a good argument since it is a well known fact that 
genuine banknotes all have different numbers. But as the text stands, the first claim 
does not follow from the second – at least not deductively – because the crucial 
premise is omitted. (5) is an enthymeme.43 In critical thinking the standard 
procedure for interpreting an enthymeme is to add the missing premise, on the 
grounds that it is needed to ensure that the conclusion follows from the original 
premise(s). Then, since what is added is in this case true, (5) would be given a 
favourable rating on the following interpretation: 
(6) These banknotes have the same serial numbers. (Genuine banknotes 
all have different numbers.) So these banknotes are forgeries (not 
genuine). 
The practice described above is usually presented in critical-thinking literature as an 
application of the principle of charity.44 This principle, or maxim, is basically a 
constraint on interpretation, to be observed for example when we are not sure 
what some utterance means, or what is intended by it. The paradigm example, 
known as radical interpretation (Quine 1960; Davidson 2001), is translation from 
scratch from a wholly alien language into one’s own language. But the principle 
applies also to the domestic case, of interpretation within a shared language, as 
Quine and Davidson both agree. Without some constraint we could, in theory, 
construe the sentences or utterances we encounter in any way we chose or 
guessed at. The principle of charity limits our options to those which, in Davidson’s 
words, would ‘maximise (or optimise) agreement’ (2001: 27, 169). At the very least, 
our interpretation of others’ utterances should accord with our own standards of 
rational behaviour. It would obviously be uncharitable to interpret someone’s 
words in the least plausible way, when there was a perfectly plausible 
interpretation available: namely what the critic or interpreter would mean by the 
same utterance. It would be equally irrational to assume a person is always lying, or 
                                                     
43
 Technically and traditionally an enthymeme is an incomplete syllogism, but the notion has come 
to include incomplete arguments of other forms as well. Since (6) is a deductive form, (5) can 
properly be called an enthymeme in the technical as well as the more general sense.   
44
  See, e.g., Fisher (1988b), Bowell & Kemp (2002) and Butterworth & Chislett (2009). 
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ignorant, or intentionally employing deficient logic. In the context of critical-
thinking methodology, applying the principle of charity is understood as a simple 
dictum that one should construe an argument in the best light possible; not assume 
that it is a fallacy and interpret it accordingly. Indeed, within a dialectical system, a 
debate for example, it is considered a disreputable form of rhetoric to interpret an 
opponent’s case uncharitably in order to assist refutation or counter-argument – a 
so-called ‘straw man’ (Warburton 2000: 126–7).  
 
In the case of (5) there is no difficulty in recognising the potential of the text to be 
interpreted as a good argument, suitably supplemented by a covering 
generalisation. By interpreting the text as an argument at all, we are tacitly 
assuming that the covering generalisation is somehow implicit in the text. But why 
should the interpretation be motivated in this way? The principle of charity, as an 
applied procedure in critical thinking, envisages an author who is broadly as 
knowledgeable and as rational as the interpreter. But in the case where all we have 
is the text, and the task is to respond to it critically, the ‘author’ is purely notional. 
As (5) stands the reader knows nothing of the provenance of the text, so that 
without any guiding principle one interpretation is theoretically as good as any 
other. Different contexts could be envisaged for (5) in which no argument was 
apparent. Imagine an expert pointing out various features of a set of banknotes 
which have already been identified as counterfeit. The fact is that (5), like (4), is 
ultimately no more than a pair of sentences. We can say, to be sure, that one of the 
sentences of (5), with a suitable covering assumption, follows validly from the 
other. But we have no grounds to presume that either one is claimed or supposed 
to follow from the other. Besides, even if it is presumed that (5) is an argument, its 
surface form, in the absence of a connective, gives no indication of the direction of 
the supposed reasoning. Before the logician engages with a set of sentences the 
conclusion and premises are designated, and there is no further interpretation to 
be made prior to evaluation. Nothing is designated in (5). In that respect the critic 
working on a natural language argument starts further back.  
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A familiar classroom technique for dealing with undifferentiated sets of sentences 
like (5) is to insert an inference indicator to assess whether or not the resulting 
complex makes sense. It is sometimes referred to as the ‘therefore test’ (Fisher, 
2001: 25–27), although any illative term can be employed to the same or similar 
effect. But the unreliability of the test is patently obvious. For a start, making sense 
grammatically, does not necessarily coincide with logical sense. It makes no better 
sense to say: 
(7) The numbers are the same so the notes are forgeries  
than to say: 
(8) The notes are forgeries so the numbers are the same. 
To urge that (7) is the right way to interpret (5),on the grounds that it is a better 
argument than (8) is to presume that (5) is an argument. Were the critic to 
presume instead that (5) was an explanation, (8) would be the more charitable 
interpretation. The upshot of all this is that if we first have to recognise and 
construe a text as a good argument, in order to identify it as an argument, the 
grounds for the identification are question begging.  
 
If the grounds are shaky for interpreting texts charitably as good arguments, they 
are even shakier for interpreting a text as an argument in such a way as to show 
that it is flawed. For then the principle of charity appears to conflict with itself. 
Consider the following:  
(9) Blackpool is not a city. It has no cathedral. 
Although both sentences are true, neither is a good reason for the other. Of course, 
the first sentence would follow from the second if having a cathedral were a 
necessary condition for being a city. But it is not. By following precisely the same 
interpretative procedure as was applied to (5), (9) can be interpreted as a valid 
argument. The difference is that the envisaged author of (9) would have to be 
judged either ignorant of an important relevant fact, or irrational in arguing on the 
basis of a known falsehood. Ennis (2001: 114) takes this up as follows: in a situation 
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where an assumption is required to validate a piece of reasoning, and the 
assumption would be a falsehood, ‘ascribing that same assumption could be useful 
as a way of exhibiting a probable defect in the argument, a defect that shows that 
we probably should not draw the given conclusion’. Here, as before, the 
interpretation is premised on appraisal – on what it would take for (9) to be valid – 
only in this instance the assumption-ascription (as Ennis calls it) exhibits the defect. 
Applying the principle of charity cuts both ways. It can be used to interpret (9) as an 
argument by filling in what is needed to construe (9) as an argument, but so doing 
exposes (9) as a bad argument. The remaining option is that (9) is not an argument: 
just a pair of supposed facts about Blackpool. That way neither sentence need be 
judged not to follow from the other; and since neither does follow from the other, 
this would be the charitable interpretation to give if it is assumed that (9) was an 
actual pronouncement.  
 
It is important to clarify that it does not make sense even to ask whether (9) is an 
argument, without importing the notion of an author, and/or context. If (9) is not at 
least conceived of as someone’s output, the application of charity does not get a 
grip. The question, as it is being addressed here to a pair of sentences encountered 
out of context, is at most a hypothetical question: How should the audience take 
the sentence if it had been uttered just as it is? The whole idea of the principle of 
charity is that it assists radical interpretation. It implies a starting point where there 
is doubt as to the meaning or purpose of the utterance. If I knew that the speaker 
in this case was propounding an argument I would not have to ask whether (9) was 
an argument, even if it was a ludicrous argument! I would move ahead to 
appraising it accordingly. The principle of charity is what we employ precisely when 
we don’t know what the speaker intends. In the case of (9) we don’t know whether 
there is a speaker. The question for me as interpreter is whether I would respond 
to (9) – if I heard it spoken or saw it written – in the way that people usually 
respond when they encounter an argument, i.e. by recognising the reasonableness 
of giving one of the sentences as a reason to believe the other. If so I can charitably 
entertain (9) as an argument, even if I then go on to judge the reason wanting. If 
not, I should not evaluate it as an argument, but look for some other 
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interpretation. The principle of charity does not require there to be an actual 
source or author – it assumes one and then discharges the assumption once the 
principle has been applied.  
 
Fisher (1988b: 17–18) makes it quite clear that this is ultimately what the principle 
of charity dictates: ‘If interpreting as reasoning a passage which is not obviously 
reasoning yields only bad arguments, assume it is not reasoning.’ Plainly, (9) is not 
‘obviously reasoning’, so Fisher’s application of charity should require that we treat 
(9) as a non-argument, rather than a defective argument. But which is more 
charitable? On the one hand (9) does not exhibit bad reasoning so much as a 
factual misconception. For if the assumption that the critic ascribes to the 
argument were true then the reasoning would be sound; and we must assume that 
the author – if there is one – is not inexplicably advancing an unsound argument. It 
would not be uncharitable, in the Davidsonian sense, to assume that the author 
had reasoned properly within the bounds of his or her beliefs.45 On the other hand, 
as Ennis rightly says (above), the falsity of the required assumption is a signal that 
‘we probably should not have drawn the conclusion’. In other words, on the 
principle of charity we should not construe (9) as an argument.  
 
Obviously this is wrong. To conclude that (5) is an argument and (9) is not, on the 
basis of the procedure described above, is a misapplication of the principle of 
charity. (5) is no more an argument than (9); it is just the better argument if both 
are interpreted as arguments. Moreover, to discriminate between (5) and (9) on 
that basis is self-defeating, for it limits those objects that we are at liberty to assess 
as arguments to those we can interpret as sound. That is not to say that (9) is an 
argument. The supposedly charitable rule that Fisher proposes does not settle the 
identification question either way. Instead what is shows is that the criteria for 
identifying arguments cannot be evaluative criteria. There is no obvious cut-off 
point below which a set of sentences cannot be accommodated by adding a 
                                                     
45
 Davidson (2001: 196): ‘The guiding policy is to (apply the PoC) as far as possible, subject to 
considerations of simplicity, hunches about the effects of social conditioning […] and knowledge of 
explicable error’.  
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covering premise, if at the same time the covering premise need not be true. The 
falsity of the covering premise, as Ennis rightly says, can tell the critic that the 
putative argument is unsound, but not that it is not an argument.  
 
11. The principle of charity (2) 
From the previous section it can be seen that the principle of charity has both a 
descriptive, and a prescriptive (normative) application. It is the latter application 
which predominates in critical thinking, where the principle comes over as a quasi-
ethical injunction to interpret a perceived argument in a way that one would find 
most persuasive oneself; to give it its best shot, so to speak. The account given by 
Bowell & Kemp (2002: 44–7) has this slant, at least in part. People, they say, are 
seldom completely illogical, but do not always express their reasoning as clearly as 
they might. We should not judge just what a person says so much as try to ‘bring to 
light’ what he or she is trying to say, their ‘genuine reasons’.  
If we do not attempt this, then we are not really doing the person justice; we are not 
being as receptive to his or her attempts at communication, as we would surely wish 
others to be to ours. (Bowell & Kemp 2002: 47) 
This is just the golden rule, by another name. Of course the word ‘charity’ invites 
this conception of the principle as something commendable but ultimately 
voluntary. But in the descriptive sense there is nothing voluntary about it. 
Charitable interpretation of the words of others, Davidson tells us, is ‘unavoidable’. 
It is ‘forced on us; whether we like it or not, if we want to understand others, we 
must count them right in most matters’ (Davidson 2001: 197).46  
 
Why must we count them right? Not because we must assume that people are in 
general truthful, rational, and informed. ‘Must’ has more the sense it has in Stanley 
Cavell’s ‘Must we mean what we say?’ (Cavell 1969: 1–43), to which the answer is 
Yes, and again whether we like it or not – it’s a logical ‘must’. The speaker can lie or 
be mistaken when asserting something, and the audience can be mistaken in taking 
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 See also Davidson (2001: 27). 
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it to be true when it happens to be false. But what neither can be mistaken about is 
that a declarative sentence, uttered assertively, has the purport to be true even if it 
is patently false. Indeed, an assertion could not be called a lie or a mistake if 
assertions were not supposed, or did not have the purport, to be true. The purport 
remains in force even in the extreme case of both parties knowing that what is 
being asserted is false. There is no choice about this: the speaker cannot make an 
assertion without the words having the purport to be true; and the audience 
cannot choose to understand the assertion as lacking that purport – though they 
can choose to disbelieve it or contradict it.  
 
That is one sense in which the principle of charity is descriptive and ‘unavoidable’. 
It is not Davidson’s point, though it must surely be a necessary condition for 
maximising agreement. Davidson’s is the stronger point, that in order to 
understand others, you have also to assume that most of their beliefs are true; if 
you did not assume that, you would have no way into interpreting their language. 
Nor would you have a way in if you did not assume that in their language an 
assertion committed the speaker to the truth of what is asserted. Both are 
descriptive because it is how things are in the language community to which we 
belong. In any particular case there is a potential for disagreement, or for mistakes. 
But the principle still holds, and must hold, across the board. As Malpas (1992: 150) 
points out, charity is much more than a heuristic device for translation. It is, he 
says, ‘a methodological presupposition of interpretation rather than a principle that 
will assist in resolving particular cases of interpretative difficulty’. The prescriptive 
application of the principle derives from the descriptive, not vice-versa. We are not 
naturally charitable in our reception of others’ speech because we ought to be. But 
given that we are naturally and necessarily charitable, we ought to heed the 
principle when we are in reflective or critical mode. To interpret what others say in 
ways that maximise agreement, we should start out from the assumption that what 
people say is what they hold to be true, and that what they hold to be true is what 
we would hold to be true under sufficiently similar conditions. In particular cases 
the presumption may lead (and does lead) to misinterpretation. But so long as 
these are anomalous cases, and not the norm, the maxim will hold good and 
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communication will flourish between speakers of the same language, and 
translation will be enabled. If disagreement were the norm and not the anomaly, 
communication would break down, or never get started. Due to the principle of 
charity, even radical translation is not quite ‘from scratch’.  
 
Competing interpretation 
We return now to the question which prompted this discussion at the end of §8: On 
what grounds do we, and should we, interpret some sequences of sentences as 
arguments and others not? The principle of charity provides a lead. Sequences of 
apparently unrelated sentences or assertions are puzzling, implying (to no great 
surprise) that we expect there to be some relation between successive assertions 
to account for their being asserted. We do not and should not assume that there is 
no relation, if we can see a plausible one; nor should we interpret a text as a weak 
argument if we can see a fair interpretation under which it is a stronger argument. 
There will be competing interpretations: different ways in which the propositions 
could be seen to be related. There are standard, conventional ways for speakers to 
clarify the relation they have in mind which can limit the number of plausible 
options, at best to just one. One way to leave no doubt is by uttering what Austin 
(1962) called an explicit performative. For example: 
(10) From the colour of these leaves I infer that the tree is dying. 
This is not an express argument, however; it is rather the expression of an attitude 
or intention, like saying ‘I believe that…’, or ‘I assert that’. The standard way to 
express an argument in English is very familiar. For instance: 
(11) The leaves on these trees go yellow if the tree is dying. The leaves on 
this tree are yellow, and so this tree is dying.  
Here there is no practical difficulty in interpreting the words as an argument. There 
are no obvious competing interpretations besides argument. The principle of 
charity enjoins us to assume (in the absence of any counter-indications) that the 
speaker is right about what his words commit him to, and in particular what his use 
57 
 
 
 
of ‘and so’ commits him to in the context: namely to the truth of his first two 
assertions, and to the existence of a consequence relation between them and the 
further claim. The question of whether or not it is an argument looks to be settled 
by its surface form. No reasoned interpretation is needed. The critic can get on with 
the evaluative question – is (11) a good argument? – with apparent confidence that 
the object of evaluation is an argument.  
 
Identifying bad arguments 
But even with this apparently clear-cut case, we have not solved the problem of 
identifying bad arguments. We, as critics, recognise (11) as an argument on the 
principle that its author is generally right about things, and has the same rational 
perception of what follows from what as we do. We recognise certain claims as 
reasons if they strike us as good reasons. If we think something is not a good 
reason for some ensuing claim (C) we should think twice about construing it as a 
reason for C. The trouble with (11) is that the notional author required for 
application of the principle of charity is committing a fallacy, as any logician or 
competent critic – including, it is hoped, anyone with a basic training in critical 
thinking – would recognise. Thus the principle of charity, at least in its prescriptive 
mode, sends conflicting messages. If the critic takes (11) at face value, as an 
argument, he should either conclude (uncharitably) that the author is not as 
rational as he is, or assume (charitably) that the author meant something else short 
of an argument, that did not entail his having argued so badly; or that he meant 
something more than his words literally mean; but that he just didn’t put it across 
properly.  
 
This last course would appear to be Bowell and Kemp’s application of charity. We 
assume that the author meant to say ‘only if’ rather than merely ‘if’. That would 
rescue the author from the charge of perpetrating a fallacy. (11) is reconstructed as 
(e.g.): 
(12) The leaves on these trees go yellow only if the tree is dying. The leaves 
on this tree are yellow and so this tree is dying.  
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‘The argument’ can now be passed as valid, and sound if both premises are true. 
But in what sense is this an evaluation of the argument in question, which was 
expressed by (11), and is now re-expressed as (12)? Despite differing only by 
addition of one word, (12) is not remotely the same argument, as shown 
conclusively by the fact that (12) is valid and (11) is not. But that is a difference 
identified by evaluation, not by prior interpretation. We are seeing again the 
entanglement of the two conceptions: object of evaluation versus object of 
interpretation. Moreover, the rescue package offered by interpreting (9) as (10) 
could misfire if, on inspection, it turns out that not all trees of the relevant species 
that develop yellow leaves die. So what the argument gains in validity from the 
application of charity, it might lose in soundness. 
 
Acknowledging this the critic might adopt the other available approach of 
weakening the conclusion: 
(13) The leaves on these trees go yellow if the tree is dying. These leaves 
are yellow and so this tree could be dying / is probably dying.  
But again this is a different argument. Not to labour the point further, the principle 
of charity is not a procedural rule for reconstructing putative arguments 
sympathetically, especially if we do so as a preparation for critical appraisal. 
Charitable interpretation requires us not to construe a fragment of discourse as a 
bad argument if there is a more rational explanation for its utterance. But it does 
not require us to construe the fragment as a good argument. We can, in the role of 
critic, correct it; but that is to evaluate it and identify what is defective in it. We 
would lose any coherent sense of evaluation – and of ‘it’ – if what we evaluate is 
the corrected text. We can correct for factual accuracy, or for clarity, or 
conciseness, or other presentational features. But if we correct the reasoning, we 
have another argument, as in (12) and (13) above. Bowell & Kemp (2002: 47) are 
well aware of this, and qualify their proposed methodology with the following: 
The principle of charity … has a certain limit, beyond which the nature of what we 
are doing changes somewhat. If our task is to reconstruct the argument actually 
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intended by the person, then we must not go beyond what, based on the evidence 
available to us, we may reasonably expect the reasoner to have in mind. Once we go 
beyond this point then we are no longer in the business of interpreting their 
argument. Instead we have become the arguer.  
To recap, we must look for the identifying marks of argument independently of the 
criteria which we would use for identifying good (or bad) argument, if the purpose 
is objective critical evaluation. The alternative, which the formal logician accepts in 
practice is to treat all sets of propositions as arguments indiscriminately; in other 
words of making no distinction between a mere set of propositions and what 
intuitively we think of as a real argument: someone’s actual argument. In critical 
thinking, however, and amongst most proponents of informal logic, the concept of 
real argument, for all its problems, is foundational.  
 
12. ‘Real’ argument  
In critical thinking, and for many informal logicians, ‘real argument’ is a term of art, 
hence the quotation marks around ‘real’. It has roughly the meaning of natural or 
actual argument, but also has a negative sense where the term itself can appear 
almost provocative or disparaging. Fisher’s The Logic of Real Arguments Fisher 
(1988b) catches both senses: 
Nearly all the arguments used in this book are arguments which have actually been 
used by someone with a view to convincing others about some matter. They are real 
arguments – not the ‘made up’ kind with which logicians usually deal. They originate 
from various sources... (Fisher 1988b: 15) 47  
Douglas Walton, Trudy Govier, and Ralph Johnson are among others who have 
made free with the term, not always critically. Johnson (2000: 121) claims that 
‘informal logic is the logic of real arguments’. But that is really a comment about 
the efficacy of informal logic in dealing critically with certain kinds of argument, 
broadly defined as natural-language arguments. Johnson’s claim cannot be taken as 
                                                     
47
 Walton (1990: 409) is more nakedly disparaging : ’Among those not corrupted by logic courses, 
however, the term “argument” has a broader meaning.’ 
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a definition, however, since even the most formal and artificial of arguments can be 
expressed in natural language. In the spirit of the concept the distinction is 
between arguments that have occurred naturally, for a purpose such as persuasion, 
and those that have no other purpose than to exemplify some argument form, or 
to help students learn logic.  
 
The purpose most commonly associated with ‘real’ argument, is persuasion.  
This cannot be a definition of an argument either, since there are many 
instruments of persuasion that are not arguments. Moreover there are (arguably) 
arguments which neither persuade nor exist to persuade. Persuasion may be a 
characteristic use of argument, but that is a different point and even then it is 
questionable whether persuasion is an exclusive use.48 Proofs and demonstrations, 
for example, are forms of argument whose conclusions need not be in doubt, and 
whose purpose therefore is not to persuade. It can be objected that these and 
other exceptions still exhibit something persuasion-like; that for something to be 
recognisable as an argument it would have to have some recognisable capacity to 
persuade? But that would be a confusion. Are we to take it that to qualify as ‘real’ 
an argument must actually have been put to use, for some persuasive or quasi-
persuasive purpose? Or is it sufficient that it has the appearance of an argument 
that could be put to such use; i.e. be ‘natural’ in its form of expression? It is clear 
that the answer is the former. If we are to give any strong sense to the notion of 
real argument it must apply first and foremost to the object of an actual act of 
argument – something put forward by an arguer. Texts which give expression to the 
act are real then by derivation: texts of real arguments. Texts which resemble the 
texts of real arguments are at two removes: they are real in the sense in which we 
refer to a good copy – ‘X is a real likeness’. But although this is correct, in practice it 
has little value as a distinction because between the text of a real argument and 
the ‘real’ likeness there is typically no discernible difference.  
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  See (Blair 2004: 138): ‘By focussing almost exclusively on the persuasive function of arguments 
and on argumentation as a process of rational persuasion, many have tended to conceptualize 
argument as having an analytic connection with persuasion.’  
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Govier (1987: 4) clearly aligns ‘real’ with ‘actual’. She describes an actual argument 
as ‘a piece of discourse or writing in which someone tries to convince others (or 
himself) of the truth of a claim by citing reasons on its behalf.’ Like Fisher she 
makes the contrast with ‘contrived arguments—series of statements constructed 
by logicians to illustrate their principles and techniques’ (ibid.). Blair & Johnson 
(1980: 27), in a similar vein, write: 
We need a term to refer … to arguments actually used in a first-order way to 
attempt to convince – and moreover used without self-consciousness about the 
‘nature’ or ‘structure’ of some ideal argument. The term ‘natural arguments’ will 
then distinguish such arguments from those which are invented just in order to serve 
as examples, and also (for the most part) from those which are self-consciously 
framed according to an explicit model of argument.  
Objections 
It cannot be ignored that the English expression ‘real argument’ has an ordinary 
sense outside the confines of critical thinking and informal logic. To say that an 
argument is real if it has actually been used for some recognisably argumentative 
purpose is a legitimate use of the word. However, it is only one such use. There is 
another important sense in which the designation ‘a real F’ just means ‘an F’.49 
‘Real’ in that sense is close in meaning to ‘genuine’: a sense under which is 
reasonable to ask: ‘If such and such a text is not a real argument, in what sense is it 
an argument?’. Those who uphold the distinction between real and non-real 
argument need to answer this question. They might brush it aside as equivocation, 
and fall back on a stipulative definition of ‘real’. However, if the ordinary term is to 
retain any of its natural meaning, the objection is a substantial one.   
 
Open scepticism about the coherence of the distinction can be found in Goddu 
(2007). He begins: 
I am not an informal logician—though admittedly, I am not sure what it would take 
to be one. I am, however, very interested in understanding the nature of arguments 
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 Colloquially ‘actual’ has this sense too, but we can ignore it here. 
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and in producing a general theory of arguments. So my question here is—does the 
notion of “real” argument have any place in a general theory of argument? Put 
another way, is the concept of a “real” argument a theoretically significant one? 
(Goddu 2007: 1) 
Goddu compares the notion of real (i.e. genuine) diamonds, and rightly observes 
that just as non-genuine diamonds are not diamonds at all, non-genuine arguments 
are not arguments at all. But if non-‘real’ arguments are understood in this sense, 
then the distinction is empty because the class of ‘real’ arguments would be one 
and the same as the class of arguments. This would supposedly exclude only the 
‘made-up’ kind with which logicians deal, but since, ex hypothesi, these are made-
up arguments, on what grounds are they not real? Goddu turns to the idea of fake 
or ‘pseudo argument’:  
(I)t may turn out that some of the non-genuine arguments are similar enough to 
bona fide arguments that care must be taken to distinguish the genuine ones from 
the pseudo ones. We might even call particular uses of the pseudo arguments, ... 
fake arguments. (Goddu 2007: 2)  
We could add here ‘apparent’ arguments which would include arguments that have 
no persuasive or similar purpose, but have the hall-marks of an argument. Another 
is ‘synthetic’ (in the same sense as ‘synthetic fibre’, or ‘synthetic snow’). Some such 
arguments might be employable as persuasive arguments, but fail the ‘real-
argument’ test because they are simply parodies of persuasive texts. That would 
identify them as fakes, and certainly as ‘made up’ or synthetic. But here the 
analogy with diamonds plainly fails, as Goddu means it to. We can distinguish a 
fake diamond from a real one by its composition, its molecular structure or 
detectable physical properties. But a ‘real’ argument and a parody of ‘real’ 
argument may have exactly the same composition and hence have no discernible 
difference from the bona fide case. There is a scene in the 1970s film The Sting, in 
which two hoaxers pose as decorators in order to get temporary access to a 
telegraph office. To preserve the illusion they put up ladders and start painting the 
walls. We can say that they are not real (bona fide) decorators, but we cannot say 
that they are not really painting the walls. Similarly if an expression is made up to 
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look and sound sufficiently like an argument as to be indistinguishable from an 
argument that has been produced to really influence its audience, then it is hard to 
justify denying it the status either of an argument or a real argument. The best that 
can be made of the situation may be to say that arguments can be judged more or 
less realistic, according to how closely they resemble bona fide arguments. But this 
is a clumsy compromise, and one that probably raises more problems than it 
solves.  
 
One such problem, ironically, arises directly out of critical-thinking procedure. 
Bowell & Kemp (2002: 47) referred to it as the task of reconstructing the argument 
actually intended by the person. Fisher uses the term ‘extracting’. The purpose of 
the ‘extraction’ is to identify – or in Fisher’s word ‘uncover’ – the argument in the 
text, and to show that it is an argument. In practice this means reconstructing all or 
part of the text to display its structure. So understood, extraction may amount to 
no more than picking out the perceived conclusion and listing the premises. But in 
many cases major reconstruction of all or part of the text may be necessary in 
order to interpret the content as an argument. The problem is that what is 
extracted and deemed to be the author’s argument, is in fact the critic’s 
understanding of it. Only when a text already exhibits a standard argument form is 
no overt interpretation needed. But standard form is unusual in ordinary-discourse 
reasoning and, besides, even identifying a text as a standard argument is an 
interpretation. As Blair (2004: 144) rightly notes: ‘Discourse can be identified as 
argumentation or as containing arguments only in the light of a given particular 
interpretation of it.’  
 
So which is the real (genuine, actual) argument: the author’s text, or the reasoning 
extracted from the text, or the critic’s interpretation? The notion of ‘real’ argument 
does not provide an answer: each might qualify on one or more counts and fail on 
others. The text is ‘real’ in the sense of being what we take directly from the 
source. The reasoning extracted from the text is what is understood to be 
expressed by the author in the text. If the critic’s interpretation is a fair 
representation of what the author intended his or her text to convey, then both are 
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legitimate senses of ‘the argument’ on one level or another – roughly analogous to 
an actual assertion and what is asserted. If the ‘real’ argument is identified with 
what is extracted, then it is a wholly abstract object corresponding to that which 
the author’s original text and the critic’s interpretation have in common. A third 
contender is the interpretation. But the interpretation exists for no other reason 
than to show the form of the putative argument; it has no persuasive or other 
natural purpose. We might say that it is a ‘real’ argument because it has been 
derived from an actual argument, but the interpretation of a text as an argument 
no more escapes Blair & Johnson’s (1980: 27) charge of being ‘self-consciously 
framed according to an explicit model of argument’, than do the classical logician’s 
made-up examples. Given these countervailing criteria, I agree with Goddu that 
unless a clearer notion of ‘real’ argument is forthcoming, there is no obvious utility 
for a general theory of argument in the demarcation.  
On the one hand, assuming there are counterexamples to the adequacy of formal 
logic as part of an adequate theory of argument, no appeal to a class of ‘real’ 
arguments seems required to identify these counterexamples. On the other hand, 
none of the primary candidates for ‘real’ arguments, viz., everyday arguments or 
actual arguments or natural arguments, can support either a clearly demarcated 
subject matter for informal logic or an adequate defense against counterexamples to 
one’s preferred theory. Thus, instead of focusing on an alleged class of ‘real’ 
arguments, I would recommend focusing on the theoretically significant and 
challenging problem of distinguishing those entities that are genuine arguments 
from those that are not. (Goddu 2007: 9) 
If the notion of real argument has a significant part to play in any general theory of 
argument, we need to find some way to eliminate the need for quotation marks. 
The question should have a different emphasis: not, ‘What is a real argument?’ but, 
‘What is a real argument?’ (or, ‘What is an argument really?’). This deeper and 
more open question is not answered by working backwards from the presumed 
domain of informal logic and asking what is real about the arguments in that 
domain.  
 
  
65 
 
 
 
What is real argument? 
There is one very obvious answer to this question: real argument is the act (or 
activity) of arguing. It is a platitude to say that any act of argument is argument, but 
it is not a pointless platitude if what is wanted is an unassailable position on which 
to premise a definition. It is not, of course, an answer to the earlier question of 
what an argument is, real or otherwise, since arguments are not acts. Argument, in 
the grammatically mass sense of the noun, is an attribute of arguments, and of acts 
of argument. But ‘an argument’, in the grammatically countable sense, does not 
ordinarily refer to the performance of an act of argument, but to the object-
argument presented or propounded in the process. Moreover, ‘an argument’ 
usually refers to a complete, complex object, whereas an act of argument can be 
something less than the propounding of a complete argument. ‘Argument’ (mass) 
can also mean dispute, and ‘an argument’ can be a dispute – though according to 
Hitchcock (2008) that is just a quirk of English.50 Disputation may consist merely of 
claims, counter-claims, questions, objections, and so on — even insults. But 
typically disputation also features what I have been calling acts of argument, in 
particular acts of reasoning-giving. Hitchcock usefully draws a distinction between 
mere dispute and reason-giving, by which he means reason-giving for some 
position or claim (as opposed to the purely explanatory sense of ‘reason’). An act of 
reason-giving in the context of a dispute is a natural act of argument, and real 
enough in that sense to provide the desired starting point. It may not be 
accompanied by an explicit conclusion, but so long as it is clear from the context 
what the reason is for, or meant to accomplish, we can be satisfied that a 
conclusion is implicit. Conversely, if no conclusion is either explicit or implicit, the 
act in question is not an act of reason-giving, in the act-of-argument sense.    
 
                                                     
50
  It is worth noting that English is apparently unique in using the same word for these two senses. 
In classical Greek, for example, the reason-giving sense is expressed by the word logos ... in one of 
its many senses, whereas the disputational sense is expressed by the word amphisbetesis or 
antilogia, “dispute” or “controversy”. In Latin, the reason-giving sense is expressed by the word 
argumentum, “proof” or “evidence”, the disputational sense by the word disputatio, “debate” or 
“dispute”. ...  In Spanish the reason-giving sense is expressed by the word argumento, and the 
disputational sense by the words discusión (discussion) or controversia (controversy) or disputa 
(dispute)’.  
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Perhaps our best insight into the nature of the act is dispute, for which reason 
many thinkers who have written about natural language argument view it primarily 
from the perspective of dialectic. Notable examples are Hamblin (1970), Walton 
(1989; 1990), van Eemeren & Grootendorst (1992), and Johnson (2000.) Dispute 
certainly is a natural context for argument. In the extract from Lord of the Flies at 
the head of this chapter the two principal characters are arguing, in the sense of 
disputing, with each other. But at a number of points in the exchange they can be 
seen to be reasoning with each other as well. Out of context the line, 
(14) I’m chief. I was chosen. 
would be just a pair of sentences. In context we can see that they are claims made 
in response to Jack’s challenge to Ralph’s authority or entitlement to give orders 
and tell people what to do. Ralph does not say: ‘Therefore I have the right to tell 
people what to do’, but because Jack has challenged that right, it is clear what 
Ralph is arguing for, by giving reasons to defend his right. Insofar as we can say 
such things about a fictional exchange Ralph gives expression to an act of 
argument. (14) is not that argument, but can reconstructed so as to convey an 
argument.  
 
Analysing the fragment of dialogue, the critical reader might want to say that (14) is 
therefore an argument for a conclusion that is implicit in the context of the 
dialogue. He or she might want to go further still by identifying (14) itself as a 
simple argument: a sub-argument with its own (intermediate) conclusion, feeding 
into to the larger argument for the implicit conclusion. (14) might then be 
reconstructed on lines like these:  
(15):    I was chosen. So I’m chief. So I can tell people what to do. 
                   (Reason)              (Int. concl.)      (Main conclusion) 
This kind of mapping will be familiar to anyone versed in basic critical-thinking 
methodology, though usually in application to longer and more developed texts. 
The orthodox rationale would be that (15) is Ralph’s argument, extracted from the 
dialogue and interpreted in a standard verbal form, supposedly to clarify the form 
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of Ralph’s reasoning. Only (15) is plainly not Ralph’s argument, nor is it even a 
plausible representation of anyone’s actual thinking in such a context. (15) is a 
construct on the words Ralph speaks: an interpretation moulded to fit a conception 
of argument and premised on the assumption that the speaker has such a line of 
reasoning in mind.  
 
Recall Bowell & Kemp’s constraints on the interpretation of a putative argument: ‘If 
our task is to reconstruct the argument actually intended by the person, then we 
must not go beyond what, based on the evidence available to us, we may 
reasonably expect the reasoner to have in mind.’ How in practice the text can be 
made to yield that evidence conclusively is a crucial issue for critical thinking.  
 
13. Analysis and classification 
Divining author intention is an inexact science.51 Speakers can make their 
inferences more or less transparent by the use of indicative language. Context can 
often do the rest: ‘I’m chief. I was chosen’ is not transparently an argument, but we 
can construe it as such, and identify its unstated conclusion, from the context of 
the dispute from which it was extracted and in virtue of which it is a paradigm of 
‘real’ argument. But many arguments are only obliquely stated, either for rhetorical 
reasons, or economy of words, or simply because the text lacks clarity; and 
contextual evidence is not always to hand. We can be sure that there are intended 
arguments expressed in some texts that we would not recognise or identify as 
arguments, and texts in which we might be inclined to read argument when none 
was intended. But even outside these grey areas, authorial intention can be hard to 
determine with confidence. 
 
One strategy, as we have just seen, is to be guided by charity: effectively to 
recognise as reasons what we would give as reasons to justify a conclusion. Fisher 
details a strategy of this sort, based on what he calls the ‘Assertibility Question’ 
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  With reference to the fictional dialogue, I use ‘author’ to mean the character speaking, not the 
author of the book, Golding.  
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(AQ). Starting with what can be perceived to be the main conclusion (C) of a text to 
be analysed, ask: 
(AQ)  What arguments or evidence would justify me in asserting conclusion C. (What 
would I have to know or believe to be justified in accepting C?   
Having done this look to see if the author asserts or clearly assumes these same 
claims (reasons). If he does it is reasonable (and accords with the principle of charity) 
to construe him as having intended the same argument. If he doesn’t you have no 
rational way of reconstructing his argument (on the basis of the text alone). (Fisher 
1988b: 22) 
This strategy clearly involves a measure of circularity. First, it requires the 
identification of a conclusion in order to gauge the support given to it (or not) by 
the other claims in the text. But given that the designation ‘conclusion’ implies a 
relation to reasons or premises – good or bad – the text has already been posited 
as an argument, and the AQ is really a question about its justificatory quality. 
Second, it assumes that the only argument extractable from the text – if there is an 
argument at all – is the one that can be attributed charitably to the author. But that 
is not a purely analytical question: it is in large part already an evaluative one. By 
merely asking whether certain claims in a text would commend themselves to us as 
reasons for another claim, we have posited the existence of an argument and are 
effectively judging its worth. This is a crucial point, and a general one, not confined 
by any means to argument extraction. For any F, that is subject to evaluative 
judgement, if something is a sufficiently bad F, it ceases to be an F at all, or at least 
a recognisable F. This applies to vague predicates only, of which ‘is an argument’ is 
evidently one. There would be no comparable issue with, for example, the 
predicate ‘is a number’, since even if we have some pretext to call a given number 
‘bad’ – unlucky, say – there is no degree of disapprobation of any sort that would 
render it any less a number. By contrast, a designation such as ‘is an estimate’ 
becomes decreasingly apt in proportion to the degree of difference between it and 
the value being estimated, to the point where it is unrecognisable as an estimate. 
Nonetheless, people make grossly unrealistic estimates, just as they give grossly 
inappropriate reasons or advance patently fallacious arguments. The point beyond 
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which it is implausible to assume, on the strength of the degree of accuracy, that a 
person is making a considered estimate, as opposed, say, to a random guess or 
intentional distortion, is not a sharp one. The parallel with argument is obvious and 
needs no explication.  
 
As Bowell & Kemp (2002: 47) rightly warn, the critic always runs the risk of arguing 
for the author, and then assessing his (the critic’s) own argument. Of course, in 
practice, we do interpret what others write and say charitably, and this would 
include recognising someone as arguing when he or she is arguing as we would 
argue, either by using the words and phrases we would use, or by evidently making 
the sort of inferences we would make. But that is the principle of charity in its 
descriptive form. It is not a prescriptive strategy for objective analysis of texts as 
arguments. (Fisher 1988b: 22) concedes as much. The application of the AQ, he 
says, ‘is not a mechanical method …; it requires judgement and imagination’. He 
adds: ‘Furthermore, the extent to which you can grasp an author’s intended 
meaning will depend on your understanding of the language and your knowledge 
of the subject and so will be a matter of degree.’  
 
The insistence that critical thinking deals with ‘real’ argument goes hand in hand 
with the idea that the presence or absence of argument is determined by the 
intentions of an author. Except in cases of outright transparency, where an 
argument is expressed in a patently standard form, interpretation will always be 
defeasible. For critical thinking this is a problem.  
 
Classification    
The interpretation of an argument does not end with interpretation as an 
argument. Arguments differ in form, style, strategy, and more; and the differences 
in the way an argument is characterised or classified are obviously relevant to its 
subsequent evaluation. In particular an argument that is assumed to be deductive 
will face a different criterion or standard of approval from those that are applied to 
an inductive or otherwise non-deductive argument. But if, as we have seen to be 
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the case, some evaluation becomes almost inevitably part of the means by which 
we identify an argument in a text, it is no less inevitable that it will also influence 
how we classify an argument. The same charitable principle operates: we should 
not jump to the conclusion that a putative argument is a bad deduction when we 
can see that it is a good argument of some other sort. But how can we make that 
judgement without first recognising the argument as a deduction and then as 
good? Moreover, how do we recognise the argument we reject as a bad deduction 
without first having some means to identify it as a deduction? We are in a classic 
chicken and egg situation. 
 
Needless to say, we can set aside cases of standardly expressed arguments. If an 
argument is constructed with a transparently deductive form, then obviously it 
needs no reconstruction to show its form, and so neither of the above questions is 
an issue.  
(16) All birds can fly; Tweety can fly; therefore Tweety is a bird 
has a paradigm deductive form, though an invalid one with a false premise to boot. 
There is still the question of whether it is a real (as in actual or natural) argument, 
but that is a different question. Its relevance is that arguments of the kind that 
concern critical thinking rarely have explicit deductive form. (16) is deductive and 
invalid just because it has been written to instantiate the form of an invalid 
deduction. If it had been written as the lyrics of a song it could still be argued that it 
wasn’t a ‘real’ deduction. 
 
Robert Ennis (2001) addresses the problem these questions raise for real or 
natural-language argument in an important paper entitled ‘Argument appraisal 
strategy’. He begins with the observation that most critical thinkers, and most text-
books on the subject, adopt a three-stage procedure for dealing with arguments. 
The stages he describes are:  
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(1) identifying the parts of the argument, (2) classifying the argument as deductive, 
inductive, or some other type, and (3) appraising the argument using the standards 
appropriate for the type. (Ennis 2001: 97)   
Ennis recognises that this sequencing of the three main critical tasks is plausible ‘at 
a glance’, but he argues that it is a flawed strategy. In particular he claims that the 
second stage, discerning the type of argument before evaluating it, is unacceptable. 
He cites Woods & Walton, Samuel Fohr, and Trudy Govier as proponents of the 
approach, but also describes it as a ‘popular strategy’ that people are intuitively 
inclined to adopt as the logical or natural modus operandi. Fohr (1980: 6), for 
example, writes:    
When faced with judging the worth of an argument philosophers will commonly 
decide how it is to be analyzed and only then examine it. In other words, 
antecedently to judging it they will decide how it is to be judged.  
Ennis rejects this partly because he considers the distinction between deductive 
and inductive arguments to be ‘not viable’ (Ennis 2001: 98). Here he is not denying 
that there is a distinction between the terms, only its applicability to analysing 
argument prior to appraisal. Where the distinction is useful, he says, is ‘between 
sets of standards (for appraisal) and not between types of arguments’ (ibid.). A 
second part of the problem as he sees it is that very few real arguments of the sort 
with which critical thinking is concerned, as they are explicitly stated, actually 
satisfy deductive standards. This, he says, is in fact two problems. One is that 
ordinarily people rarely state all the premises that they would need to state if they 
were seriously attempting to present a deductively valid argument. It is standard 
practice in critical thinking to fill the perceived gap in the reasoning with a further 
sentence which would make the putative argument valid. But unfortunately, Ennis 
continues, this ‘gap-filler’ is often a universal generalisation which is often false, 
making the argument defective anyway. The other related problem, that Ennis says 
is often ignored, is that 
though many arguments appear to come close to satisfying deductive standards 
(usually after reasonable assumptions are added), they include implicit or explicit 
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qualifying terms like 'generally', 'probably', 'ceteris paribus', and 'prima facie', which 
usually render them deductively invalid. (Ennis 2001: 98) 
In place of the three-stage procedure, Ennis advocates a technique of applying sets 
of variable standards, in turn, to undifferentiated arguments, and only 
retrospectively, if at all, differentiating arguments by type. It is a form of what is 
termed ‘appraisal-first’, in contrast with analysis-first which is the order of events in 
the three-stage strategy. Before discussing the merits of appraisal-first, which 
rightly belongs to the next chapter, I shall complete this chapter by examining some 
of the grounds for scepticism – a scepticism which I share with Ennis – about the 
viability of analysis-first procedure.  
 
Psychological accounts, and achievement accounts 
Ennis (2001) suggests that there are two main approaches to analysing an 
argument as deductive or otherwise: the psychological account and the 
achievement account. He summarises the difference as follows: ‘The psychological 
account distinguishes on the basis of what is attempted, claimed, intended, 
purported, believed, etc., to be achieved by the argument. The achievement 
account distinguishes on the basis of what the argument actually achieves’ (Ennis 
2001: 101). 
 
The difference can be illustrated, albeit simplistically, by two short texts that were 
discussed in §10:  
(5) These banknotes are forgeries. They all have the same serial number.  
(9) Blackpool is not a city. It has no cathedral. 
As noted in the earlier discussion, (5) can be construed plausibly as a deductive 
argument, because there is a charitable reading under which one of the sentences 
does follow pretty conclusively from the other. The charitable reading just requires 
the critic to take as read what is common knowledge anyway – indeed, it is virtually 
analytic, given the meaning of ‘serial’ – that genuine banknotes all bear different 
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numbers. There is no need to invoke an actual author, nor to speak of anything 
being actively ‘claimed’ or ‘intended’ to follow from another. Under the 
achievement account all that is claimed is that as a deduction (5) succeeds in 
establishing its conclusion on the strength of its premise. That success is conferred 
on (5) by a well-known fact about banknotes. When (5) is supplemented with that 
fact the argument is not only valid but sound:    
   
(5’)  All legal banknotes have different serial numbers. 
These banknotes all have the same serial number.  
These banknotes are forgeries (not legal).52 
 
In short, the validity of (5’) together with the truth of its implicitly conditional 
premise, warrants the interpretation of (5) as a deductive argument; technically an 
enthymeme. It is valid because if the banknotes have the same number, given that 
all legal banknotes have different numbers, the conclusion cannot be false. But 
simply interpreting the complex as valid is not enough for the so-called 
achievement account. This can be seen when we turn to sample (9). Superficially 
this has the same form as (5) – a mere pair of statements – but in (9) neither 
sentence follows from the other without the addition of a false premise. Construed 
as a deduction (9) fails to establish that Blackpool is not a city, since having no 
cathedral is known to be an insufficient reason for that conclusion. The 
achievement account is therefore unavailable; the most that can plausibly be said is 
that the text expresses an attempt at deduction, or intended deduction, and any 
such notions as these are plainly psychological. It is of no avail to say that the 
author may not have known that some cities lack a cathedral, or may have had 
some special knowledge as to why in Blackpool’s case the lack of a cathedral cost it 
city-status; for these, too, are psychological factors. From within the author’s 
sphere of knowledge, (9) may be as sound as (5). But the perspective required for 
the achievement account is not the author’s but the critic’s – and moreover a critic 
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 I am ignoring the possibility that one of the banknotes could be a genuine note whose number is 
duplicated on all the others. Strictly speaking the conclusion should be: ‘At least one...’.  
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who is sufficiently well informed to judge correctly whether the implicit assumption 
is true or false and the argument therefore sound or flawed. In that respect the 
achievement account is an objective judgement, effectively an evaluation. Any 
sequence of sentences can be said to be valid – i.e. to ‘achieve’ validity, in that 
rather curious sense – if it has a valid form. But most natural language arguments 
are neither valid nor invalid as they stand. A pair of sentences like (9) cannot be 
said to achieve validity as it stands. Nor can it be said to achieve validity after being 
assigned an additional – supposedly implicit – premise, since any pair can be ‘made’ 
valid in that way by adding a rider to the effect that if (the premise) then (the 
conclusion). However, it can be judged whether, if augmented in such a way as to 
be valid, usually by adding a covering premise, the outcome would be sound or 
unsound – sound if the needed premise is true, otherwise not. If sound, then we 
can say that the argument is valid because that is entailed by its being sound. Then 
‘achievement’ has some acceptable sense. That I take to be the essence of the 
achievement account. But if, in order to make the argument valid the added 
premise is patently false, then there is a quandary. For any set of sentences can be 
‘made’ valid if there is no restriction on what can be added. In general, ‘A therefore 
B’ (which is not valid) achieves validity on the addition of ’If A then B’. But if the 
extra premise required for validity is patently false, the principle of charity would 
rule against that interpretation. The test would have to come down to how 
patently false the additional premise would have to be; what would be a 
reasonable misapprehension to be under.  
 
In short, the achievement account is applicable only to arguments that are 
evidently sound, or that would be deemed sound on a charitable interpretation. It 
is clearly an insufficient condition (for deductive status) that a given text be 
interpreted as a valid argument, since any set of sentences can be interpreted as a 
valid argument by judicious supplementation. If what has to be added to the set to 
achieve validity is unwarranted or implausible, then there are no objective or 
charitable grounds for declaring the original text to be a deduction. If we are to 
provide some explanation for unsound or invalid deductions, we have surely to use 
the language of failed attempts, or errors of reasoning, on the part of a supposed 
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proponent – that is, we must to revert to a psychological account. But if a failed 
attempt at deduction is to count as a deduction, so is a successful attempt. Indeed, 
a sound argument may be judged a deduction under either the achievement 
account or the psychological, or both, and there are no obvious explanatory 
reasons to prefer one account over the other? For example, on the analysis of (5) 
given above, it could be said that the conditions of the achievement account have 
been met or, by the same token, that (5) represents a successful attempt at 
deduction – if, indeed, a deduction is what the proponent of (5) was attempting.  
  
But what are the grounds for presuming that a deduction has been attempted at all 
– i.e. that an attempt at deduction is the right interpretation of (5)? If I wanted to 
appraise the text of (5) charitably as an argument, I might be better advised to 
construe it as abductive. The envisaged speaker, on observing that there are 
duplicate serial numbers on the banknotes judges the best explanation to be that 
the notes have been forged. This is an unmistakably psychological account; but it is 
also right to say that if (5) was intended as an abductive inference, it patently 
succeeds. It is just possible that the duplicate numbers were not the result of 
forgery but instead a fault at the mint. But forgery is the more plausible 
explanation, which is all that is required for a favourable appraisal of the argument 
so interpreted. (It is worth noting for future reference that the remote possibility of 
a different explanation is more of a threat to the deductive interpretation than to 
the abductive, especially if we are looking for logical consequence, since the 
assumption that all banknotes with duplicate numbers must be forgeries could 
conceivably be challenged. Hence, more accommodation or qualification, of the 
ceteris paribus kind Ennis mentions above, has to be made in interpreting the text 
as a valid deduction, than as a good argument to best explanation.) Last but not 
least, (5) might be understood as a form of induction, the notional author simply 
premising his or her conclusion on never have having seen identically numbered 
banknotes that weren’t forgeries. The fact is that without some contextual 
information or acquaintance with author intention, the text of (5) does not 
vindicate any of these classifications above the other. And strictly speaking this 
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applies to those putative deductions which ‘achieve’ validity as to those that do 
not.53 
 
Comments on the psychological account 
Despite its widespread use both in definitions of argument (e.g. Copi 1962, Vorobej 
1992; 2006) – and in resulting methodology (e.g. Black 1946, Fisher 1988b; 2001, 
Bowell & Kemp 2002) – the psychological account is quite obviously problematic. 
As we have seen, Fisher, (1988b: 22) advocates a procedure to ‘divine’ an author’s 
intention which, he admits, draws on ‘judgement and imagination’. Another 
patently psychological account is given here by Vorobej: 
[D] An argument is deductive if, and only if, the author of the argument believes 
that the truth of the premises necessitates (guarantees) the truth of the 
conclusion.  
In other words, in a deductive argument the author of the argument believes that it 
is not logically possible for all the premises to be true and the conclusion to be false. 
An argument is non-deductive if, and only if, it is not deductive, i.e. if, and only if, the 
author lacks the requisite belief referred to in [D]. (Vorobej 1992: 105) 
The problem here is not so much that we cannot be expected to know in all or even 
very many cases what an author of a text intends or believes. The real problem is 
that, as an object of evaluation, an argument is deductively valid or not 
independently of the claims its author is making for it. By analogy a proposition is 
true (or false) whether or not it is believed, or claimed, to be true by the utterer of 
a sentence whose meaning it is. If we want to say that the author’s beliefs 
determine what type of argument he is presenting, then we are giving a different 
meaning to ‘the argument’, from that which corresponds to what the critic is 
assessing as valid or sound. Vorobej acknowledges that these twin perspectives 
impinge on the definition of deduction, insofar as the ‘requisite beliefs’ of the 
author may be true or false, and the argument acceptable or unacceptable 
                                                     
53
 I return to these issues in connection with natural language deductivism in the final section of the 
thesis. 
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accordingly.54 He claims that [D] meets this necessary ‘bifurcation condition’ 
without which all deductive arguments would be valid (1992: 106). Nonetheless 
Vorobej is unequivocal in his assignment of priority to the proponent’s perspective: 
On my account, to call an argument deductive is simply to describe it with reference 
to how it is conceived by its author. To call an argument deductive is not even to 
begin to evaluate it, though it does carry some implications as to what sorts of 
evaluative questions eventually ought to be raised about the argument. (Vorobej 
1992: 107) 
An obvious consequence of [D], however – not lost on Vorobej – is that a non-
deductive argument could be deductive under [D], if for example, the beliefs of the 
author are ‘sufficiently eccentric or confused’ (ibid.), that is if the author believes 
what he conceives of as a conclusion to follow from what he conceives of as 
premises. Likewise a classical paradigm such as modus ponens or hypothetical 
syllogism could be described as non-deductive according to [D]. To insist, says 
Vorobej that every example of a classically recognisable modus ponens is deductive 
reasoning is to ‘beg the question against [D]’ (1992: 108). But to insist that [D] is an 
adequate description of deductive argument, is to impose on the critic the task of 
recognising failed attempts at deduction, and eliminating unintended successes. 
Both are unintuitive measures of what we take ‘deduction’ to mean. 
 
By what means do we identify an argument as a failed attempt, or unfulfilled 
intention – or for that matter a chance achievement? In Ennis’s words: 
Because arguments are not living purposeful creatures, they do not literally attempt, 
claim, intend, purport, or believe. Rather it is people, usually argument authors, who 
do those things with arguments … Sometimes an argument is just being considered 
without any proponent. Then it would not be classifiable at all by those advocating a 
psychological approach, since no one is making a claim, etc., about it, constituting a 
problem for the psychological approach. (Ennis 2001: 102) 
                                                     
54
 It should be noted that Vorobej (1992: 105–6) intends the word ‘author’ to be ‘interpreted liberally 
so to mean anyone who supports, advocates, or is committed to an argument, even if they are not the 
person originally responsible for that argument.’ 
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Ennis asks what we are to make of an author who does not have a competent grasp 
of the concepts of, for example, deductive validity, or following necessarily, or 
logical. How could such an author be deemed to have performed a deduction 
merely from the evidence of the text? According to Ennis (2001: 104), ‘An arguer 
cannot claim what is not in her conceptual scheme.’  
 
Deducing a conclusion from a stated premise is a complex mental act, typically 
linguistic, but not necessarily a speech-act. If someone makes a statement and I 
draw a conclusion from it without saying anything, I have no less deduced a 
conclusion from it. Still, it is an act that can be performed only by someone who 
knows how to do it, and has some intention to do it. Having a general feeling of 
confidence that some claim, B, is warranted by some evidence or reason, A , may 
suffice to prompt a person to conclude the probability of B on the strength of A; 
and it might be the case that an interpreter more at home with logical concepts can 
see that B can be validly deduced from A. But that does not mean that the arguer 
performed a deduction other than in the sense of having uttered some sentences 
that form a deductively valid argument, or that can be construed as such under the 
achievement account. The psychological account requires us to know at least what 
the arguer is attempting to do to; what standard of conclusiveness he is aiming for. 
 
Ennis, however, goes further than this in proposing that unless an arguer has the 
concept of deductive validity, he or she cannot be considered to have argued 
deductively – i.e. succeeded in the attempt. But this is neither convincing nor 
necessary to the account. By analogy, an act can be an attempt at murder even if 
the perpetrator does not know the difference between murder and manslaughter. 
Murder is defined not by the intention to commit what the agent takes to be 
murder, but by direct reference to his premeditated act of killing. Likewise an 
attempt at murder on the part of an agent does not require the agent to have the 
concept of murder or know its legal definition. Speaking generally, an agent can 
properly be described as attempting to φ even when φ-ing is not the description he 
would necessarily give to the act he commits, or intends to commit. In other words 
his intention – what he intends – can be described in a de re rather than a de dicto 
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manner. It is not at all implausible that an act of argument could be an attempt at 
arguing deductively even when the proponent is unable to distinguish between 
deductive and non-deductive argument. People can know how to argue deductively 
inductively, abductively, from analogy, etc., without knowing that these 
classifications exist on any formal level. Ryle (1949: Ch. 2) famously argued against 
what he called the ‘intellectualist’ view that theoretical knowledge precedes 
practical ability – though not with respect to ability to argue in particular. Of more 
specific relevance perhaps is the distinction Peirce (1901) makes between the 
notions of logica utens and logica docens.  
Every time a man really reasons..., he is clearly or obscurely conscious that his 
present inference belongs to a general class of cases in which an analogous 
conclusion might be drawn; and his approval of this reasoning consists in a belief 
that by acting on the same principle in all cases he will on the whole be advancing his 
knowledge more than by not drawing such conclusions. If this be true, as the 
reader's self-observation may satisfy him that it is, a man cannot truly reason 
without having some notions about the classification of arguments. But the 
classification of arguments is the chief business of the science of logic; so that every 
man who reasons (in the above sense) has necessarily a rudimentary science of logic, 
good or bad. The slang of the medieval universities called this his logica utens – his 
‘logic in possession’ – in contradistinction to logica docens, or the legitimate doctrine 
that is to be learned by study. (Peirce 1895: 891–92) 
The idea that we can reason by acquired instinct, habit, or imitation, etc. without 
knowing any rules or concepts of formal logic, is not unduly controversial, any more 
than is the idea that we can learn a language without studying formal grammar. 
Searle (2001) argues that people do not argue from the rule of modus ponens to 
the validity of a conclusion given certain premises, but just from the content of the 
premises to the conclusion. The recognition of the rule of modus ponens follows 
from our habitually arguing that way, not vice versa. Searle (2001: 21) advises (with 
emphasis) that ‘We need to distinguish between entailment and validity as logical 
relations, and inferring as a voluntary human activity.’  
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If a person can argue deductively by instinct or accident or good luck, just if his 
chosen premises happen to entail his conclusion, then we have no need of the 
psychological account. A successful attempt at deduction will be accounted for 
entirely under the achievement account. The psychological account is required only 
to explain what it is for an argument to be an invalid deduction, for which of course 
the achievement account has no answer, by definition. The problem with the two 
accounts is that they address different questions, one about the act of arguing, the 
other about the argument-object – sentences or propositions and their relation to 
one another.  
 
A disjunctive account 
Whether or not an object of evaluation is valid is a matter that is settled under the 
achievement account. Hence there are some texts which may be construed as 
attempts at deduction and which are, as it happens, deductions and therefore, 
arguably, successful attempts. Monroe Beardsley is prompted by this to offer a 
disjunctive definition. A deductive argument, he proposes, is ‘an argument that 
either is or claims to be valid’ (Beardsley 1975: 23). Notwithstanding the objection 
that arguments do not themselves claim anything, this two-pronged definition 
might be thought to have a superficial attraction. If an argument is sound, it is 
classifiable as a deduction under the achievement account; and if invalid, but 
evidently an attempt at deduction, it is a deductive argument under the 
psychological account. It is non-deductive only if it fails on both counts.  
But there is an obvious problem with this. The achievement account is based on 
appraisal of the argument regardless of any intentions or beliefs that may have 
brought it into being. If the object of appraisal is deductively valid, it is valid and a 
deduction. If it is not valid but can be supplemented in a manner that makes it 
valid, without false assumptions, then too it may be said to ‘achieve’ deductive 
validity. But would that still be the case if, under the psychological account it could 
be seen that no attempt at deduction was made by the author – perhaps no 
attempt at argument even? To use a football analogy, a shot at goal (like a shot at 
deduction) may or may not produce a goal; but conversely a goal need not be the 
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result of a shot at goal but instead of a pass or fumble of some sort. Goals are 
registered exclusively on an achievement basis; shots on the basis of intention or 
attempt. A shot at goal may be so poor that it is unrecognisable as a shot, but it is a 
shot nonetheless. Alternatively it may be very good, and produce a goal; but even 
then the goal is not a shot, nor the shot itself a goal. Hence ‘shot’ and ‘goal’ have 
easily distinguishable extensions, whereas ‘deduction’ has the misfortune to carry 
both meanings if, as Beardsley claims, either account is applicable. Under the 
psychological account a deduction is an act of (typically verbal) reasoning that is 
performed with the intent to provide conclusive reasons for some conclusion. 
Under the so-called achievement account all that is necessary for the argument to 
be a deduction is that the conclusion does follow necessarily from the premise-set, 
or can be so construed on the basis outlined earlier.  
 
I agree with Ennis (2001: 104) that the disjunctive account is a case of ‘want(ing) it 
both ways’. There is nothing wrong with that if both ways can be had. But I would 
go further than Ennis by saying that the disjunctive account falls between two 
stools. The premise for Beardsley’s case is that alternative accounts can be given 
with respect to the same argument, classified in the same way. But, as with goals 
and shots, the psychological and achievement accounts do not relate to the same 
thing or even similar things, but to two very different things, one an intentional act, 
the other an abstract object. The disjunctive account falls foul of the ubiquitous 
ambiguity between, in this case, an act of (or attempt at) deducing, and some 
object or product of the act. When arguer X deduces something, he or she 
performs a deduction; and so on for an induction, an inference, an assumption, and 
other acts generally. But it is an equivocation to say that the same ‘deduction’ can 
be recognised on the one hand by its validity or soundness, or recognised on the 
other as an attempt to deduce. The object cannot be classed as an attempt; and an 
attempt cannot be assessed as sound – although, if the object is sound, the 
attempt can be judged successful. 
  
Ennis gives rather short shrift to the achievement account. He merely draws the 
distinction as above and, at a later point, comments that it is ‘a reason to be 
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pessimistic’ that these two accounts between them are all that the majority of 
textbooks have to offer (Ennis 2001: 110). His fire is directed almost entirely at the 
psychological account. My own objection to the ‘achievement account’ is that the 
term is a misnomer. Achievement implies that some aim or purpose has been met. 
For something to be ‘achieved’ by a text there needs to be some notion of aim or 
purport, which, in the case of argument, would be to justify or establish some 
claim, or persuade some audience, etc. (It need not be the author’s actual aim; it 
may be an aim supposed by the interpreter.) But if all that is necessary for 
classification as a deduction is to be valid – under one of Beardsley’s two 
alternative criteria – then any argument that is valid ‘achieves’ the status of a 
deduction by being valid. But then the language of ‘achievement’ just seems otiose.  
 
Conclusions 
The fundamental problem with the two accounts is that they purport to relate to 
the same things, namely arguments. But when critically examined it is clear that 
these conceptions of ‘the argument’ are deeply different in kind. In the 
psychological account what is being identified is an act of arguing or reasoning on 
an agent’s part, and the question is whether in psychological terms the author can 
be judged to be reasoning, and reasoning deductively – namely: would an author 
(or charitable interpreter) argue from this premise to that conclusion; and, in so 
doing, make the assumption required for it to be construed as deductively valid? 
The achievement account, on the other hand, relates to an object, a pair of 
propositions and a supposed relation, the argument itself, so to speak. This clear 
categorial distinction must be observed if the two accounts are to maintain their 
distinctiveness and thus be genuine alternatives under a disjunctive account. The 
danger of the disjunctive account is that the two questions tend to trade on each 
other and hence blur the distinction. The achievement account cannot borrow a 
notion of intention or aim from the psychological account, and at the same time be 
based on the criterion of validity alone. Yet without notions like aim or intention on 
some agent’s part it is hard to see what logical grounds there are for importing 
implicit assumptions. The difficulty for the disjunctive account is that the supposed 
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alternative tests overlap, bringing psychology into the achievement account, and 
the criterion of deductive validity into the psychological.  
 
With the achievement account and the psychological account both facing major 
problems, and resting on a category mistake, I would follow Ennis in expressing 
serious doubt that the deductive / non-deductive distinction can serve any useful 
purpose at the stage of interpretation and analysis. I would agree, too, that the 
time and place for invoking the distinction – if at all – is at the stage of evaluation, 
once the text has been identified as an argument, and without first attempting to 
surmise what standard or criterion it, or its author, aspires to. The line I take is that 
all arguments purport to be valid, because all purport to be sound, thus aligning 
myself with the school of natural language deductivism. Critical appraisal, on that 
account, can proceed without the need for categorising a putative argument either 
as deductive or as having some non-deductive form. Assuming instead that the 
argument purports to be conclusive, the critic judges what – by dint of assumption-
ascription, qualification, etc. – would be required to interpret the argument as 
valid, and reconstructs the text accordingly. Finally, he or she assesses the truth or 
plausibility of the premises and implicit assumptions. If no such interpretation is 
feasible – or if the required assumptions and qualifications are patently false or 
mutually contradictory – then the argument should be rejected as unsound. (A 
somewhat fuller account of this procedure is given in the final chapter, §42.) 
 
This of course does not deal with the problem of the first stage, about which Ennis 
has less to say, namely recognising arguments and distinguishing them from non-
arguments in the first place. There the same problem remains, only on a more 
general level, especially with respect to arguments that are judged defective or 
fallacious. As Hamblin (1970: 224-5) puts it: How can we ‘nail a fallacy’ if it remains 
open to the arguer, or to another critic reading with a different eye, to deny that 
there was ever any intent or attempt to present an argument – or, if there was an 
argument, that it purported to be conclusive? The actual or presumed arguer, 
‘cannot be convicted of fallacy until he can have an argument pinned on him. And 
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what are the criteria for that?’ (ibid.). What indeed? Hamblin’s answer is well 
known:  
There is little to be gained by making a frontal assault on the question of what an 
argument is. Instead let us approach it indirectly by discussing how arguments are 
appraised and evaluated. (Hamblin 1970: 231) 
In the coming chapter Hamblin’s staunchly non-deductivist concept of natural-
language argument is examined closely, along with his proposed criteria for 
argument appraisal. 
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CHAPTER THREE:  Appraisal 
 
14. Resumé and introduction 
We arrive now at the point and purpose of critical thinking, namely the appraisal of 
arguments in natural-language contexts – so called ‘real arguments’. It is to this end 
that arguments need to be identified and analysed. It has been argued in the 
foregoing that these precursory tasks are hampered by a number of obstacles, chief 
among them the fact that some degree of appraisal is needed to recognise an 
argument at all, lending an uneasy feeling of circularity to the widely practised 
‘three-stage strategy’. This problem is magnified if we add to the mix the question 
of what kind of argument the object for appraisal is and in particular whether it is 
deductive or non-deductive. For ‘deduction’, like ‘argument’ generally, is in part a 
success term; in part a description of something attempted or intended by an 
author.  
 
It should once more be noted that these issues apply only to so-called ‘real’ 
argument which, as has also been argued, is not as coherent a notion as it is 
intended to be. A more useful demarcation for critical thinking would be between 
texts that do and those that do not need interpretation as argument. For it is they 
alone that require critical analysis to present them in a standard form that will 
facilitate objective, methodical appraisal. (At the very least this entails identifying 
the conclusion and listing the premises.) That is not to say that an argument which 
is obscured by its natural form of expression is any more real than an argument 
whose form is so transparent that it comes ‘appraisal-ready’. What we find among 
natural-language arguments is a continuum from the wholly transparent to the 
extremely obscure, where the principle of charity would lead us to question 
whether there is an argument present at all. On that basis we can drop the 
quotation marks from ‘“real” argument’, and call anything that is an argument a 
real argument, effectively making the distinction redundant. But once pointed in 
that direction – that is, in the direction of appraisal-first, as discussed in the 
previous section – there may be, as Hamblin suggests, little to be gained from 
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asking what an argument is other than an object of appraisal. The critic looks for 
good arguments; or perhaps more openly still, good reasons for further claims.  
 
This in part is Ennis’s proposal. It is no magic bullet, for it simply exchanges 
questions about the criteria for identifying and classifying arguments for questions 
about the criteria for judging putative arguments. He recommends a method of 
‘successively applying sets of standards’ corresponding to argument types. 
Effectively the critic works through a list of criteria: (deductive) soundness, best 
explanation standards, standards for generalisation from instances, etc. I leave 
aside the details of the procedure except to comment on the order of application. 
Though discretionary by his account, Ennis nonetheless ‘find(s) it easier to start 
with soundness standards, unless it is immediately apparent that the argument 
would fail them, but might pass some other set of standards’ (Ennis 2001: 127). 
Soundness standards he then defines in the customary way as ‘deductive validity 
and true or acceptable reasons’ (ibid.). Hamblin goes further, not only in the 
adoption of appraisal-first, but in the levelling of the distinction between standards, 
and above all in rejecting deductive soundness as a viable criterion of appraisal. He 
declares his hand as follows: 
I shall stop using the words ‘valid’ and ‘invalid’ lest they cause concentration on too 
narrow a feature of this process of appraisal. To avoid jargon as much as possible, let 
good arguments be described simply as ‘good’. (Hamblin 1970: 231) 
In this chapter I take issue with this position, and with Hamblin’s case against the 
efficacy – indeed the necessity – of employing deductive criteria in the appraisal of 
arguments. Looking ahead further, I take the view that aiming at deductive 
soundness is characteristic of the act of argument in the much the same way that 
aiming at truth is characteristic of assertion.  
 
15. What is a good argument?  
A good argument provides its audience with good reasons: claims that, if true, 
warrant acceptance of the conclusion as true. Since it would clearly be irrational to 
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believe the reasons provided by a good argument and deny the conclusion, it might 
be thought that a good argument is just one which would persuade a rational and 
informed audience that its conclusion is true. This would accord with Ralph 
Johnson’s definition of an argument as ‘a type of discourse or text … in which the 
arguer seeks to persuade the Other(s) of the truth of a thesis by producing the 
reasons that support it’ (Johnson 2000: 168). It accords, too, with van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst’s (2004: 2) definition of an argument as ‘a complex speech act aimed 
at convincing a reasonable critic’. They continue: 
When someone advances argumentation, that person makes an implicit appeal to 
reasonableness. He or she tacitly assumes that the listener or reader will act as a 
reasonable critic when evaluating the argumentation. Otherwise, there would be no 
point in advancing argumentation (ibid.).  
We judge favourably things that achieve what they are aimed at, or what their 
authors seek to achieve by them, and unfavourably if they fail or fall short. But 
persuasiveness, even when the audience is conceived of as an informed and 
rational judge, is no definition of a good argument. Although it is unobjectionable 
that a good argument should persuade a rational audience or reasonable critic of 
the truth of its conclusion, that is a comment on the rationality of the audience 
more than on the quality of the argument. A rational person is one who should be 
persuaded by a good argument. But a capacity to persuade on the part of the 
argument is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for its being a good 
argument, unless the ‘rational audience’ is idealised to the point of being 
persuadable by all and only good arguments, at which point the definition descends 
into triviality. When an argument persuades the right sort of person for the right 
sort of reasons it is because it is a good argument; not the reverse.   
 
The first requirement of a good argument is that the premises must be true; second 
the conclusion follows from them. An argument which meets both conditions we 
call sound, or deductively sound to be exact. A third condition, therefore, is that 
the conclusion must be true. But from the perspective of the critic (appraiser) there 
is something odd about this third condition. On the one hand, it is a necessary 
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condition of soundness since, if the premises are true and the conclusion false, the 
conclusion does not follow. On the other hand the first two conditions are 
sufficient. If the first two conditions are met, the conclusion will be true. That is the 
measure of a good argument: a good argument is just one that establishes the 
truth of its conclusion. Conversely, an argument that does not establish the truth of 
the conclusion is not a good argument, even if the truth of the conclusion is known 
independently of the argument. Of course, if the truth of the conclusion is needed 
to establish that the argument is sound, then the argument is circular. That, 
however, does not make it a bad argument. That Socrates is mortal does not 
detract from the soundness of the reasoning that he is mortal on account of his 
being human, and of all humans being mortal. Where the circularity is unacceptable 
is in the critical (evaluative) argument that the reasoning is sound because Socrates 
is mortal.  
 
So the question for the critic is whether the first and second conditions have been 
met: the truth of the premises and the obtaining of the claimed relation of 
following from. Neither of the other pairs of conditions is sufficient for a positive 
appraisal. In particular it is not sufficient that the premises and conclusion are both 
true. Simply having true premises and a true conclusion does not make an 
argument good in the sense that the conclusion follows from the premises or 
receives any warrant or justification from them. As Etchemendy (1990: 93) puts it: 
A logically valid argument must, at the very least, be capable of justifying its 
conclusion. It must be possible to come to know that the conclusion is true on the 
basis of the knowledge that the premises are true. This is a feature of logically valid 
arguments that even those most sceptical of modal notions recognize as essential. 
Now, if we equate logical validity with mere truth preservation ... we obviously miss 
this essential characteristic of validity. For in general it will be impossible to know 
both that an argument is “valid” (in this sense) and that its premises are true without 
antecedently knowing that the conclusion is true. This is why such arguments as 
(B) Washington was President 
  So, Lincoln had a beard 
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are incapable of justifying their conclusions. For although this argument preserves 
truth, there is no guarantee of this fact independent of the specific truth values of its 
constituent sentences.  
This introduces something of a paradox for appraisal. To assess an argument for 
validity, he says, it must be possible ‘to come to know’ that the conclusion is true 
on the basis of the premises, the implication being that the truth of the conclusion 
is not known other than by inference from the premises. If Etchemendy is right that 
there is no guarantee of truth preservation other than the truth of the premises 
and conclusion, then there is a sense in which knowing the truth of those 
components of the argument robs the critic of the perspective from which to judge 
the ’passage‘ from one to the other. If the conclusion is known to be true, in what 
sense does the passage ‘preserve’ truth? At the same time, however, we cannot 
confidently judge the argument to be sound if we retain doubts about the truth of 
the conclusion at the same time as knowing the truth of the premises. For then we 
would have to say that the classical criterion for validity – the impossibility of true 
premises and a false conclusion – (and hence of soundness) has not been met. On 
the other hand it is frankly absurd to say that an argument is defective just because 
we know its conclusion to be true independently of the reasons given in the 
argument! It seems equally absurd to say that we cannot evaluate an argument as 
sound if we know both premises and conclusion to be true. No one really doubts 
that Socrates is mortal, or requires to be told that his mortality is a consequence of 
his being human; but few would seriously deny that the classic paradigm is a sound 
and in that sense good argument; or that we cannot see this because we know that 
Socrates is mortal.55 But how is that judgement made? It might be answered that a 
critic with knowledge of the truth of the conclusion can still evaluate the argument 
by saying that it would persuade him or her, if the conclusion were in any doubt. 
But since on this hypothesis the conclusion is not in any doubt, it is hard to see how 
that judgement could be made other than by having some further, independent 
criterion by which to establish that the reasoning is sound; and we are back to 
                                                     
55
 It might be objected that a syllogism is not a good argument on the grounds that it is trivial; but 
that is a different issue.  
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where we started. Besides, if Socrates’ mortality were in doubt – or merely 
supposed to be in doubt for the purpose of the appraisal – the major premise that 
all men are mortal would also be in doubt, and the argument would not be 
recognisably sound. It would seem that we cannot know that the argument 
succeeds without knowing that its conclusion is true. Etchemendy concludes the 
piece quoted above with: ‘Consequently, any doubts we may have about the truth 
of the conclusion translate directly into doubts about the argument’s “validity”’ 
(ibid.). So, when the conclusion is known to be true, what is the test of a good 
argument? What criterion must be met? It would seem that it cannot be just truth 
preservation since in any argument with a true conclusion truth is preserved. This is 
a symptom of the well known paradox of material implication, B(AB), and the 
corresponding argument: B ; (AB). 
 
I would agree with Etchemendy that the conclusion in a valid argument – as in a 
good argument generally – must be justified; also that truth preservation alone 
does not meet this criterion. However, the contrast that Etchemendy makes 
between these criteria is not entirely of like with like. He speaks of the argument 
justifying its conclusion, and of the argument preserving truth, giving both 
attributions an active sense of the argument doing or achieving something. Both, I 
suggest, are imprecise. A valid argument does not literally justify its conclusion: a 
conclusion is justified in a valid argument if the reasons given in its support warrant 
the inference to it. In other words, it is the premises of a valid argument which 
justify the conclusion. It is not the premises which preserve truth, however. I would 
go further and say that it is not the argument either. It is hard to see how it (the 
argument), or any of its component propositions, ‘does’ anything corresponding to 
‘preserving’. Truth preservation is key to the classical definition of validity, for 
which it is sufficient that the premises and the negation of the conclusion form an 
inconsistent set. It is right that this does not capture the intuitive notion of what it 
takes to ‘justify’ a conclusion. But, when Etchemendy says that, although (B) 
preserves truth, there is no guarantee of this fact other than the truth values of the 
sentences, there is a degree of equivocation. (B) does not ‘preserve truth’ any more 
than it ‘justifies’ its conclusion. It would preserve truth if its premise justified the 
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conclusion, but it patently does not. Indeed the point that Etchemendy is making is 
that (B) does not justify or warrant its designated conclusion. In that sense we 
could also say (B) does not ‘preserve’ truth: it merely happens to have a true 
conclusion. It is interesting that Etchemendy has something of the above ambiguity 
in mind because he uses quotation marks for the more formal meaning of ‘valid’. 
My point is that the quotation marks should be applied to ‘preserve’. Either way, 
what is acknowledged is the very obvious fact that not all formally valid arguments 
are necessarily good arguments, in the intuitive, everyday sense of providing 
grounds that support, establish, or lead to, a conclusion.   
 
Arguments like (B) are examples of what logicians term ‘over-generation’. Mares 
(2004: 4f), observes that any argument whose conclusion is a logical truth follows 
validly from any proposition. His example is Fermat’s last theorem which, he says, 
follows validly from the proposition that the sky is blue. More notorious still is the 
classical criterion known as ex falso quodlibet (EFQ) which sanctions the conclusion 
of anything whatsoever that is premised upon a logical falsehood. Any argument of 
the from: (A &~A) ; B is valid, whatever sentences are substituted for A and B 
(Read1995: 54f). (We need not be exercised over these cases in the present thesis, 
since arguments with known-to-be-false premises are rightly rejected, and 
arguments from logical falsehoods would obviously fall at the first fence. So, too, 
would blatant non-sequiturs like Mares’ blue sky example. But as well as 
overgenerating, the criterion of logical consequence can also undergenerate. An 
example given by Read (ibid.) is that ‘This is not square’ is not a logical consequence 
of ‘This is round’, insofar as there is no logically valid form into which the sentences 
could be substituted. (It’s a mathematical, not a logical, consequence.) Moreover, 
indefinitely many arguments with the same form, ‘A1,…An ; B’, will have true 
premises and a false conclusion. Yet  
(1) A1,…An (and) therefore B  
is basically the form of all natural-language arguments, valid and invalid alike. It is 
not that logically valid arguments do not have this form, but that they have a more 
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structured form, requiring a deeper level of analysis into which no simple 
propositions can be substituted without preserving truth. An argument such as 
(2) It’s round so it’s not square 
depends not on structural form for validity – since it lacks it – but on the meanings 
of the ‘component sentences’ (Read 1995: 54). We might nevertheless wish to say 
that (2) exhibits logical consequence because it is a necessary truth, or that it is true 
by definition, that nothing square can be round. But then do we say that  
(3) These banknotes have the same serial number so they are not genuine 
banknotes 
exhibits logical consequence because serial numbers, by definition, are unique? 
Clearly there is a difference, but it seems more like a difference in degree than in 
kind. Read (ibid.) notes that truths of mathematics are ‘difficult’ because they can 
be reduced to logic, placing them in a special category, different from, say, facts of 
science or history, or facts about banknotes. But the distinction between logical 
and definitional truths, and those of a more mundane sort, is not a sharp one 
(Quine 1961: 20-37). Example (3), it might be said, has a foot on both sides of the 
line: it could be argued that its validity rests on the meaning of ‘serial number’, or 
on the mere fact that all genuine banknotes have been given unique numbers in 
the past, and continue to be so at present. On the latter reading, the truth that 
determines the validity of (3) is of the same order as the truth of, say: ‘All US 
presidents to date have been men’, from which it follows validly – and in ordinary 
parlance ‘logically’ – that 
(4) If Leslie was president then Leslie was a man, 
Hence, by deduction equivalence,  
(5) Leslie was president so Leslie was a man 
is valid. The example (4) is Etchemendy’s (1990: 107). The problem it illustrates is 
that  
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(w)hen we equate the logical truth of a sentence with the ordinary truth of a 
universal generalization of which it is an instance, we risk an account whose output 
is influenced by facts of an entirely ‘extralogical’ sort. Clearly, the question of 
whether ...[4]… is a logical truth does not depend on the sorts of historical truth that 
determine the truth or falsity of the generalization 
[G] ∀x[if x was president x was a man]56 
Yet, as Etchemendy goes on to say, [G] just happens to be true, so that claiming 
logical truth for (5) on the basis of the ‘simple truth’ of [G] would mistakenly 
succeed; it would have the claimed outcome but for the wrong reasons. So, too, 
would a denial of the logical truth of (4) if [G] happened to be false.   
 
These are problems enough for classical logic, where logical truth and logical 
consequence are fundamental issues. But for critical thinking and related 
disciplines the problems of identifying the right appraisal criteria are no less acute. 
If anything, they are more intractable for lacking the anchor of a developed logical 
system. Argument form gives no guidance if, as in the case of all (2), (3) and (5), the 
surface-form is not deductive. So, for example, the conclusion of (5) cannot be 
derived from its premise, by any rule of natural deduction, because its soundness 
or otherwise depends on its content rather than its form. But nor, as we have just 
seen, does the soundness of (5) – less still the soundness of most so-called ‘real’ 
arguments – turn on the logical truth of a covering generalisation. So when the 
critic of an argument that lacks any superficial deductive form comes to the 
question of whether the conclusion follows from the premise(s) – one of the two 
conditions for soundness – the answer tends to rest on extralogical knowledge. No 
reasonable critic would want to say that any of (2), (3), or (5) was unsound (at any 
world where the statements involved were facts). However, in each case some 
form of substantive knowledge is required to underpin the judgement. Whether 
Leslie’s being a man follows from his having been a US president, rests on the fact 
that every US president has been a man – including Leslie. Therefore to be in a 
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  The labelling of the examples is mine, for ease of reference. 
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position to assert that the conclusion follows from the premises effectively requires 
knowing that the conclusion is true – another symptom of the problem seen 
earlier, and one that will have important implication in coming sections.  
 
Intuitively what we expect of a sound argument is that from known-to-be true 
premises we come to know that some conclusion is true. But intuitively we also 
know that if the conclusion is true, its truth value is unaffected by the truth or 
falsity of the premises. On the other hand, unless we can be sure that the 
conclusion is true when the premises are true, we cannot say with assurance that 
the argument is sound. I do not deny that this presents a difficulty for natural-
language argument appraisal, although I shall argue against Hamblin that it is not 
an insurmountable one. First, however, I look at Hamblin’s head-on challenge to 
deductivism: the application of the standard of soundness to ‘real’ argument.  
 
16. Hamblin’s critique of soundness as a criterion of appraisal 
The problems outlined above are amongst those addressed by Hamblin (1970). 
Hamblin reviews a set of ‘alethic criteria’ – essentially truth preservation – which he 
claims are too weak for the purpose of appraisal, and an alternative set of 
epistemic criteria, which he claims are too strong. He says that we cannot approve 
an argument on the basis that its premises are true, and the conclusion implicit in 
the premises, without knowing that the premises are true and that the conclusion 
is consequent upon them. In Hamblin’s words: ‘...my premisses may be true but the 
argument will be quite useless in establishing the conclusion so long as no one 
knows them to be true’ (Hamblin 1970: 236). Alethic criteria, therefore, can be 
applied only in a provisional sense; or, as Hamblin puts it: ‘Arguments which pass 
these alethic tests can be regarded as setting a certain theoretical standard of 
worth, corresponding with a certain conception of “pure” Logic’ (ibid.). Here 
Hamblin is contrasting ‘pure’ logic with what he calls the ‘Logic of practice’. The 
point he is making can be put more simply as follows: the alethic criteria which he 
associates with ‘pure’ logic will allow evaluation only as far as the establishment of 
validity. In the logic of practice, a (merely) valid argument is useless, and its 
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practical worth is undecidable without the additional input required to verify the 
premises and so determine soundness. That cannot mean that a merely valid 
argument has no worth at all, for, as Hamblin says, it has a ‘theoretical’ worth –
though he says this in the somewhat disparaging tone that he employs in his 
treatment of traditional logic. Putting it more positively we can say that validity is 
the theoretical half of the evaluation, the part of the procedure in which the form 
of the reasoning is assessed in the absence of knowledge of the truth or falsity of 
premises. Nonetheless, there is little to object to in Hamblin’s basic contention 
that, for the purpose of critical appraisal of natural arguments, ‘It is not enough for 
the premisses of an argument to be true: they must also be known to be true’ 
(ibid.).  
 
So Hamblin (1970: 236–37) considers what might be gained by replacing the main 
alethic criteria with two epistemic E-criteria: 
(E1)  The premises must be known to be true;  
and  
(E2)  The conclusion must follow clearly and directly from the premisses.
57  
What we are to understand by ‘following clearly’ is that it is clear to the audience 
(including the critic) – so clear that they will be in no doubt that the conclusion 
follows from the premises. That is the whole point of considering the application of 
epistemic rather than merely alethic criteria. If the premises are known, and the 
passage to the conclusion is clear, then the conclusion is known too.  
 
Crucially Hamblin stipulates that the conclusion need not follow by rules of 
deduction from the premises. In fact he makes a point of insisting that it need not 
                                                     
57
 Emphasis added. Hamblin condenses two ‘alethic criteria’ that he has considered earlier to give 
one  E-criterion, which he labels ‘E2,3’. The alethic (A) criteria were: (A2) ‘that the conclusion must 
be clearly implied’, and (A3) that it must follow ‘reasonably immediately’, i.e. without gaps in the 
reasoning. If there are gaps in the text of the argument the missing premises must be clearly 
implicit, but that is dealt with by a further criterion (E4) which he comes to later, as do I. From here 
on I will refer to the compound E-criterion of following clearly and directly simply as ‘E2’. Hence 
there is no E3.  
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be sanctioned by any particular logical rules. This is in line with his stated 
disinclination to attempt to say what an argument is (Hamblin 1970: 231)), and to 
pursue what was earlier called an appraisal-first methodology; that is, without prior 
identification or classification of the argument as an argument, or as an argument 
of any specific sort. The hypothesis he is setting up simply requires that the 
audience can see that the conclusion is an unmistakable consequence of the 
premises, even if the reasoning to it is, in his words, ‘inductive, or extrinsic, or of a 
form for which no calculus has been developed’ (ibid.). Hamblin also, and 
presumably for the same reason, stipulates a broad understanding of ‘implies’, less 
than entailment. ‘Implication’, he says ‘may be strong or weak, and the argument 
strong or weak accordingly’. The point of this, however, is not to weaken the 
epistemic criteria. If knowledge that the conclusion follows from the premises is the 
requirement, then the same level of assurance or confidence would have to obtain 
whatever the nature of the reasoning.  
 
That might appear contradictory. But Hamblin’s objective is not to defend the E-
criteria. On the contrary, his aim is to establish (by reductio) that the criterion of 
soundness is too restrictive to apply to ordinary argument if the necessary 
epistemic criteria are also applied. It is simply a manoeuvre on Hamblin’s part to 
pretend that the E-criteria, as he defines them, can be met without the presence of 
a deductive step in the argument. Under the E-criteria the critic would have to 
know, not only that P, but also that P follows from C – i.e. that if P then C.  
1. K(P)  (E1) 
2. K(P  C) (E2) 
Then, of course, the critic knows that C, by modus ponens.  
3. P   1 
4. P  C  2 
5.  C  MPP 3,4 
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In other words, if the critic does not know that ‘C’ (as well as ‘P’) is true, he cannot 
meet the twin criteria of E2 without knowing something at least as strong as ‘if P 
then C’. That is a necessary condition for judging that C follows ‘clearly and 
immediately’ from P. But to know the truth of ‘if P then C’ (in the knowledge that P 
but the absence of knowledge that C) the critic must know that C follows from P – 
and in turn that ‘A ; C’ is valid. In these circumstances the critic is either drawn into 
circularity, or into the regress that Lewis Carroll describes in ‘What the Tortoise said 
to Achilles’: that the validity of arguments depends on a logical rule that depends 
on the validity of arguments, ... and so on, ad inf.58  
 
Hamblin does not make his case against the viability of the criterion of soundness in 
quite the terms that I have used here, but his point is broadly as I have stated it. In 
practice, any argument, ‘P ; C’, which has no obvious deductive form, requires the 
ascription of some implicit assumption to establish that C is meant (claimed, 
supposed) to follows from P. One of the most challenging tasks for students of 
critical thinking is identifying such assumptions, and justifying their inclusion in the 
reconstruction of natural-language arguments. In view of its importance in critical-
thinking methodology – and its relevance to the conclusions in Chapter 6 of this 
thesis – the topic of assumption-ascription and its attendant problems is addressed 
in some detail in the coming section. 
 
17.  Implicit assumptions 
Suppose, as Hamblin supposes, there is a set of premises P and a conclusion C that 
is implied by P sufficiently clearly for the appraiser to be satisfied that C follows 
from P, but without any stipulation as to the nature or even strength of the 
reasoning employed. On analysis, the composition of the argument is just 
(6) P ; C.  
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  Carroll (1895). See Searle (2001: 19) who invokes Carroll’s paradox to make a similar point. ‘The 
way to avoid the regress’ Searle says, ‘ is to refuse to make the first fatal move of supposing that the 
rule of modus ponens has any role whatever to do with the validity of the inference.’   
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(6) is the minimum level of analysis, making no claims or presupposition about the 
nature of the consequence relation. It merely labels the constituent parts of a 
standard argument and arranges them in an ordered list: conclusion to the right of 
the separator, premises to the left. In that respect it preserves the hypothetical 
conditions that Hamblin is asking the reader to accept of an argument sanctioned 
by no particular system or calculus, yet seen nonetheless to be ‘good’. But if (6) 
represents any sort of argument then, according to the standard definition, C is 
claimed or supposed to follow from P. So to meet the two epistemic criteria so far 
considered, C must ‘follow clearly’ from P by some recognisable, though non-
specific, line of reasoning. But there is a further missing element in any claim that C 
follows from P, because ‘P ; C’ as its stands lacks a valid argument form. Take, for 
instance: 
(7) Donald is a duck so Donald has webbed feet. 
This has the basic, non-specific argument form of (6). What is more if Donald is a 
duck it is reasonable to conclude that he has webbed feet, despite the argument’s 
being invalid as it stands. To be valid it would have to be added that ducks have 
webbed feet; for if that were not so, it would not follow that Donald has webbed 
feet. There is nothing unusual in this. In many (probably most) natural-language 
arguments, one or more premises will be omitted on account of their being so 
clearly implicit as to need no explicit expression. In an argument of the bare form, 
‘A therefore B’, B could be false in any number of instances where A is true, so that 
it cannot be judged that the conclusion follows from the premise just by examining 
(7). A duck whose feet had been bitten off by a pike would arguably provide a 
counter-example, either invalidating the argument or requiring some ad hoc 
amendment to (7), e.g. 
(7)   Donald is a normal duck, so Donald has webbed feet. 
But if (7) is understood, charitably, as (7) and advanced by some speaker, as an 
argument, Donald’s having webbed feet is claimed to follow from his being a 
normal duck. It ‘goes without saying’ in the argument, therefore, that normal ducks 
have webbed feet – or more specifically that if Donald is a normal duck he has (or 
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must have) webbed feet – not because it is necessarily true, but because it is 
implicit in the text’s purport to be an argument (or its author’s purport to be 
propounding an argument). For if it were known to the author and/or audience of 
(7) that ducks have claws and not webbed feet, (7) would not merely be invalid but 
practically unintelligible as an argument.  
 
So when it comes to appraisal under E1 and E2 the standard critical procedure is 
this: we ascertain that Donald is a duck and we recognise that, if this single truth is 
to establish with any certainty that Donald has webbed feet, then it must be 
assumed that all ducks (in the normal way of things) have webbed feet. As well as 
being a necessary presumption this is also, in conjunction with the stated premise, 
a sufficient condition for the conclusion. So, once satisfied that in general ducks do 
have webbed feet, we can give the argument a favourable evaluation. Indeed 
(assuming Donald is a normal duck) we can say (7) is sound; and more specifically 
that it is deductively sound since, together with the covering generalisation, the 
premise could not be true and the conclusion false of any object that is a normal 
duck. This is the basic procedure set out in most critical-thinking course books and 
commentaries,59 with or without any mention of deductive soundness. It is 
ostensibly an informal procedure since it does not require any prior analysis of the 
text as deductive, inductive, abductive, etc. or, in Hamblin’s words, ‘sanctioned by 
any particular calculus’. It is therefore applicable, arguably, to arguments of all 
sorts. Instead of the question of formal validity, the question for the critical 
audience shifts to the truth or credibility of the implicit assumption, which in a case 
such as (7) is conspicuous by its absence; and it is the conspicuousness which 
justifies its inclusion. In more complex arguments the identification of implicit 
assumptions is both more challenging and more challengeable; but the principle is 
the same.  
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  For a fuller exposition see Thomson (2009: 23ff); also: Bowell & Kemp (2002: 153f), Butterworth 
& Thwaites (2013: 63ff).   
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On alethic criteria then, (7) is sound if the premise(s) and any implicit assumptions 
are all true, and from their truth it follows that the conclusion cannot be false. To 
meet the E-criteria it must be known that the assumptions as well as premises are 
both true; or, as Hamblin puts it, adding the further clause:  
(E4) Premises that are not stated must be such that they are taken for 
granted.  
If it cannot be taken for granted that ducks have webbed feet it cannot be taken for 
granted that the conclusion follows from the premises. This procedure, applied to 
arguments in general, has a promising simplicity. If I know that P, and I know some 
general fact or principle (G) that means that if P is true then so is C, then I may 
conclude C from P with confidence. Conversely, if I know – i.e. it is perfectly clear – 
that C follows from P, then I implicitly know the general fact or principle (G) that 
makes it so. I know what G is – its content (e.g. that ducks have webbed feet) – 
because it is implicit in the claim that C follows from P, and once I ascertain that P 
and G are true I also know that C, and may then accordingly rate the argument 
sound (without overtly employing any deductive proof). But then comes the catch: 
how could I know that P and G without knowing that C? If I were to say: ‘There was 
a point in the reasoning process at which I knew that P, and that G was something 
that could be safely taken for granted, but I didn’t know C until I put the two 
together and formed the argument...’ it would be fair to question whether I really 
knew P and G60 before I knew the truth of C. But more to the point, vis-à-vis 
appraisal, how could I say that knowing P and G provided sufficient grounds on 
which to claim knowledge of C, if any lingering doubt about C persisted? Yet as 
discussed in the previous section, matters are no better if the appraiser does know 
the conclusion. Once the premises of an argument are known, and the conclusion 
known with them as opposed to from them, we are back to the seemingly 
paradoxical situation whereby, in knowing the conclusion, the critic loses the 
means by which to evaluate the passage from reasons to conclusion. What the 
critical audience needs to assess is whether, when presented with an argument, 
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 For economy ‘know P’ is taken to mean know that P, or that P is true.  
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the premises justify the conclusion. That is essentially the point Etchemendy 
makes. The critical (evaluative) question is whether the reasoning would carry us, 
so to speak, from the premises to the conclusion in such a way that if we knew the 
truth of the premises we would have good reason to believe or assert the 
conclusion. The other point, that knowledge of the truth of constituents of an 
argument compromises assessment of the passage from premises to conclusion, is 
the basis of Hamblin’s rejection of the epistemic criteria. But Hamblin pursues the 
point much further by his wholesale rejection of deductive soundness as a viable 
criterion for appraising ordinary-language argument.  
 
Why can we not just say that if the argument has a valid form – i.e. a form that is 
truth preserving under all interpretations of its non-logical parts – and its premises 
are known to be true, it can then be judged that the conclusion is true from those 
antecedents? Then the critic can say that the conclusion does follow from the 
premises by the form of reasoning in the argument. In the example under 
consideration, if it follows from Donald’s being a duck, together with the implicit 
premise that  
(G) if x is a duck, x has webbed feet,  
then Donald’s having webbed feet is a logical consequence of Donald’s being a 
(normal) duck.  
 
Hamblin’s answer, would be that – ex hypothesi – (7) does not have any particular 
logical form, still less a deductively valid form. Hamblin’s interest is in ‘real’ 
arguments, which do not, as a rule, have explicit deductive form. Under the 
principle of charity a reasonable listener would take certain supposedly implicit 
claims for granted in recognising the argument. Likewise the critical appraiser 
makes the same accommodation, and reconstructs the argument with the 
necessary assumption or assumptions (Ass) in place, for example: 
(8) P, Ass ; C  
But in this argument C follows from P only if Ass is equivalent to  
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(9)  if P then C, 
Anything weaker than (9) would not establish C, or the validity of (7). Hence to 
construe (7) as valid it is necessary to assume that either C is true or P is false. But 
to meet Hamblin’s first E-criterion, P must be known to be true, meaning C must be 
true to meet the E-criteria. If C is already known to be true if P is true, then there is 
no evaluation to be done on the ‘passage’ (Hamblin’s term), from P to C. To that 
extent I think Hamblin has a point. Unless an argument is explicitly valid on account 
of having a standard valid form, it cannot be judged sound without knowledge of 
the conclusion, because knowledge of the conclusion is needed to identify the 
requisite assumptions which make the conclusion true – and that involves a 
circularity. From this Hamblin argues that the E-criteria of appraisal, imposed on 
the alethic criteria, are too strong. If a person were to know for sure that the 
premises were all true, and to know for sure that whenever they are all true then C 
is true in consequence then, Hamblin claims, the person would already know that 
C.   
 
There is of course something altogether counter-intuitive in this claim. It comes 
from the feeling we naturally have that if we follow an argument through from 
premises to the conclusion we often do arrive at (reveal, learn, discover) something 
we did not know before; and that precisely what we learn is C. Therefore knowing 
that C, once we do know it, just seems different from knowing the argument for C. 
Intuitively we think of a good argument as advancing from something known to 
something that was hitherto unknown or at least questionable. But then, as we 
have seen, the argument for C, if it is a really good argument from known premises 
via seen-to-be sound inference, must supply all the information that is needed for 
the person in possession of it to be in a position to know, too, that C. In that sense 
it may be said that nothing new is learned (or can be learned) from an argument if 
it meets the epistemic criteria in full.  
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Argument as a response to doubt  
In response Hamblin (1970: 238) proposes, provisionally, an additional, remedial E-
criterion: 
(E5) The conclusion must be such that, in the absence of the argument, it 
would be in doubt.61  
But clearly this reopens the basic problem of appraisal raised at the start of the 
chapter. For either an argument with known premises does establish the 
conclusion, in which case it is a sound argument; or it does not, in which case it is 
not a sound argument. So E5 is a curious criterion to introduce. As mentioned at 
the start of the chapter, there is something absurd about the idea that an argument 
cannot be judged good – i.e. the judgement is inhibited – merely because its 
conclusion is known to be true. Likewise there is something absurd about 
restricting ‘good’ arguments to those that have conclusions not previously known 
to be true. As Hamblin, of course, is well aware, the critic cannot judge an 
argument to be valid, when he knows the premises to be true, unless he knows 
that the conclusion cannot be false. If the audience is in a position to know that the 
premises establish the conclusion, and that therefore the argument is good, then 
the audience must be in a position to know that the conclusion is true, for that is a 
necessary condition of its following from true premises. But if E5 is required for a 
good argument, the appraiser cannot know that the conclusion is true except by 
inferring it from the premises of the argument, for which purpose it is necessary to 
rate the argument as sound and from that infer the conclusion.  
 
Hence E5 does not cure the circularity that Hamblin claims for the application of 
the epistemic criteria. But then he does not expect E5 to save the epistemic criteria 
since he is in the business of rejecting them as excessively strong. Moreover, E5 is 
not needed to break the circle. As I will argue shortly, the circle can be broken by 
proceeding in a different direction: that is, asking the critical questions in a 
different order. For although it is indeed a necessary condition of the argument’s 
                                                     
61
 Emphasis added. 
104 
 
 
 
being sound that the conclusion is true, you don’t need to draw on your knowledge 
that the conclusion is true, ahead of appraising the argument, in order to know that 
the premises are true and the argument is valid, and that therefore the conclusion 
is true. After all, you don’t in general need to know all the necessary conditions of 
the things you know. You might know that Y; and, whilst it might be a necessary 
condition of Y that X, you might not know that X. In fact that’s a common situation. 
(People knew that apples fell from trees before anyone knew that gravity was 
necessary for that to happen.) So there could still be some epistemic distance to 
travel from knowing the premises, and knowing the validity of the argument, to 
working out the conclusion. That, in general terms, is how the circle is broken; how 
we can apply deduction and learn something from it. The practical problems of 
interpreting ‘real’ arguments do not change this general point.  
 
A case study 
Consider the following: Sam and Sarah are walking on the beach. The tide is out 
and there is bare sand between the shore and a nearby island. Sam says: ‘Look, the 
tide is out, so we can get to the island.’ Assuming that this is an argument, we may 
analyse it in the following standard manner: 
(10)  P: The tide is out 
  C: We can get to the island  
Sarah can see (and hence knows) that the tide is out. That is sufficient to satisfy 
both E1 and the entailed alethic criterion that premises must be true. What else 
must she know or assume if she is to accept the argument as sound? It must be 
clear to Sarah that  
G1  If (or when) the tide is out we can get to the island 
Without (G1) the tide could be out and the island still be unreachable for any 
number of reasons. (G1) pre-empts all of these contingencies. Accordingly, (10) 
may be interpreted as an enthymeme and reconstructed to include (G), bridging 
the inference from P to C as follows: 
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(10)  P:    The tide is out 
  G1:    If the tide is out we can get to the island 
  C:     We can get to the island  
Reconstructing a presumed enthymeme in this way is standard procedure in critical 
thinking. (See Bowell & Kemp 2002: 43–47). It is also an application of Hamblin’s E4 
which, it will be recalled, stipulates that implicit premises must be such that they 
would be ‘taken for granted’. But taking a premise for granted does not make it 
true. To assume that G1 is true alongside P is effectively to assume that (10) is a 
sound argument. The original question must simply be recast as a question about 
the truth of G1, just as we did in the example concerning ducks and webbed feet. If 
we are to appraise (10) favourably we have to know whether G1 is true, as well as 
recognising that it is needed to infer C from P. So here, in ‘real’ terms we have a 
plausible situation. On learning that the tide is out, and, given some local 
knowledge to the effect of G1, Sarah is satisfied that she and Sam can get to the 
island. 
 
But now suppose that by some means Sarah knows both that the tide is out, and 
that the island can be reached whenever the tide is out. Then she knows the 
conclusion is true because it follows from the stated premise P, together with the 
truth of G1. Surely she must still say that the argument is sound, since what she 
knows is sufficient to justify that conclusion. But on interrogation we find that 
Sarah’s knowledge of G1 was based on her knowledge that the island can be 
reached whatever the state of the tide, which entails not only G1 but also 
(G2) If the tide is not out we can get to the island.  
and likewise validates the argument: 
(11) The tide is not out 
  (So) we can get to the island. 
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Furthermore (11) would be a sound argument if uttered at any time at which the 
tide was not out. But that would not sit well with (10), since it would then be 
irrelevant on Sam’s part to mention the tide in connection with getting to the 
island. Concluding C from P, though not unsound, would be incomprehensible as an 
argument. Sarah would be justified in responding: ‘What has the tide got to do with 
getting to the island?’ or just, ‘What does “so” mean in what you have said?’  
 
The soundness of (11) does not conflict with (10)’s being sound. Yet on any day-to-
day reckoning, (10) would be a bad (in the sense of pointless or senseless) 
argument if (11) were sound also. The problem is well known. Its root, as observed 
earlier, is the classical theorem: B  (A  B), from which, by substitution, we can 
derive both C  (P  C) and C  (~P  C). This is commonly referred to as a 
paradox, although in this particular case, it is not so very paradoxical. There would 
be nothing unusual about an island that could be reached whatever the state of the 
tide – by a causeway perhaps – so that, if the island is reachable in any event, it 
follows that it is reachable if the tide is out, and that it is reachable if the tide is in; 
or (like Fermat’s theorem) if the sky is blue. None of these makes the others false; 
there is no paradox in that respect. However, if the island can be reached whether 
the tide is out or not out then there is no point or purpose in arguing that it can be 
reached on the grounds that the tide is out; nor any need to assert that the island 
can be reached if the tide is out. So, whilst G1 is not false just because G2 is true, it 
can still be said to be misleading. In Gricean terms (10) – and accordingly G1 – has 
the clear implicature that if the tide were not out, it would not (or might not) be 
possible to get to the island. Supposing that Sam knew perfectly well that the island 
could be reached whatever the state of the tide, he would be saying something less 
(i.e. something weaker) than he knows to be the case, if he argued from P to C. 
Asserting that G1 is equivalent to asserting that either P is false or C is true; but 
according to the present scenario Sam knows that C is true and that P is not false.  
 
One practical problem with the practice of assumption-ascription in argument 
analysis is that not everything that may seem to be implied (conversationally) by 
the author in an argument-text is an implicit assumption for the argument – i.e. 
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necessary for the conclusion to follow from the stated premise(s). Making a related 
point, Jackson (1979; 1981) claims that a conditional has a low level of assertibility 
if its consequent is known to be true regardless of the antecedent.62 He measures 
the assertibility of a conditional statement such as ‘if P, C’ in terms of its 
‘robustness’ with respect to P. He considers the following situation, which is 
somewhat analogous to Sam’s argument. A two-horse race has resulted in a win for 
Hyperion (over Hydrogen). If, knowing this, I report that either Hyperion or 
Hydrogen has won then, says Jackson (1979: 116), ‘Everyone agrees I have done 
the wrong thing’. That changes if all that I know is that the winner’s name began 
with ‘H’, even if I also know that Hydrogen was a rank outsider and could not have 
won except under extraordinary circumstances. For then there is still some point or 
purpose to saying that the winner was either Hydrogen or Hyperion. Indeed, for the 
purpose of arguing that Hyperion must (almost certainly) have won, it would be 
relevant to the argument to know that either Hydrogen or Hyperion won, because 
of the improbability of the only alternative outcome. Likewise, ‘If Hydrogen or 
Hyperion won, then Hyperion must have won’, is assertible. But its assertibility 
would fall to zero if the speaker knew at the time of asserting it that Hyperion had 
won anyway.  
 
‘Arguable’ can have a similar sense to ‘assertible’ in a context such as ‘Given X, it is 
arguable that Y’. If the island can be reached, it is true that if the tide is out the 
island can be reached; but it would be odd to say that this was ‘arguably’ true. This, 
I take it, goes some way towards vindicating Hamblin’s E5 as a necessary 
concomitant of the E-criteria. There must be conceivable room for doubt about the 
conclusion in order to judge whether the argument establishes the conclusion. But 
if the audience is required to know that the premise(s) are true, and that they 
establish the conclusion, E5 cannot be met. So do we say that for an expression to 
be a good argument it must, as well as being sound, also be ‘arguable’ with 
something like Jackson’s sense of ‘assertible’? Certainly there are sound arguments 
                                                     
62
 I ignore Jackson’s distinction (1981: 130) between ‘assertibility’ and ‘assertability’ since it does not 
have direct relevance here. There is a discussion of the distinction in Chakraborty (2001: 106ff). 
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that are not useful or relevant as persuasive instruments; and that might seem a 
warranted reason for eliminating them from what we want to call ‘good’ 
arguments. This would make soundness at most a necessary condition. But that is 
something that we should accede to anyway.    
 
Summary of Hamblin’s argument  
I. To rightly be judged ‘good’ an argument must demonstrate that it would 
persuade an ideally rational audience of the truth of a claim to which he or she 
would not necessarily accede without the benefit of the argument.  
II. To meet condition I, the argument must be sound: the premises must be true 
and the conclusion must follow from the premises, and hence the conclusion must 
be true also.  
III.  For the audience to be satisfied that Condition II is met, they must know that 
if the premises are true, the conclusion is true also. But if, in order to judge that the 
argument is good, the audience must know – or possess sufficient information to 
know – that the conclusion (as well as the premises) is true, then Condition I cannot 
be met. 
  
Traditional logic does not resolve or even address this dilemma because it is not a 
logician’s dilemma. Logic is concerned with validity, not with soundness. It defines a 
sound argument as a valid argument with true premises, but maintains a strict 
separation between the two issues – validity and truth – so that there is no 
interference by one in the assessment of the other. Thus for example, an argument 
that is unsound due to the logical falsity or inconsistency of its premise(s) may 
nonetheless be judged valid under EFQ. This has led many informal logicians, 
looking for a calculus by which to evaluate natural-language arguments, to reject 
classical methods as irrelevant or inappropriate. Certainly for Hamblin this 
separation is seen as a limitation on the part of logic, rather than a strength, at 
least in relation to natural-language reasoning, and especially to argument that is 
not overtly deductive. The logician can say with finality that an argument is valid if 
the conclusion cannot be false when the premises are true. But the critical 
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appraiser – in the field – cannot judge a particular, putative argument to have met 
that standard without some way of knowing whether the conclusion (as well as the 
premises) is true. But having that knowledge, paradoxically, seems to rob the critic 
of the crucial litmus test: whether a given argument would establish a conclusion 
that would otherwise be in doubt; or would persuade a rational critic who needed 
persuading.  
 
That, in broad terms, is Hamblin’s negative argument. I shall offer my own response 
to it in §19. But first it is necessary to examine the positive proposals for which 
Hamblin’s negative argument is intended to pave a way. 
 
18. The alternative: dialectical criteria 
Hamblin’s solution, on which I shall dwell fairly briefly here, is to modify the criteria 
of appraisal. To modify the criteria of appraisal is not necessarily to modify the 
definition of a good argument. An argument may be good without our knowing or 
being able to know whether it is good or not, either because we do not know 
whether or not all its premises are true, or because we do not have the knowledge 
to judge whether the conclusion in fact follows from them. Equally the argument 
may be bad without our being aware of its flaw or flaws. Hamblin does not 
expressly deny that an argument’s premises either are or are not true, or the 
reasoning sound or unsound. His point is that appraisal can and should be 
conducted without reference to these criteria, or expectation that they can be met. 
In his own words: 
The modified criteria, which I shall call dialectical ones, are formulated without the 
use of the words ‘true’ and ‘valid’; or the word ‘known’, which would imply truth. 
With this difference they run closely parallel to the epistemic criteria. (Hamblin 
1970: 245. Hamblin’s italics.) 
The dialectical requirements Hamblin proposes rest on acceptance by the parties to 
the discussion in which a given argument is contextualised. These criteria (prefixed 
‘D’) are as follows: 
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(D1)  The premises must be accepted. 
For ‘accepted’ one may read ‘accepted by X’, where the name of any person or 
group of persons may be put for ‘X’, provided the same substitution is made all the 
way though.  
(D2) The passage from premises to conclusion must be of an accepted kind.63  
(D4) Unstated premises must be of the kind that are accepted as omissible.  
(D5) The conclusion must be such that, in the absence of the argument, it would 
not be accepted.  
In respect of the crucial D5, he adds: ‘If we are prepared to countenance degrees of 
acceptance, we can weaken this to: The conclusion must be such that, in the 
absence of the argument, it would be less acceptable than in its presence.’(Hamblin 
1970: 245 [his emphasis]). This addendum has something in it of Jackson’s 
robustness criterion (see previous section). An argument that is robust in respect of 
its premises mirrors an implication that is robust in respect of its antecedent. The 
argument ‘P and so C’ is a good argument if, as well as P and C both being true, C 
gains more acceptability from P than it would have without P’s having been given in 
support of it. Do Hamblin’s modifications solve the (alleged) problem posed by E5? 
That is, does the replacement of E1-5 with the proposed ‘dialectic criteria’ solve the 
problem? Insofar as it removes the need to know the truth of the conclusion, then 
it seems clear that it works, especially if degrees of acceptance are permitted. A 
conclusion may be judged to have gained in acceptability from the argument 
without having to be true, less still known to be true.  
 
Hamblin’s modified criteria come at an obvious cost, however. As he himself 
concedes (though he may not see it as a concession himself):  
(T)his makes the whole question of the worth of an argument a relative matter ... 
(A)n onlooker who wishes to apply these criteria to the assessment of an argument 
must decide from whose point of view he wishes it assessed – the arguer’s, the 
                                                     
63
 The reason for the absence of a D3 is the same as for the absence of an E3, as explained in §16, 
above (footnote 57).  
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addressee’s, or his own. When an onlooker pretends to give an ‘absolute’ or 
‘impersonal’ assessment, the point of view is largely his own. (Hamblin 1970: 245) 
One very obvious cost is that two arguments with contradictory conclusions drawn 
from the same true premises may both be rightly judged good arguments on the 
grounds that for X the passage from P to C is of an acceptable kind, and for Y the 
passage from P to not-C is of an acceptable kind. Let’s say that in X’s case the 
reasoning for C is construed as abductive, and approved because it provides the 
best possible, or only feasible, explanation for the agreed truth of P. Let’s also say 
that in Y’s case the reasoning is construed as a reductio ad absurdum, and C is 
denied (and not-C therefore affirmed) on the grounds that C has contradictory 
consequences. An onlooker (Z) who wishes to apply the criteria is then in effect an 
adjudicator; but whether he concurs with X or with Y, the point of view is, as 
Hamblin says, ‘largely his own’, and any claim to objectivity a ‘pretence’ – a kind of 
role-play. Besides, to be objective, Z would have to be in a position to know which, 
if either, of X’s or Y’s interpretations of the reasoning was the right one, or the 
better one; and to have to know that would be to reinstate one or more of the 
epistemic criteria that Hamblin claims to be too strong.  
 
Returning to Sam’s argument, it seems an intolerable outcome that the worth of 
his reasoning should depend upon whether Sarah accepts the premise and its 
implications or not. She can see that the tide is out; she may know, or not know, 
that the island is reachable at the time of Sam’s claiming that it is. She may (may 
not) know or simply accept that G1: if the tide is out the island is reachable; and 
she may (may not) know or accept that G2: the island would be reachable if the 
tide were not out, making G1 robust with respect to P, as well as merely true. But 
each of these is the case or not the case regardless of whether Sarah knows or 
accepts them. And it follows from this that Sam’s argument is either good or bad 
regardless of Sarah’s attitudes to its premises or its reasoning. I as appraiser 
(Hamblin’s ‘onlooker’) am assisted in my appraisal neither by knowing what Sarah 
knows or by what she accepts, but only by what is so. It is alethic criteria, surely, 
that determine whether the argument is good or not. If we depart from this we are 
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pushed in practice, it seems, either to relativistic, pragmatic criteria, or to epistemic 
ones, with unwanted consequences either way. 
 
19. Response to Hamblin 
Hamblin’s thesis, as we have seen, has two parts, a positive one and a negative 
one. In the positive part he introduces the criteria that he goes on to develop into 
‘a formal dialectic’ in the subsequent chapter. With this in mind he maps the 
dialectic criteria onto the alethic and epistemic which he has found both wanting 
and problematic in the preceding negative part of the chapter. It is open to 
question whether the negative argument is entirely open-minded: that is, whether 
it represents a genuine inquiry into the applicability of formal concepts to ‘real’ 
arguments, or whether the rejection of formality was motivated by his preferred, 
pragmatic approach. There are indeed different ways of appraising arguments 
depending to a large degree on what one’s theoretical interests are. Acts of 
argumentation in a dialectical framework, and arguments construed as abstract 
objects, differ from one another on a polar scale, and certainly cannot be evaluated 
along the same lines. To use a somewhat overworked term, they belong to 
different paradigms. Therefore my aim in the rest of this section will not be to 
assess the positive case Hamblin, along with many others, makes for a dialectical 
theory of appraisal, but for now to venture some critical comments on the negative 
arguments. 
 
Hamblin starts out from the premise that arguments can be assessed as good or 
bad without further, technical ado; in particular without analysis and classification, 
or even identification as arguments. Likewise he is reluctant to offer any firm 
appraisal criteria, yet ready to deny outright that the terms ‘valid’ and ‘invalid’ have 
any central role to play:   
The first thing we need to do is deny one thing that most of the elementary logic 
books affirm. A distinction is faithfully made between the truth or falsity of the 
premises and conclusion, on the one hand, and the validity or otherwise of the 
inference process on the other. A valid argument, it is said, may have completely 
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false premises and it may thus have a completely false conclusion. But this is a 
complete misrepresentation of the nature of argument. (Hamblin 1970: 231-2)  
Here Hamblin’s disdain for formal logic, as a tool of appraisal, is undisguised. In 
indulging it, however, he transgresses an important part of his own declared aim. If 
he is unwilling to venture a view on what an argument is, he is in a poor position to 
assert so forcefully what it is not. Worse, he mistakes the logician’s definition of 
validity (above) for a representation of ‘the nature of argument’, which it is not. To 
say that a valid argument may have false premises is not a statement about what 
argument or inference are, but about what validity is. The distinction he describes 
as being ‘faithfully’ observed by logicians is not, anyway, a fair representation of 
classical logic. Johnson (2000: 85) justly remarks that Hamblin was ‘fuzzy on the 
distinction’ between argument, inference, reasoning, and, above all, implication. 
This is not so surprising perhaps, since they are fuzzy terms. All have a tendency to 
ambiguity between the activities of arguing and inferring on the one hand, and the 
objects inferred, or the arguments advanced, on the other. The ambiguity is 
apparent in the Hamblin extract above, but it is not explicitly acknowledged. The 
process of inferring is something performed by an agent, and clearly its ‘validity’, if 
that is the right word to use at all of an act, is of a different order from the relative 
truth or falsity of the propositions (or sentences) to and from which the inference is 
made. As Hamblin goes on to say, platitudinously: ‘in practice we like our premises 
to be true, and we do not describe an argument as good if the premisses are false.’ 
(Hamblin 1970: 232). But all this amounts to is that in practice we like our 
inferences to be (at least) sound: the validity of an argument, for very obvious 
reasons, is insufficient warrant to believe or assert its conclusion. But then no one 
with the most elementary grasp of logic would claim that a merely valid argument 
is sound; nor even that a sound argument is necessarily ‘good’.  
 
Nor is classical validity a statement about ‘the nature of argument’, especially ‘real’ 
argument. The fact is, the test of validity can be performed on a sequence of 
propositions or sentences regardless of whether or not it is conceived of as an 
argument, even on the standard (e.g. Copi’s) definition. When an argument is put 
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or expressed, or advanced, then, indeed, something is ‘claimed to follow’ from 
another thing or other things; and in any kind of practical context that would 
suggest the latter are likewise claimed to be true. But the bare sequence of 
propositions or sentences makes no such claims itself, because ‘claiming’ is an act 
(even if it is merely notional for the purpose of the definition). Acts, actually 
performed, require agents to perform them. (Even envisaged acts require 
envisaged agents.) In many modern logic texts (e.g. Bergmann et al. 2004: 9), 
‘conclusion’ is merely a designation. Indeed the term ‘argument’ is often dropped 
by logicians in preference for ‘sequent’. For the purpose of assessing validity the 
‘designation’ could as well be expressed in terms of a proposition’s being to the 
right or left of the turnstile, with the complex being valid if and only if the RHS 
cannot be false if the LHS is true. Hamblin has a point therefore if he is saying that 
an argument, understood as a ‘process of inference’, is misrepresented if it is 
equated with an object which can be assessed as valid. But who would disagree?  
 
Hamblin’s underlying objection to arguments conceived of as objects of appraisal 
by the standard of validity is that they are not ‘real’ arguments. Generally ‘real’ 
argument is contrasted with the artificial, contrived, or inauthentic. Hamblin’s 
criticism is unusual in that he contrasts ‘real’ argument with ‘hypothetical’ 
argument, by which he means something like suppositional or provisional. In my 
view this confuses an argument – in the abstract, or on the page – with the practice 
of arguing or inferring, ‘real’ argument being the latter. Worse, however, Hamblin 
blurs the distinction between inference and implication (as Johnson, too, 
complains). Logic, it is fair to say, is indifferent to the actual truth value of the 
premises, so that the question can be asked: ‘If the premises are all true, could the 
conclusion be false?’, or ‘Could all of the premises and the negation of the 
conclusion be an inconsistent set?’ Then only if the answer is ‘No’ is the argument 
valid. The question of validity has to be a hypothetical question.  
 
Hamblin fails to see that the hypothetical nature of the logical question is its 
strength, seeing it instead as a deficiency. The tell-tale passage is here:  
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It will be said [in logic]: Arguments occur not only in the form ‘P therefore Q’ or ‘Q 
because P’, but also sometimes, when we discuss the passage from the premiss to 
the conclusion, without becoming committed to the premiss or the conclusion 
themselves. We say ‘If P then Q’; and in this form an argument can be presented, 
discussed, validated and agreed to quite independently of whether P or Q are true or 
false. In some sense, in fact (it would be said), this is the proper form of an argument 
so far as the logician is concerned, because he is not involved in the question of 
actual truth or falsity of the statements in his examples, but only with the inference-
process that they exemplify.  
The answer to this is that ‘If P, then Q’ is not a real argument at all, but only a 
hypothetical argument. It says that a certain hypothetical statement P, which I am 
not now making, would serve if I were to invoke it, as a premiss for a possible 
conclusion Q; but the argument remains hypothetical because I do not necessarily, 
now argue in this way. A real argument has real premisses and conclusion, not 
hypothetical ones. (Hamblin 1970: 233.)  
Here, I would argue, Hamblin is again conflating two quite unrelated issues, 
presumably in preparation for the dialectical criteria he ultimately intends to put in 
place. Hence he introduces the distinction between ‘real’ and what he is calling 
hypothetical argument. But it is a straw man. First, logicians are not in the habit of 
saying that the proper form of argument is a conditional (or hypothetical) 
statement. Clearly, ‘If P then Q’ is not a real argument at all, because it is not an 
argument at all. But who would say ‘If P then Q’ was a real argument? A logician (of 
formal or informal persuasion) may, as Hamblin observes, discuss the passage from 
premise to conclusion in hypothetical terms; and is right do so because that is the 
surest means by which to separate the critical questions: 1) does a relation of 
consequence hold; 2) are the premises true? But that is very different from saying 
that an argument, when judged to be valid, has a hypothetical form. It is true to say 
that in stating ‘If P then Q’ I am not stating ‘P’, as a premise, but merely supposing 
what would follow if it were invoked as a premise. That, however, is just the 
difference between the conditional form and the argument form, ‘P (and) therefore 
Q’. But a few lines later Hamblin (1970: 234) anticipates and brushes off this 
objection with a claim that ‘examples in logic books are mostly hypothetical ones 
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anyway, even when they are in “therefore” form’. This is ad hoc as well as wrong. 
The form of the standard expression of an argument determines that, P, if 
expressed, is a statement, rather than a mere posit or supposition. That is, if I utter 
an expression of the form, ‘P and therefore Q’, with its usual meaning, I state or 
assert P and I state it as a premise for the conclusion that Q. By contrast, if I utter 
an expression of the form, ‘If P then Q’, I do not assert P (or Q), but only the whole 
conditional. This has nothing to do with the question of whether the argument is 
‘real’ or otherwise, but with whether or not P – in the standard expression of an 
argument – occurs as the antecedent of a conditional, or in detachment, as the 
premise of an argument. In an argument it is plainly the latter. 
 
Nor does this question have anything to do with whether P is actually stated or not, 
as Hamblin appears to suggest. ‘P’ need not be uttered at all. The whole argument, 
along with its premises, may be stated or unstated. Indeed, if we recall Copi’s 
standard definition of an argument (see §1 above), we see that the premises and 
conclusion of an argument are held to be propositions (or perhaps sentences), not 
statements – at least not statements in the sense of acts of stating.64 When and if 
an argument is advanced, then P is stated and C claimed to follow from P. But the 
form of the complex expression ‘P and therefore C’ is the same whether actually 
expressed, or merely contemplated as an abstract object. Lemmon (1965: 1) makes 
the point as follows, without confusing an argument per se with the expressing of 
an argument (or process of inferring): 
When an argument is used seriously by someone (and not, for example, just cited as 
an illustration), that person is asserting the premisses to be true and also asserting 
the conclusion to be true on the strength of the premisses. Logicians are concerned 
with whether a conclusion does or does not follow from the given premisses.  
                                                     
64
 ‘Statement’, may be added to the long list of terms that is used with a measure of ambiguity, or 
difference of emphasis. It may be understood at times to mean what is stated, or the act of stating. 
‘Statement’ is also used in a grammatical sense to mean a declarative sentence in some contexts. 
Lemmon (1965: 1), in a definition of argument otherwise practically identical to Copi’s, classifies the 
constituents as either propositions or statements, but without specifying which (one or more) of 
these meanings ‘statement’ has.  
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‘Seriously’ here means ‘when put to use’ or ‘for a purpose’ (other than illustration). 
But the notion of an argument used seriously, and the informal logician’s concept 
of ‘real argument’, do not line up with one another. Where Hamblin has a point is 
in his saying that logic assesses arguments hypothetically. But he is wrong if by that 
he means that the arguments examined by logicians are hypothetical (or unreal). If 
they are arguments they are as real, and their premises as categorical, as those that 
are put to ‘serious’ use. The difference is that for argument in use the truth of the 
premises must be known, or the argument rejected (or judgement on it reserved), 
because an argument with false premises cannot be taken seriously or trusted to 
yield a true conclusion; whereas for the purposes of assessing validity the truth of 
the premises need only be posited provisionally. 
  
I consider this part of Hamblin’s account to be its main weakness. This is a view 
evidently shared by Johnson (2000), although Johnson’s criticism is that Hamblin 
does not go far enough in distancing his methodology from formal logic. ‘To that 
degree’, Johnson (2000: 85) says, ‘[Hamblin’s] critique remained well within the 
orbit of traditional logic (with its bias for deductivism65), even though his thinking 
contained hints of a significant break with that tradition.’ Johnson observes, too, 
that given Hamblin’s reluctance to offer a definition or classification of argument in 
advance of attempting to define good argument, he failed to provide a sufficiently 
clear conception of argument to justify his proposed dialectical framework – a 
framework which Johnson also takes as the defining one for argument. This is a fair 
observation by Johnson. Hamblin struggles to distance himself sufficiently from the 
language and paraphernalia of deductive reasoning to make his objections to it 
clear. For instance, as seen earlier, the attempt to apply E2 without the sanction of 
any particular rules of inference or methodology, required the ‘taking for granted’ 
of implicit assumptions that, if true, effectively render an argument deductively 
sound, or if false show it to be flawed. That, as Johnson, implies, is close in essence 
to deductivism. For my own part I have no quarrel with deductivism – quite the 
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 In Informal Logic, deductivism, or Natural-Language Deductivism (NLD), is broadly a methodology 
whereby arguments that are not formally deductive are construed as deductive and appraised 
accordingly.  
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contrary – but Hamblin is not making a case for deductivism; and for Johnson it is 
anathema.  
 
20. Appraisal procedure 
Hamblin, then, takes issue with the traditional distinction made in logic between 
the truth or falsity of the premises and conclusion, on the one hand, and validity on 
the other; and with the hypothetical character, as he sees it, of the latter. But 
neither the separation, nor the hypothetical nature of claims of validity, is an 
inadequacy on the part of logic, as Hamblin seems to be saying. Rather, it is the 
means by which logic enables the inquirer to separate the concepts of necessity, 
consequence, entailment etc. from the content of individual arguments, and the 
truth or falsity of their content. Hamblin, of course, is moving straight to the 
appraisal of the individual (‘real’) arguments, with stated premises and claimed 
consequences. So for him the question of the truth of premises comes to the front. 
Once it is decided that P is false, any ‘real’ (serious / purposeful) argument must be 
rejected. That is unobjectionable. But if it is decided that P is true, then the basis for 
critical appraisal is no longer hypothetical. And that is why Hamblin takes the view 
that alethic criteria are too weak, and why, too, epistemic criteria are too strong.  
 
But aside from the question of criteria, there is a further line of objection to 
Hamblin’s account that concerns the procedure he lays down for the appraisal. As I 
suggested earlier Hamblin is confusing the argument in use with the appraisal of 
the argument itself. The confusion is easy to make because an appraisal – if critical 
– is also an argument: a critical argument, or appraisal argument. But the 
distinction is important. The object of appraisal is a sequence of propositions 
comprising one or more premises and a conclusion. In an argument in use, the 
premises are asserted and a conclusion drawn by the speaker, typically (though not 
invariably) for the purpose of persuading an audience of the truth of some further 
proposition. This audience is the target audience. The target audience experiences 
and responds to the argument directly, by being persuaded or not. This audience 
belongs to the dialectical system within which Hamblin conceives of arguments; but 
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he does not distinguish between the target audience, on the one hand, and the 
critic (or critical audience) on the other. The critic is not (or not necessarily) in the 
target audience. The same person may be both a target and a critic of an argument, 
but, if so, will wear two quite different hats. It is perhaps clearer therefore to think 
of the ‘audiences’ as representing different perspectives rather than individual 
persons. 
  
Now, if the argument is a sound one, and the target audience is rational, they will 
experience the accrual of knowledge (or strengthened belief) that follows from 
acquaintance with the premises. But they will have the experience only if they do 
not already know the conclusion. It is in that dialectical context that Hamblin’s E5 
(the requirement that the conclusion be in some doubt prior to the argument) is 
needed. To put it another way, because the argument operates affectively on the 
target audience, the effect is lost if the conclusion is already known. However, if the 
conclusion is known, something else may be experienced; for example appreciation 
of the quality of the reasoning. But in making a judgement of that sort, the 
audience has on its critical hat, for which antecedent knowledge of the truth or 
falsity of the conclusion is no impediment.  
 
As already stated, the critical response to an argument is itself an argument 
(Finocchiaro 2005: 92ff), whose conclusion is a verdict on the soundness of the 
object-argument: P ; C. Whatever the object-argument’s inner form of reasoning 
might be, the critical argument addresses two basic questions. The first is whether 
every member of the premise-set, P, is true; the second whether C follows clearly 
from P. If and only if both questions are answered in the affirmative, then the 
conclusion of the critical argument – its verdict – will be that the object-argument is 
sound: 
(12)  P  
P  C  
‘P ; C’ is sound  
120 
 
 
 
Of course, the critical argument, having a judgemental conclusion, is open to 
higher-level criticism: one critic may approve or disapprove of another’s verdict, 
just as the first may approve or disapprove of the object-argument (initiating a 
process that in theory may be repeated ad infinitum). A first-level appraisal – which 
is as far as we need to take things here – is a sound appraisal if and only if the 
premises of the critical argument, (12), are correctly judged to be true (false). Given 
the form of (12) we can see that appraisal places a deductive overlay (namely 
modus ponens) on the object-argument.  
 
This does not mean that the object-argument itself is deductive. Hamblin’s 
desideratum that the method of argument appraisal should be applicable to 
arguments regardless of the ‘nature of the passage’ from P to C is not challenged 
here; it is shared. What is challenged is the claim that E-criteria are too strong as a 
basis for appraisal without E5. The perceived need for E5 results from a failure to 
recognise that there are two arguments in play: the object-argument which is 
sound only if the alethic criteria are met, and the critical argument which is sound 
only if they are correctly judged to have been met. This paves the way for an 
appraisal procedure without Hamblin’s counter-intuitive E5.  
 
There is one further and much simpler procedural point that Hamblin overlooks: 
one so obvious that it raises the suspicion that he omits it intentionally. His method 
of appraisal begins with assessment of the truth of the premises followed by 
assessment of the ‘passage ... to the conclusion’ (Hamblin 1970: 233). Effectively 
the critic says: ‘I am satisfied that these premises are true; now do they imply the 
conclusion?’ But why would Hamblin order the procedural tasks in a way which, on 
reflection, leads to the paradoxical problems discussed earlier? One way to 
summarise Hamblin’s problem is that once the truth of the premises is known to 
satisfy E1, then the conclusion must be known to meet E2. But once the truth of 
the conclusion is known, the opportunity is lost to ask the hypothetical question 
needed to assess for validity, namely: ‘If the premises are true, could the 
conclusion be false?’ The circularity with which Hamblin charges the application of 
E-criteria can broken by a simple, procedural rule:  
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P-RULE:  Ask the hypothetical question first; the substantive question second.  
Another way to explain the efficacy of this rule is simply to observe that asking the 
substantive question first closes the process prematurely: it blocks the remaining 
steps that are needed to complete the process. To remedy the problem, all that is 
needed is to establish the possibility of soundness – i.e. by assessing for validity – 
before addressing the question of actual soundness – i.e. by verifying the premises. 
Then we have a full warrant for the conclusion, without circularity in the process, 
and without the need for the counter-intuitive E5. 
 
21. Acceptability versus objectivity 
Hamblin sketches out in the last part of his book a ‘formal dialectic’. Dialectic, he 
says, ‘is a more general study than Logic’ (Hamblin 1970: 255–56). It starts out from 
‘the concept of a dialectical system... a regulated dialogue or family of dialogues’ 
involving a number of participants, in the simplest case two. Drawing on the ideas 
explored towards the end of the previous section, we can see that these 
participants consist of the speaker (arguer) and the target audience. The 
interaction between these two participants (or categories of participant) is what 
constitutes a ‘dialectical system’.  
 
It is, in essence, a closed system, into which the critical appraiser may look but in 
which he does not necessarily participate; nor necessarily have the same 
involvement or interest, or even the same perceptions, as those ‘on the inside’. In 
Hamblin’s own words: ‘We shall not be concerned to consider any contact with the 
empirical world outside the discussion-group’ (ibid.). This makes sense of the 
applicability of the criterion of acceptance within the particular ‘dialectical system’. 
It might be a special system: Hamblin cites parliamentary debate, or juridical 
examination and cross-examination, which have their own peculiar rules of 
engagement, definitions, protocols, etc. But it may also be a much larger cultural 
group; even the whole linguistic community. Brandom (1983: 640) inclines towards 
a view of this sort, though on a larger scale than the microcosmic dialectical 
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systems Hamblin seems to have in mind. Brandom contrasts two approaches to the 
question of what makes an inference appropriate or not. The first, which he dates 
back to Frege, Russell, and Carnap, holds that an inference is correct ‘just in case 
the truth conditions of its conclusion are a subset of the truth conditions of its 
premises. On this line inferences are to be appraised in terms of their faithfulness 
to the objective reality that determines which sets of representations are correctly 
inferable from which others’ (ibid.). But he continues:  
Another approach, which we may identify with Dewey and the later Wittgenstein, 
begins with inference conceived as a social practice, whose component 
performances must answer originally not to an objective reality but to communal 
norms. Here the appropriateness of an inference consists entirely in what the 
community whose inferential practices are in question is willing to approve, that is to 
treat or respond to as in accord with their practices (ibid.).  
Macro or micro, the point is broadly the same: if the appraiser is within the group, 
he or she will tend to judge truth, and valid inference, by the norms that operate 
inside the system. If he or she is outside the system, looking in, then it will still be 
appropriate to relate any critical judgements to what passes for truth and validity in 
the context of the observed community – if the appraiser has that insight – because 
what counts as a good argument in that system is what people in that system will 
accept. As H.G. Wells’ famous parable illustrated, in the country of the blind the 
one-eyed man is not king but an outsider, whose judgements are considered fallible 
on the inside.  
 
The fact is, however, that the critical appraiser is not an outsider; nor is the 
appraiser of the appraiser, and so on. Each must make appraisals of others’ 
arguments in the light of the norms of the linguistic community of which the 
particular dialectical system may be considered a representative slice. But that in 
turn does not alter the basic criteria which intuitively we take to define a good 
argument. It remains the case that a good argument is one which is deemed to 
have true premises and a conclusion that follows from the premises. As Brandom 
adds to the above:  
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The authorizing of inferences, that is of further assertions, which is our first clue 
about assertion is to be understood as part of the social practical significance of an 
assertive performance. In the usual sense, one asserts that the circumstances 
expressed by a declarative sentence obtain (ibid.). 
If, in the usual sense, one asserts that the circumstances expressed by a declarative 
sentence obtain, then it seems no less justified to say that in the usual sense one 
asserts that the relation expressed by a sound argument obtain. When an 
argument is put forward, the standard form of expression is a complex declarative 
sentence  
(13) P and therefore C, 
which is true if and only if : (i) the circumstance expressed by ‘P’ obtain; (ii) 
necessarily, the circumstances expressed by ‘C’ obtain if the circumstances 
expressed by ‘P’ obtain.  
 
Inferential practices are not any less grounded by ‘what obtains’ than assertive 
practices. People are still free to disagree about what it is for one circumstance to 
be the consequence of another, but surely no more so than to disagree about what 
it is for a circumstance to obtain in the first place. Lying and falsely asserting meet 
with disapproval because what is expressed in those instances is false, i.e. doesn’t 
obtain. What is expressed is not (conversely) false because it meets with 
disapproval. If we think of an argument as a complex proposition, asserting it will 
meet with disapproval if either the premises are false, or the premises are true but 
the conclusion does not follow. We can say that these are just communal norms, 
but they are communal norms in virtue of our notion of what obtains.  
 
Brandom states that assertion authorises inference. But if the inferential practice is 
not at least as well grounded as the initial assertion, the further assertion is not 
grounded, however well P is grounded. At the very least there must be confidence 
in the most basic instance of (13), namely 
(14) P and therefore P  
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If (14) is not universally approved as sound under conditions (i) and (ii), where is 
the warrant for (13)? And without the trivial (14) being valid, the fact that the 
circumstance represented by P obtained would not warrant an assertion that P.  
 
Ultimately, the view that inferential practices are determined by communal norms, 
subject to approval or acceptance within a community or dialectical system (rather 
than ‘objective reality’), cannot be refuted because we cannot step outside the 
community to which we belong to check out the reality. But if we widen the 
‘dialectical system’ sufficiently to take in the whole linguistic community, then the 
norms that are accepted by all the rational participants are the objective reality (or 
indistinguishable by those participants from objective reality).  
 
22. What is an argument? 
Hamblin declines to say what an argument is. His contention is that the question 
could and/or should be approached indirectly via the question of what a good 
argument is, and this chapter has traced the route on which this took him. In 
principle it may seem a reasonable expectation that if we can define, for any F, 
what a good F is, and by contrast what a bad one is, we can infer from the criteria 
we apply what an F is, per se. For instance, a good knife is one that cuts well 
because it is sharp, and a blunt knife is one that cuts badly because it is blunt. But 
clearly this does not yield a definition of a knife. A razor cuts well but is not a knife 
and a fish-knife cuts badly but is a knife. What it is to be a knife has to do with its 
construction and its parts; a blade, a handle and so on; and also on knowledge of its 
purpose, which is standardly to cut, but in special cases it is to open letters, de-
bone fish, etc. The standard definition of a knife is of such an object, designed for 
such a purpose. Then and only then can we judge whether or not the object is a 
good object of its kind on the basis of its fitness for the identified purpose.66 We do 
not discover from its fitness for cutting alone that it is a knife.  
 
                                                     
66
 There are of course values other than fitness for purpose. I am talking here about tools and 
utensils in particular. Arguments in use are tools.  
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To be just, Hamblin is not suggesting anything so crudely impracticable – but he can 
be accused of being somewhat disingenuous, since he helps himself to the standard 
definition of an argument, as a complex with certain parts, namely premises and a 
conclusion, whilst affecting to proceed without a definition. Hamblin’s actual 
objective is to define the criteria by which it can be judged whether an argument 
succeeds or fails, and he settles, by a process of elimination, on the standard he 
describes as dialectical. (Incidentally, his own method of argument is an exemplary 
piece of dialectic, beginning with the purely deductive, alethic thesis, rejecting it for 
the epistemic antithesis, and finally proposing a synthesis in the form of 
acceptability.) 
  
Having resolved the matter of criteria, Hamblin does not return to the question of 
what an argument is. But then, indirectly, he has answered it, not via inquiry into 
the criteria of appraisal, but by implicitly applying criteria one by one to the 
classical model of an argument. He does not, in this respect, explicitly give a 
dialectical definition of argument, as found for example in Walton (1990), Johnson 
(2000), van Eemeren & Grootendorst (2004), or Walton & Godden (2007). The 
more overtly dialectical approach adopted by these writers places less emphasis on 
the individual premise-conclusion object, and more on the process of argument or 
argumentation: an interchange leading to, ideally, the resolution of dispute. From 
this dialectical perspective, argument and arguments are what people do when 
they argue, and/or what they produce in the process respectively.  
 
The identification of argument with dialectic gives rise to a potential confusion – an 
ambiguity even – between, on the one hand, the practice or process of arguing, 
and, on the other, the product of the practice. (See discussion below §§24–26). 
There are some who deny the process-product dichotomy, and/or posit a third 
meaning of argument, qua abstract object, not necessarily produced by acts of 
argument (Simard-Smith & Moldovan 2011; Hitchcock 2007; Goddu 2011).67 Some 
                                                     
67
 Simard-Smith and Moldovan deny the ambiguity and argue that the only meaning of argument is 
that of an abstract object.  
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such abstract sense of argument would be needed to explain the notion of ‘the 
same argument’: say, the same sequence of premises and conclusion. Unless it is 
denied that one and the same argument can be advanced by more than one 
individual, and/or in different contexts, the third meaning of argument as an 
abstract object needs to be accounted for, and acceptance by the participants in 
any ‘dialectical system’ can hardly be a satisfactory criterion of appraisal. Only if it 
can be shown, or is stipulated, that arguments are the token acts or output of 
individuals in particular contexts of dispute or persuasion, etc., is it plausible to 
base appraisal on the acceptability of the premises and inference received from the 
participants in the interchange in which the argument occurs.  
 
The act/process and object/product senses that are given to ‘argument’ by 
different commentators and, in association with different theories of argument, are 
the source of much debate. In the coming sections my aim is to build the case for 
an account of argument which takes the object sense as the basis of the definition, 
and dialectic as a context within which arguments, as objects, may be advanced 
and challenged. Obviously arguing is rightly thought of as an activity or practice, 
and we call the activity ‘argument’, or ‘argumentation’, in a mass, generic sense. 
We also speak of certain acts as ‘acts of argument’: acts that consist of arguing in 
one guise or another. But I challenge the view that individual arguments are 
themselves primarily speech acts, and the related view that they are exclusively the 
products of acts of argument. Instead I take an argument to be the object of an act 
only insofar as it can be advanced or propounded or thought through, but not to 
the point of its being dependent for its identity upon being advanced, propounded, 
or thought through by an actual arguer. An argument may be advanced more than 
once, or never advanced at all. The propounding of an argument is an act, and 
involves certain contributory acts, notably reason-giving (or premising) and 
concluding, deducing, etc., which Searle (1965) and Hitchcock (2007) rightly classify 
as assertive acts. There are other acts too that may contribute to lengthier 
argumentations – questioning, challenging, supposing (for the sake of argument), 
etc. But the advancing or propounding of an argument – the act of arguing – is not 
itself an argument in the account I propose. Nor do I subscribe to the view that ‘an 
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argument’, ‘the argument’, ‘X’s argument’, etc., are ambiguous between an act and 
an object sense. Arguments (and argument-parts) are the object of acts of 
argument: there is no ambiguity of reference between those two uses.  
 
This position is by no means universally accepted, especially among argumentation 
theorists, pragma-dialecticians, and many proponents of informal logic. I proceed in 
the next short chapter to examine a sample of what may be called pragmatic 
definitions of argument.     
 
  
128 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR:  Pragmatic accounts 
 
23. Act or object? 
Symptoms of the act-object ambiguity are much in evidence in the opening chapter 
of Vorobej (2006: 1): 
An argument is a social activity, the goal of which is interpersonal rational 
persuasion. More precisely, we’ll say that an argument occurs when some person – 
the author of the argument – attempts to convince certain targeted individuals – the 
author’s audience – to do or believe something by an appeal to reasons, or evidence. 
An argument is therefore an author’s attempt at rational persuasion. Arguments 
admit of either oral or written expression, and the statement, or public presentation 
of an individual argument, is typically a fairly discrete communicative act, with fairly 
well-defined temporal or spatial boundaries. Argumentation, on the other hand, is 
the more amorphous social practice, governed by a multitude of standing norms, 
conventions, habits, and expectations, that arises from and surrounds the 
production, presentation, interpretation, criticism, clarification, and modification of 
individual arguments.  
Here Vorobej refers to an argument almost exclusively as an act, and moreover as a 
public act. He could hardly be more emphatic on this point in the above extract, 
where an argument is presented as a form of social activity, an attempt at 
persuasion, a token of the wider practice of argumentation; and so on. It is a case 
of high redefinition. It excludes cases where argument is conducted in private – for 
example, arguing to oneself – without having as its defining goal any ‘interpersonal 
rational persuasion’. ‘Argument’ in the mass-sense of the term, means all of these, 
uncontroversially. But in ascribing these descriptions to individual arguments, 
Vorobej is saying more than this. He emphasises this individuality further by saying 
that arguments are fairly discrete, and spatio-temporally defined. But in practically 
the same breath we find his individual arguments sliding into apparent object roles: 
objects of expression, production, presentation, criticism, and so on. Are we to take 
it that these individual arguments are still discrete spatio-temporal acts, and that it 
is acts therefore that are presented, produced, expressed, etc.? The familiar act-
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object relation, and the distinction that goes with it, is strained by this account, 
leading to an intrusive ambiguity. Acts of presenting or producing have objects, 
namely what is presented, what is produced. An (act of) argument can be 
performed by presenting an argument; that is a natural way to think of the act 
being performed. But ‘argument’ cannot have the same meaning in both 
occurrences in the previous sentence. There is a similar equivocation when it 
comes to the last sentence of the Vorobej extract. This may seem a narrow, quasi-
grammatical point, but the ambiguity lurking in many definitions of ‘argument’ 
(including the above), is not. It can result in a serious conflation of categories and 
consequent obscuring of meaning if it is not resolved.  
 
Vorobej also casts arguments as objects of both interpretation and criticism, which 
indeed they are. It is in these roles that arguments are chiefly of interest in this 
thesis, and in which they are central to critical thinking. To be sure, an act can be 
interpreted and criticised. ‘An attempt at rational persuasion’, for example, may be 
criticised (appraised) by an audience as a success or a failure, or interpreted as a 
straw man or a clever use of analogy. In general, an act of attempted persuasion 
can be judged to be well expressed, sincere, devious, and so on. But it cannot 
coherently be appraised as valid or sound or true. These predicates apply to 
objects, in the sense of that which the author presents in his or her attempt to 
persuade. To do justice to Vorobej, he does acknowledge the distinction, although 
belatedly and somewhat half-heartedly:  
Being composed of propositions, arguments, too, therefore are, in part, abstract 
objects. More precisely, arguments occur when individuals use certain ordered pairs 
of abstract objects in a particular way while engaged in an exercise in rational 
persuasion. (Vorobej 2006: 9) 
It is unclear what ‘in part’ is intended to mean here, although the impression it 
gives is that the object-sense of argument is subsidiary to that of the act-sense. But 
it may also, or instead, mean, that an argument is an abstract object only in virtue 
of its parts, the constituent propositions which, when used for argument purposes, 
form the objects of an act of argument.  
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Either way, the view I take is the reverse: that the primary sense of ‘argument’ is 
the object-sense, and the act of arguing is performed by presenting an argument: 
the object of the act. Vorobej says that arguments ‘occur’ when the arguer ‘uses’ 
an ordered set of sentences in a particular way. Is he saying that in part the 
argument is the proposition-set – i.e. the proposition-set is one part of the 
argument – and the other the act of arguing which defines it as an argument? Or is 
he saying that the ordered pair of objects, the proposition set, is an argument, 
ready, so to speak, for use for an argumentational purpose? If the latter, then the 
argument must be essentially independent of the act, and Vorobej must be saying 
that the object is an argument even when not expressed, presented, used, or 
interpreted. If it is the former, then there needs to be some explanation as to the 
extra ingredient that transforms the object into an argument. For whilst it is 
reasonable to suppose that we recognise arguments primarily by their use, or 
context, even to the extent that the concept of an argument may be 
comprehensible only in relation to its customary use, it does not follow that an 
object-pair used as an argument is different from the same object-pair not used as 
an argument – for example as a list of items of information. An obviously analogous 
question can be asked with regard to single propositions. For it could be argued 
that we understand the concept of a proposition only in relation to acts of asserting 
(something), or states of believing or knowing (something) – i.e. as the objects of 
so-called propositional attitudes. But it would be wrong to conclude from this fact 
about our powers of conceptualisation that a proposition is an assertion or belief. 
The same goes for an argument, the only difference being that in the case of 
‘argument’ we have just the one English word to serve both needs.  
 
Products of practice 
In many contemporary accounts the act-object relation is construed – and the 
ambiguity allegedly resolved – by defining an argument as the product of the act 
(practice, process) of argument. Johnson (2000: 12) states unreservedly:  
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The term ‘argument’ can be used to refer either to the process or to the product of 
that process.  
Similar views are expressed by Fogelin (1985), van Eemeren (2004), Freeman 
(2009), and, as we have seen, Vorobej. Most incline to the act or process as the 
primary sense we assign to an argument. There are others, however, who recognise 
the dual meaning of ‘argument’ as act and object respectively, but give primacy to 
neither. Goddu (2011: 87) takes this line. 
[R]estricting ourselves to talk of arguments as acts on the one hand and objects on 
the other in no way supports the intellectual or ontological priority of one aspect of 
argument over the other.  
The view that an argument is the product of the act, practice, or process of 
argument has received much attention in recent times. I turn there next, with 
particular reference to Ralph Johnson’s (2000) work: Manifest Rationality: a 
Pragmatic Theory of Argument. Most of the critical focus of the subsequent 
sections of this chapter is on Johnson’s account of argument, partly because of the 
influence it has had in the field of informal logic, but mainly because of the 
forthright statement it gives of the position I oppose. 
 
24. Johnson’s pragmatic account 
Johnson’s pragmatic theory of argument (as he describes it) is famously summed 
up in the following short extract:  
An argument is a type of discourse or text – the distillate of the practice of 
argumentation – in which the arguer seeks to persuade the Other(s) of the truth of a 
thesis by producing the reasons that support it. In addition to this illative core, an 
argument possesses a dialectical tier in which the arguer discharges his dialectical 
obligations. (Johnson 2000: 168) 
This is a strong and complex claim, and deserves the attention it has received, 
favourable and otherwise. There has been plenty of both. In the 2002 summer 
edition of Argumentation (16: 263–309), four respondents – Hansen, Tindale, 
Hitchcock, and Groarke lined up to challenge Johnson’s account of argument from 
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various standpoints, all but one citing the above definition for special attention. 
Whilst I recognise many insightful and provocative ideas in Johnson’s study, 
ultimately I, too, find its conclusions untenable. 
  
The definition has two parts, one relating to the illative (reason-giving) core, the 
other to the additional tier in which the arguer responds to the Other. The role of 
the Other is essential in this. That is not to say that an argument cannot be 
conducted in soliloquy. The Other might on occasions be the agent, or some 
anonymous audience; and the dialectical obligations can be met by inwardly 
anticipating objections and counter-arguments, just as if they were challenges put 
by actual others. However, Johnson is emphatic that the pre-eminent function of 
argument is: ‘persuading someone of the truth of something’ (Johnson 2000: 149), 
so that if argument extends to self-persuasion, inquiry, consolidating beliefs, etc. 
these are derivative functions and it is only from persuading others that we learn 
how to persuade ourselves. ‘In other words’, Johnson says: ‘the public precedes the 
private, as elsewhere in language’ (ibid.). On this reckoning, it would follow that the 
natural forum for reason-giving (as argument) is dispute. If there is no resistance or 
challenge to a claim, there is no need to give reasons for it, hence no need for 
argument.  
 
In Johnson’s account the twin components of the argument – the illative core and 
the dialectical tier – do not represent two stages, a reason-giving stage followed by 
a dialectical one, along the lines of a speaker giving a talk and then taking 
questions. The whole argument is informed by its persuasive purpose. If the illative 
core were isolated, by having its dialectical tier removed, what would remain would 
not have the character of an argument, in the sense Johnson has in mind. What he 
terms ‘the argument itself’ is not the illative core, although the illative core is the 
component which houses what might be thought of as the arguer’s basic case. The 
argument itself is shaped by the dialectic obligations, and without them it is in his 
view incomplete or unfinished.  
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Johnson (2000: 150) also insists that it is function that gives argument its form, and 
not vice versa.  
Given its purpose as rational persuasion, the structure of argument follows. That is, 
because I wish to persuade the Other by reason, I recognize that the claim I make 
must be supported by reasons or evidence of some sort. It is standard practice to 
refer to this material as the argument's premises. Hence, an argument initially 
appears as a premise-conclusion structure: A set of premises adduced in support of 
some other proposition that is the conclusion.  
[…] But when we consider the full implications of the fact that the arguer's purpose 
is to persuade rationally, it becomes clear that there must be more to an argument 
than just this illative core. The practice of argumentation itself, as well as any 
instance of it, takes place against a background of controversy. To argue is, we all 
realize, to enter into a space shared by many others also interested in the same 
issue, many of whom take a different position. The illative core is meant to initiate 
the process of converting them, persuading them of the arguer's position. In this 
context, more will be required to achieve this than just the material in the illative 
core.  
Adapting Johnson’s own metaphor of a product,68 we can think of the illative core 
as a kind of raw material that is fashioned into a full argument by the (typically 
opposing) forces at work in the practice of argument(ation). In that sense it is the 
product of the practice.  
 
To test the definition, as I interpret it, consider the following scenario. (It is not 
Johnson’s example, but I think it illustrates the definition fairly, if critically.) The 
Government, let’s say, is making the case for a change in the extradition treaty it 
has with another country, and the Opposition is proposing an amendment to the 
Bill. The Opposition case is the one we are considering, but to meet Johnson’s 
conditions, it must be examined in the context of the debate, the dialectical 
context. Suppose, for simplicity, that the main plank of the Opposition case for an 
                                                     
68
 Not his alone: it is a commonplace term to use for the object side of the supposed ambiguity of 
‘argument’. 
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amendment is that under the Bill the extradition arrangements would be one-
sided, making it easier for the other party to the treaty to extradite residents from 
the UK than for the UK to obtain extraditions in return. The dialectical tier, in this 
case, is plain. To be appreciated fully the Opposition argument must be seen as a 
response, not merely a stand-alone, premise-inference sequence – or what Johnson 
refers to as the ‘P+I model’ (ibid.). It must rebut the Proposition; but it must also, 
according to Johnson, anticipate objections to its own case. One very obvious 
‘dialectical obligation’ would be to represent the proposal accurately; not to distort 
or exaggerate its recommendations, or minimise obvious benefits. So, for example, 
the Opposition cannot claim that the treaty would be one-sided in virtue of some 
clause that is not in the proposed treaty; or that the Opposition represents in an 
inaccurate way that makes it seem more one-sided than if fairly represented. This 
would be a failing on the Opposition’s part to meet a dialectical obligation, a failure 
known as ignoratio elenchi. If in addition it made the Government’s argument an 
easier target for refutation, it would deserve censure as a straw man.  
 
25. The argument itself, and the core 
Johnson (2000: 134) refers to the whole or finished argument as: ‘the argument 
itself, best represented as the product (or the distillate) of the process’. This is to 
distinguish the product from the act, the argumentation. But it also distinguishes 
the argument as a whole from its illative core. This core is not, in Johnson’s 
account, the argument itself. This, I suggest, runs counter to the more familiar idea 
of a ‘core’ as something within a larger whole; its centre or main ingredients(s) with 
extraneous elements peeled away; and of ‘the argument itself’ as having that sense 
of encapsulation. For example, in referring to a novel I might have in mind the 
whole complex of events and characters, setting, plot, preface, illustrations (if any), 
etc.; or I might just mean the bare story-line, in which case I would emphasise this 
by calling it ‘the story itself’ to distinguish it from the full literary (or even physical) 
product. Johnson appears to be taking the former line, analogous to someone’s 
saying: ‘No, you can’t isolate the story from its setting like that. The novel itself is a 
mix of all these factors; the interplay between them, the background. If you 
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subtract these you have a different novel – maybe no novel.’ In this analogous case 
of course we have the benefit of separate words by which to identify the whole 
product and the core elements respectively. The ‘story itself’ and ‘the novel itself’ 
pick out quite different objects, whereas ‘the argument itself’ carries the burden of 
multiple connotations, one of which, according to Johnson, is the whole with all its 
dialectical accoutrements; the other by contrast, the inner core. This latter sense of 
‘argument itself’ is commonplace in the literature of informal logic and critical 
thinking, where texts are analysed and reconstructed to reveal the underlying 
structure of the argument. From this conception Johnson’s definition is something 
of a departure. Interestingly there is an outdated use of ‘argument’ to mean the 
bare plot of a chapter or story.69 This may seem inconsequential in fixing a 
definition; but it is at least consistent with the natural way in which we conceive of 
the argument in a text; amenable to extraction from the larger, more elaborate 
context.  
 
None of this, of course, prohibits Johnson (2000: 168) from defining these terms as 
he does, i.e. stipulatively: ‘As I said at the outset, I am clear that (my) definition is 
stipulative; it is my recommendation about how we should understand and define 
the term.’ His defence of the recommendation is that, whilst it does not purport to 
identify the sole or correct meaning of ‘argument’, it does locate the mid-range on 
a spectrum of applications; or in Johnson’s own more colourful terms: ‘a kind of 
penumbra – a centre with wings’ (ibid.). Drawing on his imagery, I take this to mean 
that Johnson’s conception of argument takes centre stage; with other meanings of 
‘argument’ lying to either side. Johnson identifies some of the other applications of 
the term which might be found on the spectrum: proofs, scientific theories, 
advertisements, and (curiously) jokes.  
 
Proto-arguments  
Johnson also consigns to the wings what he calls ‘proto-arguments’, by which he 
means arguments that lack a dialectical tier and/or that have not been produced 
                                                     
69
 In Spanish, argumento is still used to refer to the plot of a literary work.  
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through any practice of argument(ation), or used for rational persuasion. These 
bare entities would include for example classical syllogisms; or, as Johnson (2000: 
170) puts it, ‘specimens that are presented as paradigms of argument in the 
traditional view’. Johnson refers to these as ‘ground-floor’ arguments; unfinished; 
‘incomplete products’; ‘works in progress’ (ibid.). He also identifies them with the 
‘reasoning consisting of the illative core alone’ (ibid.).  
 
Without some clarification, this notion of proto-argument is unsatisfactory. For one 
thing it is a confusion of at least two different ideas. One is the idea that in a 
complete or fully developed argument there is some kind of base unit of reasoning, 
an initial move, on or from which the dialectical practice proceeds. In that respect it 
is almost a temporal distinction. We can imagine someone stating his or her case – 
a claim and some reason(s) to commend it – and then going on to defend it against 
objections or anticipated challenges. But there is a potential problem with this, in 
that the core argument that is initially stated may be wholly persuasive on some 
occasions; and the only response that it meets with is acceptance of the conclusion 
on the grounds given. Under those circumstances the dialectical obligations would 
have been met as soon as the reasons(s) for the claim were first given: in other 
words by the illative core. Moreover, in such a case, the distinction between the 
illative core and the argument itself collapses, since they are one and the same.  
 
There is a second, possibly milder problem, in that the initial move in an argument 
may not be an argument of any description. It may be a question, an answer to a 
question, or a plain assertion. If the assertion, or the answer to the question, is 
challenged, what ensues may be developed into argument, in the fullest sense, but 
without any initiating illative move. One way to deal with this is by simply allowing 
that the illative core can occur later in the exchange: say, at the first point at which 
one of the participants supplies a reason for a claim. On the face of it there is no 
obvious objection to this: a core does not have to be at the beginning of a sequence 
of objects. (Typically it is not; ‘core’ has the connotation of a centre more than a 
beginning.) But if a proto-argument can play the part of a response in a larger 
argument that is already underway, then arguably it belongs to the dialectical tier 
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not the initiating move. Between these two objections we see the possibility of an 
illative core with no dialectical tier; and a dialectical tier that has no illative core. 
There is a blurring of the distinction between core and tier, and therefore between 
proto-argument and argument as the product of argumentation. 
 
This blurring is not fatal because Johnson can, and as we have seen does, fall back 
on the idea of a spectrum, in which ‘argument’ can have other meanings besides 
the central meaning he assigns it. The counter-examples may be dismissed as 
rarities, with the paradigm case being the one where the proto-argument is just the 
launch-pad for the larger argument, and incomplete without the dialectical 
superstructure.  
What my position comes down to then is that the central case of ‘argument’ is the 
entire structure composed of the illative core and the dialectical tier that has 
emerged in my investigation. I propose that this will be understood as the paradigm 
case of argument, the sense of the term over which policy is made, particularly 
policies regarding argument evaluation and criticism. ... [W]e can simply understand 
that a piece of reasoning containing only what I have called the illative core is an 
argument in a derivative sense; it does not occupy the central part of the spectrum. 
(Johnson, 2000: 170) 
It is right that Johnson should regard his definition as stipulative, rather than 
standard. What he is stipulating is not so much which conception of argument 
should occupy the central range of the spectrum, but which spectrum, if any, we 
should be considering in the first place. By the same token, he is failing to address 
the scale of the ambiguity that surrounds ‘argument’. Hitchcock (2002: 288–89) 
puts it more bluntly by charging Johnson’s account, as it stands, with circularity. 
There is some justice in this. If an argument, as well as argumentation, is 
understood as essentially dialectical, then it is almost trivially correct to require a 
dialectical tier for any argument in the central, defining part of the spectrum. It 
likewise follows that argument will be predominantly a product of practice. ‘To 
avoid objectionable circularity’, Hitchcock (2002:289) observes, ‘we need to 
remove the reference to the practice of argumentation’. But this effectively knocks 
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the stuffing out of Johnson’s definition, opening the door to other cases and 
occurrences of argument. Hitchcock continues (ibid.): ‘Removing from the 
definition of argument any reference to the practice of argumentation, in order to 
avoid circularity in the definition of the practice, has the consequence that 
arguments occur in other contexts than argumentation.’  
 
Another way to state this objection, less severe than the charge of circularity, is 
that Johnson is selective with regard to the area of interest in which argument is 
investigated. Stipulating the area of interest has the effect of determining the 
‘spectrum’ on which different cases of argument are considered. If, by contrast, a 
spectrum were selected by a deductivist, we could expect to see deductive 
arguments at the centre, with types such as probabilistic reasoning, argument from 
analogy, and inference to the best explanation relegated to the ‘wings’. The criteria 
for identifying and classifying arguments may be heavily coloured by the views one 
has on the criteria for appraisal, just in the way that interpretations of individual 
arguments may be coloured by the same theoretical or methodological 
presuppositions. There is a telling hint of bias of this sort in the short quotation 
given above in which Johnson (2000: 170) associates ‘the paradigm case of 
argument’ with ‘the sense of the term over which policy is made, particularly 
policies regarding argument evaluation and criticism’. It is pertinent, if ad hominem, 
to remind ourselves that Johnson’s discipline is informal logic; his object of inquiry 
natural-language reasoning; his theory of appraisal anti-deductivist. The aspirations 
of informal logic determine the policy that in turn determine the sense given to 
‘argument’ within that discipline. It is part of the policy of informal logic to exclude, 
or set to one side, artificial constructions such as those logicians use to define 
deductive validity, on the grounds that they are not naturally occurring, and/or 
have no practical purpose, such as Johnson’s ‘persuading Other(s) of the truth of a 
thesis’. The paradigm examples of argument used for traditional logic – which 
Johnson calls ‘proto-arguments’ – are very different from the ‘paradigm case’ to 
which Johnson refers in his definition as the argument itself. The objects logicians 
study are not manifestations or distillates of any practice (or if they are, this it is 
irrelevant to their evaluation). They are instances of valid and invalid forms. The 
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subject matter of informal logic is more varied, and more representative of what 
people do with argument in everyday contexts. In particular the arguments in the 
corpus investigated by informal logic are not all, or even predominantly, deductive 
in character – at least on the surface. It follows that most arguments in the corpus 
are not valid, and must be evaluated under different criteria from those studied by 
formal logicians or – for a deductivist – reconstructed in a deductive form. The 
‘policies’ for setting these criteria will inevitably dispose informal logicians to 
conceive of argument in a certain way, and so tend to make stipulative claims 
about what argument really is, or at least how it should best be perceived. It is 
inevitable because in order to analyse and evaluate an argument it is necessary to 
be clear about what it is one is evaluating. Johnson’s definition may reveal as much 
about the discipline of informal logic as it does about the notion of argument itself, 
understood in an everyday sense. It will be recalled that Goddu (2007), in a 
sceptical analysis of the notion of ‘real’ argument, makes a similar observation. (See 
the Introduction above.) 
 
What is the ‘distillate’?  
There is an obvious distinction between the text of an argument – a speech in a 
debate, say – and the argument which underlies it. So understood, the argument 
(or argument itself) is something found in, extractable from, whatever form of 
presentation the argument has: the text. Furthermore, this need not be anything 
actually used, or expressed. It could mean – and in many contexts does mean – a 
line of reasoning that is common to multiple acts of argument, or modes of 
expression, or practices; or to none. The purpose of formalising a natural-language 
argument is precisely to penetrate below the surface language to reveal the 
reasoning in the text. It is that reasoning (in the object-sense) which is either valid 
or invalid, sound or unsound, etc.  
 
That, as we have seen, is not Johnson’s concept of ‘the argument itself’. It might be 
thought that what he means by ‘the distillate of the practice’ is what Fisher (1988b; 
2001) means by the reasoning extracted from a putative argument-text – but that 
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would be a misreading of Johnson. An argument, Johnson (2000: 168) says, is itself 
‘a type of discourse or text’, and it is that which he also designates as ‘the distillate 
of the practice of argumentation’. But surely this is a conflation. Consider the 
fragment of dialogue from Lord of the Flies, quoted at the head of Chapter 2, where 
Jack is angrily challenging Ralph’s authority: 
 
(1)  ‘And you shut up! Who are you anyway? Sitting there 
telling people what to do.’ 
‘I’m chief. I was chosen.’ 
‘Why should that make any difference? Just giving orders 
that don’t make any sense...’  
 
The context is a dispute. But within the dispute there are rudimentary lines of 
reasoning, including: 
(2) I’m chief. I was chosen. 
This, it may be said, is Ralph’s actual argument in response to Jack. But it is an 
argument within a wider argument whose implicit conclusion is that Ralph has the 
right to give orders. In that respect (2) might be said to meet the requirements of 
an argument under Johnson’s definition. First, it seeks to persuade another by 
producing a reason for the truth of a thesis. The thesis is that Ralph is chief, the 
reason that he was chosen.70 The ‘Other’ is Jack; the agent is Ralph.71 Second, there 
is a clear illative core, which with minimal change to the text, can be standardly 
represented with the usual kind of covering assumption:  
(3)   I was chosen and therefore I am chief; therefore I can give orders.72  
                                                     
70
 An incidental point is that (2) could be construed as an explanation; or as an argument and an 
explanation. It is another symptom of the defeasibilty of interpretation of texts as arguments.  
71
 Johnson (2000: 10) actually refers to both parties in such an exchange as ‘agents’, presumably 
because they both partake in the production of arguments through their respective involvement in 
the argumentation:  ‘the matrix I propose is composed of three elements: (a) the product – 
argument, (b) the process – arguing, and (c) the agents – the arguer and the other’. 
72
 In this case the covering assumption might be: ‘Whoever is chosen is chief’ vel sim. 
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Third – and essentially for Johnson’s account – Ralph can be seen to have 
discharged his dialectical obligations, by responding in a rational manner to Jack’s 
challenge to his (Ralph’s) authority. Fourth, there is a process or practice of 
argumentation, represented by (1), and the wider dialogue of which it is part. Of 
this, according to Johnson’s definition, (2) is evidently the product, the text, and the 
‘distillate’. But in this case (2) is also the illative core, or at least Ralph’s actual 
expression of the illative core. It is more apt, therefore, to identify the illative core 
with (3), since it is only under a charitable interpretation such as (3) that (2) is 
anything more than a pair of unrelated sentences. Fifth and last, we have the 
dialectical tier, which is supplied by the relation of the core to that part of the 
dialogue to which the core is a response, namely Jack’s challenge. This effectively 
gives (2) its ‘dialectical tier’.  
 
The question to which I therefore return concerns Johnson’s notion of the 
argument itself, which in his account is not (2) (or (3), but (to repeat) ‘the entire 
structure composed of the illative core and the dialectical tier’ (Johnson, 2000: 
170). For, according to Johnson’s definition, the argument is incomplete or 
‘unfinished’ without the dialectical tier. To capture the whole argument it would 
thus be necessary to show that the claim, ‘I’m chief’, is not merely a conclusion 
from a single premise, but a response to the rhetorical question: ‘Who are you 
anyway?’ Ralph’s whole argument might then be interpreted along the lines of  
(4) Who I am, since you ask, is chief and I am chief because I was chosen, 
and because I am chief I am entitled to tell people what to do. 
This would discharge Ralph’s dialectical obligations and thus include the requisite 
dialectical tier. But (4) is not the ‘argument itself’ since, again according to Johnson, 
an argument is a ‘text or discourse’73 and there is no such text or discourse as (4) 
that is produced by either of the parties in the dispute. An alternative 
                                                     
73
  It is not altogether clear how Johnson intends ‘text’ and ‘discourse’ to be understood; but it is 
plain that they must at least relate to the same content, with the text, say, being the manifestation 
of the discourse. Accordingly I take Johnson’s ‘text’ to mean either the discourse, or the text of the 
discourse. 
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interpretation of the definition would be that (4) is a text of the ‘distillate’ of 
Ralph’s side of the argument within the dialectic. I suspect that this is close to what 
Johnson had in mind as the distillate but, if so, it then seems be an unnecessarily 
overblown account of what is really a very simple point – namely that we recognise 
(2) as an argument because of the dialectical context in which we find it. (2) is not 
the illative core so much as a subordinate or contributory argument in a larger, 
complex argument of the order of (4) within the wider context of the dispute (and 
the wider context still of the narrative). Nor is (2) necessarily the product of a 
process of argumentation represented by (1). (2), construed as (3), is an argument. 
The justification for construing (2) as (3) is found in the context, but then (3) is also 
an argument – feasibly a valid argument – in its own right. The context does not 
produce the argument; the context shows that on this occasion a pair of sentences 
is being used as an argument. The term ‘argument itself’ then has the more usual 
connotation of what can be extracted from the text and evaluated on its own 
account without further reference to the context – for example whether being 
chief does follow from being chosen (as chief). If ‘chief’ in that context is an elective 
office, then it does follow. There may be other relevant judgements to be made 
about the use of the argument in the particular context of (1), such as whether it 
‘wins’ the dispute for Ralph, or meets Jack’s challenge effectively. Both are relevant 
inquiries to make in a critical appraisal of a ‘real’ argument text, but the question of 
whether or not the core – (2), construed as (3) – stands up to scrutiny is a relevant 
question in its own right. In the view I take it is the baseline question, and precedes 
the others in the critical evaluation of an argument. 
 
26. Critique of Johnson’s account 
One objection that might be levelled against Johnson’s definition is that he uses 
ordinary terms, not only stipulatively, but also eccentrically. ‘Distillate’ is another 
word for ‘extract’. Both words have the natural sense of the argument itself, as 
opposed to the text itself – something at the level of a complex proposition. There 
is apparently no place in Johnson’s theory of argument for an entity of that sort. 
Hitchcock (2007: 118) levels the following criticism at Johnson’s account:  
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Johnson’s definition differs from the definition proposed in my chapter in at least 
two additional respects. It restricts arguments to actual discourses or texts rather 
than considering them as abstract objects that may be unexpressed. And it requires 
that their authors have as their purpose to persuade an intended recipient to accept 
a thesis on the basis of the reasons supplied, whereas the definition proposed in the 
present chapter leaves undetermined the purpose for which someone might express 
an argument.  
This is a fair criticism. Johnson does restrict argument in the way Hitchcock claims. 
That is not to say that Johnson’s pragmatic theory and concept of argument taken 
together are inconsistent. It is more a case of his definition’s being a creature of his 
theory, and leaving unexplained other conceptions of argument that cannot and 
should not be overlooked. In particular Johnson claims that proto-arguments – 
which as we have seen correspond closely to the illative core of a fully-fledged 
argument – are derivatives of what he calls arguments. It is not altogether clear 
what ‘derivative’ means in this use, but I assume it is similar to the way in which a 
précis or abstract is a derivative of the longer and more expansive document. 
Johnson actually uses the words ‘incomplete’ and ‘unfinished’ of arguments which 
lack a dialectical tier.74 If that is the right analogy, however, it reveals a difficulty for 
the concept of proto-argument. A précis is not the whole of the text of which it is 
the précis; but it is a whole précis; and, if it is a good précis, it is an expression of 
the import of the text. Unless, as part of its definition, a proto-argument is a poor, 
somehow deficient, reflection of what is at the core of the argument – ‘incomplete’ 
in that sense – there is no good reason why the précis of an argument, should not 
be as much an expression of an argument, as is the text of which it is the précis. We 
would not say that the main clause or central claim of a complex declarative 
sentence was not a sentence. Consider the sentence: 
(5) We had a meeting and by a show of hands I was chosen to be the chief 
with authority to give orders 
                                                     
74
 Johnson (2000: 170): ‘I am suggesting that they be viewed as incomplete products, as works in 
progress...’  
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If we strip aside the subordinate elements we do not have an unfinished sentence. 
The core claim, 
(6) I was chosen 
is a fully formed sentence. It may be derived from (5) in the sense of being a digest 
of it. But it may just as well be said that (5) is an elaboration of (6). Both are 
complete sentences, and their message is essentially the same message, the 
statement of historical event. This is not grounds for labelling (6) a ‘proto-sentence’ 
in relation to the finished product. It is hard to avoid the suspicion that the notion 
of a proto-argument itself is a ‘derivative’ of Johnson’s theory: an argument must 
have a dialectical tier because arguments are products of argumentation. This is 
another way perhaps to put Hitchcock’s charge of circularity. If alternatively – and 
in my view more intuitively – we start with the notion of a basic argument form, 
with dialectical embellishments to meet the needs and reflect the context of 
particular (actual or notional) disputes, then the core or proto-argument would 
have a different role in the theory, without being a different object. What 
Hitchcock refers to as abstract objects may be just the same entities that Johnson 
(2000: 144) calls ‘proto-’ or ‘core’ or ‘ground-floor’ arguments, the difference being 
that they are arrived at from different directions. In Johnson’s account the proto-
argument represents an incomplete sketch or outline of a more elaborate (or 
complete) product. Under that description the proto-argument is necessarily tied 
to that particular product, and the practice whose product it is. But from a different 
perspective – starting with the core – we can think of the same argument as an 
object there to be expressed, employed, presented, elaborated upon, etc., in one 
way or another, or in none. In that sense the proto-form may be conceived of as 
something on or around which a more complex, dialectically responsive ‘product’ 
may be constructed – the product then being the text itself as opposed to what it 
expresses.  
 
What are we to say of (4)? Is there not a sense in which (4), or what it represents, is 
a product of the practice, given that (4) is a reconstruction of the whole dialectically 
contextualised argument? But if (4) is the product of any practice it is the practice 
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of interpretation. It is what the interpreter (in this case myself) makes of the 
argument. It would be correct to call (4) a ‘distillate’, but that is not how Johnson 
uses the term. His distillate is the product of the arguer’s (or arguers’) making.  
 
Recall the earlier example in §25. The argument was that:   
(7)  the proposed treaty is one-sided and therefore it should be amended. 
According to the scenario this would qualify as a proto-argument under Johnson’s 
definition, unfinished until it is supplemented by the demands of the interchange. 
In Johnson’s definition ‘the argument itself’ is therefore something of a synthesis of 
acts and objects. It is a one-voice argument in that it is one speaker’s contribution, 
but it is distilled from the practice of engaging with others, and is therefore 
incomplete without what it inherits from and gives to the dialectic. This point is 
made by Hansen (2002: 269): 
So although Johnson insists that an argument is a product, he sees that arguments 
eventuate from a process, and his concept of argument inherits both elements of a 
product and elements of a process. It is not too far-fetched, I think, to hypothesize 
that Johnson has forged a new concept of ‘argument’ out of two distinct traditional 
senses of ‘argument.’  
I am rather less impressed than Hansen by this synthesis. The core, too, would be 
an element of the whole – if anything were. But for Johnson it cannot qualify as the 
whole argument, or the product of the practice. For, by Johnson’s lights, it is 
stripped of the requisite relation to the Other. Johnson’s enlarged notion of 
‘argument itself’ as a synthesis of act and object, plus dialectical commitments, 
conflicts with what most people would naturally take the term to mean: either the 
underlying reasoning identifiable within a text or discourse which can be extracted 
and evaluated, or that which an author puts forward in the text , but which could 
be put forward in a different manner or by a different author, or by none. In that 
light the distinction is not so much between complete and incomplete argument as 
between the expression of the argument and the argument expressed.  
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27. Object or product? 
It can be seen from the foregoing that there are two quite different perspectives on 
the object-sense of an argument, yielding correspondingly different conceptions. 
Chapter 1 began with the standard, logician’s definition of an argument as a 
suitably ordered set of propositions or sentences. It was seen that as an object of 
assessment for validity this minimal condition is sufficient. That is because the 
question of whether the last object in a sequence is consequent upon the others 
can be asked and answered without any reference to its source, purpose, or 
context. Any finite set of declarative sentences can thus be designated a simple 
argument by imposing the following order on it: 
(8) < {s1, s2, … , sn}, {sn+1} > 
or by assigning roles to the constituents. This can be entirely arbitrary, but that flies 
in the face of the intuitive idea that arguments are the objects of certain acts – 
things that human agents propound or construct for a purpose. Indeed, the basic 
form of argument represented by (8) is derived or abstracted from the more 
ordinary notion we have of arguments in use, in which the audience can recognise 
an actual or ‘real’ conclusion, and actual or ‘real’ reasons. At the same time we do 
not conceive of a conclusion merely as the last item in a list, nor do we conceive of 
a reason merely as any item that precedes it in the list. We conceive of these as 
objects drawn (as conclusions) or given (as reasons), respectively. In sum we 
recognise arguments as expressions of these acts, and not just as ordered lists of 
sentences. Nonetheless, what we recognise in the text as the argument itself is an 
object consisting of a set of propositions expressed by a sequence of sentences. 
What the critical enquirer does, in order to interpret the text as an argument, is to 
list and label the constituents in some conventional manner that facilitates 
objective assessment. Hence, the object that we designate as an a argument for 
critical inspection is the same sort of object whether its parts are designated 
arbitrarily, or on the basis of interpretation of the text of a so-called ‘real’ 
argument.  
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It is only in the latter case, however, that it is pertinent to talk of an argument as 
the object of an act – of argument (or argumentation) that is, as opposed to 
evaluation. The nature of the relation between the act and the object is central to 
this thesis. On the one hand the act of argument is just an act of presentation or 
advancement, with the argument qua object being simply that which is presented. 
Under that relationship the argument itself is independent of the act or at least 
detachable from it conceptually – insofar as the same argument can be presented 
once, more than once, or not at all, and it may be evaluated in the same way 
whichever of these circumstances might be the case. What Johnson and others 
want to say is that the act is one of production – a practice or process from which 
(to use Hansen’s word) arguments ‘eventuate’. The difference could not be more 
pronounced. In particular, the ground-floor75 notion of an argument as a set of 
propositions is rendered incoherent if arguments are defined as products of 
particular acts, a point that Goddu (2011) takes up in his criticism of Johnson’s 
concept of argument, and of the process-product dichotomy with respect to 
argument.         
 
Process and product  
Goddu (2011: 76–77) observes that the practice-product ambiguity found in many 
words depends upon: (a) there being a sense of the word whereby the word refers 
to an activity; (b) a sense whereby it refers to ‘an object or thing’; and (c) that: ‘the 
object or thing is in some sense the result or outcome of the activity’. Whilst he 
readily accepts that there are words that exhibit this ambiguity,76 he questions, 
rightly in my view, whether it holds for ‘argument’. He adds that  
without the distorting lens of these labels we [would be] in a much better position to 
provide accurate answers to some of the fundamental questions of argumentation 
                                                     
75
  I use the term ‘ground-floor’ as Johnson does to mean the core, only not with the negative 
overtones that the term has for Johnson.   
76
 Taking an example from Max Black (1946: 177), Goddu (2011: 76) compares ‘science’ with 
‘argument’ and concludes that they are different with respect to the ambiguity claim. I am not 
convinced that Black is claiming full-blooded ambiguity. Black talks rather of a ‘shift of emphasis’.  
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theory—what exactly are arguments-as-objects and how exactly are they related to 
acts of arguing. (Goddu 2011: 86). 
I agree with Goddu’s claim that, in the context of argument, the labels ‘process’ 
and ‘product’ have a distorting effect on the way in which we conceive of 
arguments as objects. Still, I would suggest that Goddu himself invites a confusion 
between, on the one hand, act-object ambiguity, and on the other the process-
product relation. The former is established if the word in question meets conditions 
(a) and (b) alone and, as Goddu rightly observes, ‘argument’ fulfils those conditions. 
But that does not establish that the right terms for the relata are ‘process’ and 
‘product’, without invoking the relation identified by (c). But if in the act-sense 
‘argument’ is a process (practice, activity), and in the object-sense its resultant 
product, the so-called ambiguity really resolves into a distinction between the two 
grammatical forms of the noun. The process from which an argument results (in 
Johnson’s account) is not itself an argument: it is argument (or argumentation77), 
the practice of arguing. Compare the word ‘building’, which can likewise be seen to 
have both a process and product meaning. The process of building, that produces a 
building, is not normally referred to as ‘a building’.78 Likewise, the relata involved in 
an act of argument are not two meanings of the same expression, but the 
respective meanings of two semantically distinguishable expressions; but that is not 
a lexical ambiguity.  
 
Having said that I am not seeking to contest Goddu’s central thesis. On the 
contrary, the above comments are more in the spirit of a point of clarification. I 
concur with Goddu in the separation he sees between acts of arguing and objects 
we call arguments. Of course, it cannot be denied that the practice of argument 
brings to the attention of others reasons to persuade them of the truth of this or 
                                                     
77
 Van Eemeren & Grootendorst (2004) blur even this useful distinction by referring routinely to 
particular episodes of discourse  as ‘argumentations’, or with an indefinite article in the singular.  
78
 People might occasionally say something like: ‘That’s a building I wouldn’t want to live through 
again’, meaning a particular bad experience, or a difficult process; but it would strain standard use. 
It is a different sense of ‘building’ from that in, e.g. ‘The building of the pyramids took a long time’, 
because ‘the building’ there refers to the generic process that ‘the building of the pyramids’ and ‘the 
building of the Shard’, etc. have in common. It is the countable act-sense which is non-standard. The 
building of the pyramids is an act. 
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that proposition, the rightness of this or that position, the desirability of this or that 
course of action; and so on. But what are claimed as reasons, and what are drawn 
as conclusions, are not produced by giving them as reasons or drawing them as 
conclusions. People do, it is true, talk of producing reasons for some conclusion; 
similarly we talk of producing evidence. But in neither of these cases does ‘produce’ 
have the meaning of create or manufacture, which is how it is understood in 
Johnson’s definition. Indeed, if evidence were ‘produced’ in that sense it would not 
be evidence in the legitimate sense. To produce reasons or evidence in the 
legitimate sense is to come up with them, to present or provide them. If the fact 
that it is dark is given as a reason not to go out, the fact that it is dark has not been 
‘produced’ by the speaker, it has been used.     
 
Against arguments as products  
Goddu proceeds by asking, rhetorically, what sorts of things might emerge as 
products, under the product-of-the-process hypothesis. He starts with 
propositions:  
Suppose you hold that arguments-as-objects are sets of propositions. Should you 
accept that these sets of propositions are the product of acts of arguing? No. 
Propositions are abstract objects, either eternal or atemporal, and not the subject of 
production. Hence, whatever is the product of acts of arguing, if there is such a 
product, it is not the set of propositions that is an argument. (Goddu 2011: 78)79 
There is little that would tempt anyone to suggest that a mere set of propositions is 
an argument. For a start, to be an argument, the set must be an ordered set, or 
more accurately an ordered pair of sets (as in (8) above). So, if the set is to be 
thought of as the product of any act, the act would merely be a grouping or pairing 
or ordering of the set under some principle. But Goddu is not saying that any set of 
propositions is an argument; he is saying that it does not take an act of 
argumentation to create the set of propositions, ordered or otherwise. And that is 
surely right. Propositions, as he says, are abstract objects, the meanings of 
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  See also Simard-Smith & Moldovan (2011).  
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sentences. When Sam says, ‘The tide is out’, as a reason for claiming that the island 
is reachable, he produces the utterance, but he does not produce (or create) the 
meaning of the sentence. The sentence has that meaning, and he uses it with that 
meaning, to give the reason, namely that the tide is out.  
 
But, to pursue Goddu’s question, does the notion of arguments as products fare 
any better if we bypass talk of propositions, and consider arguments directly at the 
level of language, i.e. does the arguer produce the sentences which express the 
premises and conclusion, and hence the text of the argument? The pair of 
sentences, 
(9)  The tide is out. We can get to the island. 
can be uttered as an argument and, if sufficient context is known, recognised and 
understood as an argument by the audience or critic. (For example, (9) could be 
interpreted as an argument if it were part of an overheard conversation between 
some people interested in going to an island.) Can Sam be said to have produced 
anything? In one undeniable sense he has done so – insofar as he has ordered and 
uttered the sentences which serve to propound an argument on this occasion. In 
that sense (9) is his text. The particular token utterance, relating to that particular 
location and addressed to that particular Other, is Sam’s doing, and is a product of 
the conversation only in that restricted sense. The token utterance gives expression 
to a token argument, then, to that extent it is a product of the practice.  
 
However, even this concession to Johnson is problematic. The objection is not that 
this product-sense cannot be given, but that it is not by any means the only sense 
we give to ‘argument’. This was the basis of Hitchcock’s complaint: that Johnson 
failed to take account of other, and perhaps more central, conceptions of an 
argument. For one thing, his definition does not make any accommodation for the 
notion of an argument as an object of appraisal.  
 
As mentioned previously a text like (9), which has no distinctive form other than 
that of a pair of sentences, is not an argument at all, as it stands. (9) can be 
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interpreted as an argument if the interpreter or critic has enough information 
about the context to warrant that construal. Even without access to the context it 
might reasonably be supposed that the best explanation for these two sentences 
being uttered in succession is to argue from the first to the second.   
(10) The tide is out and therefore the island can be reached.  
(10) is an argument, insofar as it is a standardly expressed argument. But that does 
not mean that it is necessarily Sam’s argument nor that it, (10), is the product of 
whatever Sam was up to when he uttered it. Let’s suppose (9) was a response to 
someone’s saying that the island was out of reach. In that context it might just as 
well be said that (9) was a counter-assertion or point of fact. In that context Sam 
might just have said:  
(9′) The tide is out,  
and his words could still be construed as an argument, with the counter-assertion 
that the island can be reached left unsaid. To construe (9) – or (9′) – as (10) is to 
construe it as an argument. To construe (9) as (10) is also to construe it as a pair of 
sentences the second of which is implicitly claimed to follow from the other, and as 
such an object that is open to critical appraisal of a particular sort – valid if the 
relation of following from obtains, and sound if the first sentence is also true.  
 
Supposing that the critic’s interpretation on this occasion is correct, it might be 
thought that since (10) has the linguistic form of an argument standardly expressed 
in English it is somehow closer to the underlying argument than (9) and/or (9’), 
which have no overt argument form. But this is not right. (10) either is or is not a 
correct interpretation of (9), and that is all. It is a correct interpretation if what Sam 
is doing when he utters the two sentences is asserting the first as a warrant for the 
second, and it is a misinterpretation otherwise. What it is right to say is that the 
text of (10) is literally an argument, standardly expressed, whilst (9) is literally just a 
pair of sentences. The key point, to repeat, is that (10), or any other interpretation, 
even if it is a correct interpretation, is not the argument itself. I stress this because 
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it is very easy to conflate interpreting a text with extracting an argument.80 The 
interpreter is simply setting down what he or she understands the author to be 
saying or thinking. But the interpretation is not itself the extracted argument, it is 
just another expression of the text. Even if the text of an argument is already in a 
standard form, and needs no reconstruction, we still interpret it by recognising it as 
an argument. In such a case we take it, as it were, at face value.81  
 
The confidence we have in our methods of standardising or formalising informal 
texts naturally gives the impression of getting ‘closer’ by revealing the form more 
plainly. We have to have that confidence if we are to pursue appraisal of natural-
language argument critically and methodically. But no one pursuing that goal 
should be under the illusion that his or her interpretation of the text is identical 
with the argument per se. The argument is an abstraction. If the interpretation is 
good, both it and the original text express the argument, just one more standardly 
or formally than the other.  
 
A general objection 
This last point, with echoes of Goddu’s claim that arguments are abstract objects 
distinct from processes or their products, invites a general objection. If arguments 
are abstract in that sense, how do we grasp them? Surely our ability to grasp an 
argument is both dependent upon, and fully explained by, our capacity to 
understand certain sentences in a language. If the latter is so, then there is no need 
to invoke propositions as well. This would be a valid objection if it were contended 
that we do grasp the abstract object rather than (or even as well as) understanding 
the sentences. The import of the previous few paragraphs has been that we do not 
get any closer to grasping the abstract object than is afforded by our understanding 
of the text or utterance, and our endeavour to set out more plainly the argument 
its author is understood to be propounding. The closeness of the interpretation to 
the original text is dependent on context and charitable assumptions, not on any 
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 To ‘extract’ here has the sense Fisher (1980; 2001) gives it, of identifying an argument in a 
natural-language context.  
81
  Even a formal argument needs interpretation relative to context.  
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claim to grasp the underlying argument itself, the shared meaning that exists if the 
interpretation is good. That account does not invoke the abstract object: the 
abstractness emerges unbidden, as it were, from the talk of recognising the 
argument in a text, and what it is that is understood in the text as an argument. If 
the argument were identical with the text, there would be no interpretation 
needed.  
 
Johnson, as we have seen, gives no account of an argument in this abstract sense. 
In line with Goddu and Hitchcock, I find this both a restriction on the intuitive 
notion of an argument as object, and a misrepresentation of the nature of the act-
object relation. Above all, Johnson is wrong to relegate what he calls the illative 
core to the position of an unfinished prototype. The illative core, I contend, is the 
argument, and the dialectical obligations are merely a feature of the context by 
which the core is recognisable as an argument. On that view, as suggested earlier, 
Johnson’s characterisation of arguments as products of practice can be put down to 
an elaborate way of saying that a text is the expression of an argument only in 
relation to its context of utterance, a context which is typically, though not 
invariably, dialectic. Certainly it is in the nature of arguments to occur in dialectical 
contexts. But many arguments have no dialectical context, unless we include 
implicit dialectical or disputational contexts (Hitchcock 2007: 103). For example, it 
was seen that so long as there was some context which made sense of giving (9′) as 
reason for claiming that the island could be reached, that would make it plausible 
to interpret (9) as an argument. It is not necessary for anyone to have disputed the 
conclusion for this condition to be met. What might be said is that the very act of 
giving reasons in support of some claim or assertion, is to tacitly acknowledge the 
possibility of opposition, and since all arguments consist of reason-giving, all 
arguments have at least an implicit dialectical overtone. In more Johnsonian terms, 
we might say that all arguments are marked by the obligation to give reasons in 
response to actual or envisaged contrary positions, questions, or doubt. But since it 
is in the so-called illative core that the reasons for the conclusion are found, this 
point would hardly be welcome to Johnson.   
 
154 
 
 
 
28. Interim statement 
In the preceding sections I have examined the object-sense of argument from two 
distinct perspectives. The first is the critic’s, from which the argument emerges as 
an object of evaluation. From that perspective the object is just an ordered pair of 
sets of sentences concerning which it can be asked whether the second  is 
consequent upon the first . The second perspective is that of the (actual or 
notional) proponent, from which the argument is the object of an act – in short the 
act of propounding the argument. Propounding an argument is an essentially 
assertive act, and typically public.82  
 
Assertions have objects: those things which are asserted. In the case of 
propounding an argument the object is naturally more complex than the object of a 
plain assertion, though the act-object relation is the same in both cases. However, 
the act of propounding an argument can be partitioned into: 1) an act of asserting 
premises and, 2) the act of drawing a conclusion. (See §6 above.) These 
contributory acts of argument also have objects: 1) what is asserted as a premise 
and, 2) what is drawn as a conclusion. That is not to say that in the act of drawing a 
conclusion, the object is identical with what is asserted. Drawing a conclusion, to be 
sure, is an assertive act. But if (after asserting the premises) all that were asserted 
in the act of concluding were the conclusion, an argument would be no more than 
a conjunction of propositions.83 In Chapter 6, I return to the question of what is 
asserted in propounding an argument.  
 
As for the acts of argument, it is plain that they are assertive. Before any 
conclusions can be drawn in this thesis about the act-object relation as it pertains 
to argument, an account in needed of the same relation vis-à-vis assertion. That is 
the topic of Chapter 5. It is necessarily something of a digression from the central 
topic, argument, but its relevance will emerge in Chapter 6.   
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 Even if we argue silently to ourselves, by laying out reasons and then concluding something from 
them, we perform an (albeit inner) act of assertion. 
83
 More precisely, it would be a sequence of one or more propositions, and one other. 
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CHAPTER FIVE:  Assertion 
 
The study of grammar, in my opinion, is capable of throwing far more light on 
philosophical questions than is commonly supposed by philosophers. Although a 
grammatical distinction cannot be uncritically assumed to correspond to a genuine 
philosophical difference, yet the one is primâ facie evidence of the other, and may 
often be most usefully employed as a source of discovery. ... [I]n what follows, 
grammar, though not our master, will yet be taken as our guide. 
 *The excellence of grammar as a guide is proportional to the paucity of inflexions, 
i.e. to the degree of analysis effected by the language considered. 
Bertrand Russell (1903: 42 and *footnote) 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
29. Preliminary remarks 
Asserting, like arguing, is an act, something people do, usually but not necessarily 
with words. An assertion – an instance of asserting – is also an act. As Davidson 
(2001: 110) unremarkably observes: ‘An assertion is an utterance, and it is the 
speaker who makes the assertion’. Expressed in this way, the assertion may be 
considered the object of an act of someone’s making. But we must tread carefully 
with this form of words, commonplace though it is. The reference to an assertion as 
an object of someone’s making should not disguise the fact that making an 
assertion means performing an act. The expression has the same kind of sense as 
‘make a move’, which means simply to move, or to move something, e.g. a piece on 
a chessboard. Wittgenstein famously exploited the analogy by referring to linguistic 
acts as moves in the language game.84 An assertion is such a move, but it just 
means the asserting of something. Notwithstanding the nominalised form, ‘an 
assertion’, ‘this assertion’, ‘Sam’s assertion’, etc. refer to acts.  
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  E.g. Wittgenstein (1953: §49). 
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This is not to deny that acts are objects. The very fact that we may refer to acts of 
assertion by means of noun phrases accords them object status, even when the 
purpose of referring to them is to distinguish their referents from objects of the 
more familiar sort such as tables, chairs, or trees. Whilst it would be wrong to say 
that acts are not really objects simply in virtue of being the referents of nominal 
terms, this alone can, in some cases, seem a tenuous qualification for object status. 
Wright (1983: 26) observes that ‘English abounds with noun-phrase constructions. 
Surely we cannot give them all ontological significance. It seems incredible that 
beyond rivers, people, buildings and plants, etc. the world also contains such things 
as sakes, behalves, whereabouts, …’.   An example Wright considers is: ‘I did it for 
John’s sake’.85 But Wright is deliberately singling out ‘stylistic nuances’ which, he 
says, ‘it is madness to credit with any substantial philosophical significance’ (ibid.). 
Assertions are not among these. A speech act may be at the fringes of what we 
intuitively think of as an object, but it is clearly not as obviously outlandish as a sake 
or a behalf.86 It might still be objected that we cannot say all the same things about 
assertions and statements that we say about those objects that Austin (1962: 8) 
facetiously called ‘moderately sized specimens of dry goods’, or ‘the things which 
the ordinary man says he “perceives”’. However, the fact is that we can and do talk 
about many things that fall short of our intuitive notion of objects in just the way 
that we talk about those we consider to be entirely ordinary. But clearly we can 
refer to acts, quantify over them, assign properties to them and, as already noted, 
cite them as objects of generic acts such as making (doing, performing, 
committing). It is also arguable that acts are perceptible, without distorting what 
‘the ordinary man’ means when he says he perceives ‘ordinary’ objects. I can 
witness an act being performed, record when and where I saw it happen, qualify it 
adjectivally, e.g. as violent, or mistimed, and so on. Acts of assertion, no less than 
acts of violence (or kindness or stupidity), meet these criteria. If I hear a speaker 
uttering a sentence with a force which I recognise as assertive, it is not ‘madness’ 
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 Hale (1987: 22) makes a similar point backed by some of the same examples.   
86
 A ‘sake’ or ‘behalf’ might be held to be beyond the fringe because so little can be said about it or 
done with it, or because a phrase like ‘for John’s sake’ is a semantic unit that one should not try to 
break down into components, each with its own proprietary reference to an object.  
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to say that I have heard his or her assertion, or witnessed the act. In short, classing 
an assertion as an act is no obvious bar to its being an object. The one does not 
exclude the other. Nor is there any ambiguity in this. To be sure, ‘assertion’ is 
ambiguous, but this is not where the ambiguity resides. An assertion is an object in 
the above sense in virtue of being an act, not as opposed to being an act.  
 
The well known act-object ambiguity of ‘assertion’ comes from its use to mean 
what is asserted when an assertion is made. It rests not only on two senses of 
‘assertion’ but also two senses of ‘object’, one being the sense in which acts of 
assertion have objects. In the case of an act of assertion, the object is just what is 
asserted, without which an assertion cannot be made. In this respect the verb 
‘assert’ is strictly transitive. Whereas we can say, for example, that X smiled, or X 
swam, we don’t ordinarily say, ‘X asserted’ without a grammatical object, revealing 
the thought that there must be something asserted even if not specified. Yet we 
also use and make sense of the expression: ‘X made an assertion’, where the 
reported act does not specify any asserted object. There is no difficulty, in other 
words, in understanding the concept of an act of asserting in detachment from 
what is asserted. The verb ‘assert’ has some meaning without a grammatical object, 
yet an act of argument cannot be made without asserting something.  
 
What is asserted (in an assertion)?  
What is asserted, it is said, is an intentional object, and the act an intentional act. 
This does not mean that the act in question is always or necessarily performed with 
intent, although it may have that property, too. In the case of asserting it is a fair 
assumption that assertions are made intentionally even if the intention is to 
deceive. A person might assert something with the intent to warn the public, or to 
embarrass an opponent, or simply to express a view or judgement – or, of course, 
to perpetrate a lie. There may be occasions when an assertion is made 
unintentionally, but if there are it will have no serious impact on what follows 
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here.87 ‘Intentional’ in the present context has the sense of the directedness that 
certain acts and mental states – thoughts, beliefs, wishes, etc. – have at or towards 
some object. (See, for example, Searle 1983; 2001.) Sam’s (presumed) state of 
belief when he asserts that the tide is out ‘has an object’, so to speak, to which his 
mind is turned, his thought directed. The question is what? If we take that to be 
just what he believes, then the proposition, that the tide is out (at or around the 
island), would be the natural answer.  
 
Searle for one, however, would correct this use of ‘object’ on the grounds that the 
proposition that the tide is out (at t,l) is the content of the belief, not its object. For 
Searle this preference arises from his objection to the notion of propositional 
attitudes, which imply an attitude towards the proposition. Searle argues (2001: 
36) that ‘If I believe that Clinton is president my attitude is toward Clinton, not 
toward the proposition. The proposition is the content of my belief, not the object.’  
In other words, Searle is locating the object of the belief or thought in the actual 
person of Clinton: not, that is, in what the agent believes, but in what (in this case 
who) his belief is about. This leaves us with the question of what the belief itself is: 
in other words, what is believed by the agent about Clinton. For, in general, if a 
person is thinking of some object, he must – typically if not invariably – be thinking 
something about the object. (Prior 1971: 131.) That something is what is thought 
(believed) with respect to whatever or whoever the thought (belief) is about. For 
Searle (1983: 18) the latter is the intentional object, and is an ‘ordinary’ object as 
opposed to, say, a proposition or a property. If we ask what is believed about 
Clinton, the answer that most readily comes to mind is   
(1)  that he is president.  
(1) looks like a reference to the proposition that Searle calls the content of the 
thought (belief), the only difference being the anaphoric subject, ‘he’. However, 
this difference is crucial, since it relates what is thought to the actual subject – the 
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  One sense in which I might ‘unintentionally assert’ something is when I say something that is 
reasonably taken as an assertion. I have been careless, perhaps, in allowing my utterance to appear 
assertive.  
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ordinary object – Clinton. (1), as a reference to what is thought, really corresponds 
to ‘is president’, for this is what is thought (said, believed) of Clinton. If we think of 
the question in terms of the parsing of the sentence,  
(2) John thinks (believes) that Clinton is president,  
we do not find an object corresponding to what John is said to be thinking about 
Clinton or anyone else. We have only the phrase, ‘is president’, which is not the 
name of any ordinary object. We are pushed towards what Prior (1971: 132) calls 
‘the old game of nominalising’:  
a ‘that’ is introduced in a position where it is tempting to see it as forming the name 
of an abstract object. What does Othello think of Desdemona? That she is unfaithful. 
Often, indeed, these ‘that’ clauses are interchangeable, or almost interchangeable, 
with other more familiar quasi-names of abstracta.  
What Prior means in the last sentence are expressions like ‘musicalness’, an 
example he takes from Cook Wilson, which can allegedly be substituted for a 
reference to the predicate in a sentence like: ‘Jones is musical’. 88 There is not much 
difference, Prior says, between ‘musicalness’ and ‘that he is musical’ as predicated 
of Jones. But he takes issue with Cook Wilson for identifying a clause such as: ‘that 
he is musical’, when said of Jones, with: ‘that Jones is musical.’ Prior’s opposing 
view is that ‘to say of Jones that he is musical is to say (tout court) that Jones is 
musical; or to use the other forms: to ascribe musicalness to Jones is to assert 
Jones’s musicalness‘ (Prior 1971: 133). (This last point, which hints at the directness 
of the relation between asserting and what is asserted will be of significance in 
following sections.) 
 
Abstractness is not eliminated by the collapsing of the complex relation between 
sayer (thinker), object, and predication, to a single that-clause. Prior goes on to say 
that ‘the suggestion of an abstract designatum is here, as always, a trick, whether it 
is done by ‘–ness’ suffixes or ‘–that’ prefixes‘ (ibid.). However, he does not consider 
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 The example Cook Wilson (1926: 114-117) uses is ‘Jones is a good artist’. 
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these ‘everyday-speech devices’ misleading; nor does he consider them altogether 
dispensable. ‘Their use’, he says, ‘need not involve us, any more than the use of 
‘abstracts’ need involve us, in any “Platonizing”, i.e. seriously intended nominalising 
of verbs and similar forms’ (ibid.). For the record I would agree that there is no 
need to read any serious ontological significance into the nominalising of verbs; 
also that abstract designata are probably indispensable – certainly convenient. As I 
said in §7, it is not any part of the aim of this thesis to argue for or against the 
existence of propositions, or of abstract objects generally. That is a big but different 
issue. My interest in what Prior is saying above concerns the relation of object to 
act in assertion, which has obvious parallels with objects of thought. What comes 
out clearly from the above part of Prior’s analysis is that the act-object relation is 
direct: the object is just what is asserted, however designated.  
 
A note: ‘object ’ and ‘content ’ 
Applied to Searle’s analysis of the belief that Clinton is president, the identification 
of the object of the belief with the referent of a that-clause would appear to take 
the ground out from Searle’s distinction – the distinction, that is, between Clinton 
(object), and the whole proposition (as content). If the proposition is what is 
believed, then what is believed, as a unit, is both object and content. Searle argues 
that in the case of belief the right designation is ‘content’, with ‘object’ reserved for 
entities around which the content is framed. In respect of a formulation such as 
(3) S’s belief that Obama is president 
I might choose to conceive of S’s belief as a complex object ‘containing’, as it were, 
the proposition that Obama is president. That would have some meaning in a 
sentence of the form: ‘S asserted his belief that Obama was president’, wherein 
what is asserted is understood as the content of S’s belief. One can refer to it that 
way. But one can also say that S asserted what he believed, namely that Obama 
was president. What S asserted and what he believed are the same thing in simple 
object terms, but qua content of S’s belief and qua object that S asserted, they 
differ perceptibly in sense.  
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I shall examine the idea of beliefs as objects of assertion in §36, but for present 
purposes I merely raise it merely to question whether there is any useful distinction 
to be made between the designation ‘object’ and ‘content’ in relation to acts of 
assertion, states of belief, and the like. To keep the answer short, I doubt that there 
is. Whilst the two terms may offer different ways of apprehending the act-object 
relata, ultimately they refer to the same things. Following the example of many I 
shall treat them as interchangeable, but with a preference for ‘object’ in the light of 
the present thesis.   
 
30. Objects of assertion   
Any time a speech act is successfully performed at least three things are involved: A 
person, an act of uttering a sentence with a certain illocutionary force, and a 
proposition. The proposition is said to be the object of the speech act. (Ulrich 1976: 
116) 
Recalling Davidson’s not dissimilar statement that an assertion is an utterance, and 
it is a speaker (author) who makes it, we find two objects related to the same act: 
what is uttered and what is asserted. In the first case the object would certainly 
qualify as ‘ordinary’, something audible, readable, repeatable, changeable, and so 
on. Utterance, accordingly, is an ordinary act performed by speaking or writing or, 
in the most basic sense, making a noise. In any event, utterances must have 
objects: something must be uttered, even if it is only a howl. My concern here, 
however, is restricted to meaningful utterances and, furthermore, to utterances 
whose objects are sentences (or expressions that go proxy for sentences). In the 
standard case, an assertion is performed by uttering a sentence with assertive 
force.  
 
It hardly needs saying that the object of the assertion is not the same as the object 
of the utterance. I don’t assert a sentence, except insofar as I utter a sentence 
assertively. The respective objects are different, even though the act of assertion is 
162 
 
 
 
an act of utterance.89 One difference, just mentioned, is that a sentence is an 
ordinary object, and exists in the most ordinary sense. Indeed, if a sentence is 
uttered it must exist in the most ordinary sense. For if it doesn’t exist it cannot be 
uttered. The object of a thought or a belief, and likewise of an assertion, need not 
exist in the ordinary sense. That, as most philosophers seem to agree, is a mark of 
intentional objects. It is also a mark of what most people would tend to conclude 
naturally if they reflected on the things mental states can have as objects. We can 
think of things that don’t exist, even things that couldn’t possibly exist; just as we 
can think or assert things that are not true. The same does not go for acts generally. 
Anscombe (1965: 6) makes the point nicely by observing that   
I can think of a man without thinking of a man of any particular height; I cannot hit a 
man without hitting a man of any particular height, because there is no such thing as 
a man of no particular height.  
Analogously I can think of a sentence without thinking of something with, say, 
particular words in it. For instance, I could be thinking of the first sentence of 
tomorrow’s Guardian newspaper, which has not yet been written. I could be trying 
to think of (searching in my mind for) a sentence with which to start a speech. But I 
cannot utter a sentence without uttering something with actual words in it. This is 
not surprising: uttering is a physical act.   
 
What of assertion? There are ways to say that I can assert things that don’t 
ordinarily exist, like a state of the tide that does not obtain at the time of my 
asserting that it does.90 If uttered assertively at such a time, ‘The tide is out’, 
purports to be a fact, when the fact that the tide is out does not exist. That the tide 
is out, we say, is not true. Hence the object of my act of assertion is a falsehood. 
There is no need here to argue as to whether this (or any) falsehood exists, or in 
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 Prior (1971: 14) comments that ‘while we do speak of ‘uttering’ sentences we don’t generally 
speak of ‘saying’ them....(I)n telling someone what somebody said (e.g. that he said that grass is 
green) we do not ipso facto tell him what sentence he uttered but only tell him something which 
perhaps entails that he uttered a sentence.’  
90
 That is, I can assert that the tide is in a state that it is not in; or I can assert something that is not a 
fact.  
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what sense if any it has being. We can say with some confidence that it is not a 
‘thing’, as in physical object. With the same sort of confidence I am able to say that 
it is not a fact. We can use ‘object’ in many contexts in which ‘thing’ would be 
inappropriate. Something can be the object of my attention, for instance, but 
hardly a thing of my attention (Crane 2001). If it is allowed that intentional objects 
need not exist, the distinction between asserting and uttering becomes plain. I 
cannot utter a non-existent sentence; I can assert a non-existent fact, i.e. a false 
proposition. To that extent Ulrich’s identification of a proposition as the object of 
an assertion stands its ground. 
 
As Anscombe’s ‘man of no particular height’ shows, an object of thought can also 
be indeterminate. Adapting this to the current example, someone might be 
thinking, not that the tide is in, or that it is out, or that it is somewhere in between, 
but simply wondering which state it is in. In that situation it could be said that the 
object of the person’s thought is the height of the tide. The height or state of the 
tide is neither true nor false: it is high or low; in or out. Likewise with asserting, 
stating, or believing. If I state that the tide is out, I am stating the height of the tide. 
The height of the tide is no particular height, but it is something that can be 
asserted, and it is asserted by assertively uttering the sentence: ‘The tide is out’.  
 
It might be inferred from this, though wrongly, that there must be two kinds of 
intentional object: those that exist and those that do not, translating in the case of 
propositions to those that are true by corresponding to facts, and those that do not 
correspond to any fact. On that account the object of Sam’s assertion would be one 
thing – a fact – if the tide was out at the time of utterance, and something else – a 
falsehood – if it was not out. But that cannot be any part of the identity of what 
Sam asserted, which is quite clearly the same object whether it happens to be true 
or false. The truth or falsity of the assertion is ex post facto: the object of the 
assertion is just the state Sam says the tide is in, and it answers that description 
whether the tide was out or not. A fact, in this respect, is like an object in the 
ordinary sense. ‘Object’ in the intentional sense is not an ordinary object. Here I 
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concur with Crane (2001: 342-43) in ‘denying ... that there is or can be any 
substantial conception of intentional objects’. Indeed, he continues:  
There is no necessary condition which something must meet in order to be an 
intentional object, in the sense of there being something substantial that all 
intentional objects in themselves have in common. There can be no substantial 
conception of intentional objects, since there is nothing entities have to be, in 
general and in themselves, in order to be intentional objects. Intentional objects, 
considered as such, have no nature.  
What Crane does not deny is that intentional objects nonetheless have a capacity 
to be shared or repeated. What one person believes or asserts, another person can 
believe or assert too. More generally,  
two people’s thoughts can have the same intentional object, when they are thinking 
about (looking for, desiring, contemplating etc.) the same thing. To say that 
something is an object for me does not imply that it cannot be an object for you. 
(ibid.) 
This feature of the object-hood will assume importance shortly. For now, and 
throughout, the concern of the thesis is with the nature of the relation more than 
the nature of the object. The important point is that two different acts or states can 
stand in the same relation to the one object. I can dispute, for example, what you 
believe.   
 
‘A grammatical feature’ 91 
If intentional objects are neither ordinary objects, nor private mental entities, then 
some other account of what they are, and how they relate to intentional acts or 
states, is needed. One approach to this apparent dilemma appears in Anscombe 
(1965). First of all she takes the primary use of ‘object’ to be that which is found in 
contexts such as ‘object of desire’, ‘object of worship’, and so on. She claims, 
interestingly, that this use of ‘object’ predates its use for individual things, such as 
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  The phrase is the subtitle of Anscombe (1965): ‘The Intentionality of Sensation: a Grammatical 
Feature’. The page numbers that follow refer to Anscombe (1981), in which the paper is reprinted. 
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the contents of people’s pockets. Second she draws on the grammar teacher’s 
traditional notions of direct and indirect objects. In the sentence ‘John sent Mary a 
book’, the direct object is ‘a book’. To teach the grammatical point, the teacher 
asks: ‘What did John send Mary?’ On receiving the answer, ‘the book’, the teachers 
says: ‘That’s the direct object’. Of course, the lesson is flawed. John did not send 
Mary a linguistic object, a phrase, nor did he send her what the phrase represents, 
which is no particular book. If John sent a book, then there must have been a book 
that he sent. But whichever book it was, the phrase ‘a book’ does not give it.  
 
Anscombe asks: ‘does any phrase that gives the direct object of an intentional verb 
in a sentence necessarily give an intentional object?’ Her answer is ‘No’ (Anscombe 
1981: 9). But that does not take away the insight that the question gives into the 
relation between act and object, whether intentional or otherwise. It is that, rather 
than any substantive answer, that is its value, at least for present purposes. The 
insight is revealed by the following ‘argument’ (for which Anscombe gives 
acknowledgement to Gilbert Harman). It proceeds by amending the original 
question to: ‘What does the sentence say John sent Mary?’ or ‘What is John said to 
have sent Mary?’, thus adopting the standpoint of reported speech. The answer 
now still fails to equate the direct object with what John sent, which is neither a 
phrase nor what the phrase stands for. But, as Anscombe (1981: 8) says, the phrase 
is an answer to the question. In her own words:  
Given a sentence in which a verb takes an object, one procedure for replying to the 
question: "What is the object in this sentence?" is to recite the object phrase. If 
putting the object phrase in quotes implies that the object - i.e. what John is said to 
have sent Mary, ... is a piece of language, that is wrong; if its not being in quotes 
implies that something referred to by the object phrase is the object, that is wrong 
too. To avoid the latter suggestion one might insist on putting in quotes; to avoid the 
former one might want to leave them out. One is inclined to invent a special sort of 
quotes; but the question is how the phrase within such new quotes would function - 
and if we understand that, we don't need a new sign. So ends the argument.  
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Reporting acts  
I shall draw on the insight provided by Anscombe’s ‘argument’, to introduce a 
notion of object that I shall refer to as ‘paragrammatic’. An object is paragrammatic 
if its relation to the act whose object it is lines up with the relation of the direct 
object to the verb in a sentence used to report the act: for example,  
(4) Sam asserted that the tide was out. 
(5) Sal broke the window. 
The common feature I am claiming for both acts is that they relate to their objects 
directly. What Sal broke was the window; what Sam asserted was the low state of 
the tide. Both the objects may be referred to, not just in specific terms, but 
indeterminately as well:  
(4′) Sam asserted something. 
(5′) Sal broke something. 
Anything Sal might have broken could be substituted for the object in (5’). This 
could include physical objects, like windows and plates, but also abstract objects 
such as silence, promises, or (sporting) records. In each case something is done to 
the object, or has some effect on it.92 The nature of the effect is variable. The 
window or plate, of course, is changed permanently. The record that was broken – 
e.g. a distance someone jumped to break the record – is itself unchanged; but the 
breaking of it makes it an old (past) record. These are different and perhaps 
dubious senses of ‘change’. In the case of the assertion, it is arguable whether the 
object undergoes any change at all, other than some form of Cambridge change. 
(See §5 above.) Before something is asserted it is not the object of that assertion; 
after, it is. But it is the same proposition. The same would apply to the sentence 
used to make the assertion: uttering it does not change its shape or structure or 
add words to it. Does it change it by giving it meaning? I think that is very hard to 
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  An obvious objection to this use of terms like ‘acting upon’, with respect to abstracta, is 
addressed in the next section.   
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answer. On the one hand it is the same sentence before and after being uttered; on 
the other, it has undergone some change insofar as has been contextualised by the 
utterance.  
 
The point of the comparison, however, is not to suggest that, in all acts 
corresponding to transitive verbs, the act has the same sort of effect on the object. 
On the contrary the relationship can be marked by very different effects, varying 
both in kind and in degree, down it would seem to zero. What we learn from the 
grammar of sentences that report acts is that where there is an appreciable effect 
it is mirrored by the relation of the verb to the direct object. That grammatical 
relation, however, is found in all sentences with transitive verbs that report acts. In 
(4) what is said to be asserted by Sam is that the tide is out. The whole that-clause 
is the direct object; the whole proposition is the intentional object. It is true, there 
are other ways to parse (4), which are not so apparent with (5). In Prior’s discussion 
of objects of thought, and in Searle’s analysis of beliefs, alternatives were 
considered, one being that the object is something about which an assertion is 
made. On that score (4) might be understood as  
(6) Sam asserted, of the tide, that it was out, 
(7) Sam attributed outness to the tide,  
and so on. But since neither seems to better (4), least of all for simplicity, there 
seems little to be gained by deconstructing the object in this way. Nor does either 
(6) or (7) achieve what Searle requires of an intentional object, i.e. that it be 
something ordinary or in the world. The tide is a familiar concept, but not an 
ordinary object, certainly not a physical one. Thinking about the tide is not like 
thinking about Clinton. Probably the closest ‘ordinary’ object of thought connected 
with a tide is a sea, which has varying tidal states. Must we then say that the 
sentence reporting Sam’s act says, of the sea, that it is at low tide? Arguably this is 
a reasonable interpretation of (4). But it is not a report of what Sam said (as in what 
he uttered). To go back to the beginning, an assertion is the utterance of a sentence 
and, as Anscombe would seem to be suggesting, we get our best shot at 
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apprehending the object of the act by reciting the phrase which is the direct object 
of the sentence reporting the act. It is this directness of the corresponding (i.e. 
paragrammatic) relation that I take forward.  
 
31. The paragrammatic object 
The direct object of (4), which reports the act, is a that-clause. The (paragrammatic) 
object of the act is the referent of a that-clause, the meaning of the sentence 
uttered in order to make the assertion. As such it is an abstract object, the asserted 
proposition, unlike the broken window, which is a physical object of a physical act. 
Nonetheless, in the sense in which I am using ‘paragrammatic’ the two objects 
stand in the same relation as one another to the respective acts: the window is 
broken by Sal; that the tide is out is, as a whole, is asserted by Sam.   
 
This invites an obvious objection which needs to be addressed. It is that an abstract 
object cannot literally have anything done to it – nor, arguably, have anything 
directed at it – since it has no spatio-temporal location. Nor, it is argued, can an 
abstract object undergo change as a result of an act being performed in respect of 
it, because only concrete entities can enter into the kind of causal relationships 
which effect change. It would follow that asserting something cannot be an action 
upon that which is asserted, if that which is asserted is an abstract entity – unless, 
perhaps, ‘upon’ is being used metaphorically. Taken a step further, this would be an 
objection to there being objects of assertion in addition to acts of asserting. If we 
do not already subscribe to the view that there are propositions, then we have no 
grounds to give any ontological weight to the ‘something’ in (4’) or the 
corresponding named object in (4). It would not be enough to fall back on the idea 
that no actual assertion can be performed without something being asserted. 
According to the objection, ‘Something is asserted’ would simply be a notational 
variant of: ‘There is an assertion’. If that is right then quantification over things 
asserted, as against assertions themselves, drops out. 
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Whilst I agree that asserting does not change or ‘act upon’ the paragrammatic 
object in any but the thinnest sense, not all ‘doing to’ is unquestionably causal. If I 
assert a proposition, or think of a number, that is a case of my doing something to 
something else: the proposition or number. Something comes to be true of what I 
think or speak about that wasn’t true before, without the thing itself being any 
different for it. But even if we discount this kind of attenuated notion of 
interaction, it surely does not follow that there is nothing more to be counted in 
connection with an act of assertion than the assertion. Indeed, the very denial that 
asserting can effect any change on what is asserted, on account of its being 
abstract, seems to make as much space for an object as would a claim that 
asserting can cause change to it. For the ‘something’ to survive an action 
unchanged it would have to be the same something whether asserted or not, as 
indeed I am claiming. Moreover, if there is nothing answering to the description of 
‘object of assertion’, it could not intelligibly be said that two or more people might 
make the same assertion – not, that is, unless ‘assertion’ has another meaning 
besides the simple act-sense of asserting. In the act-sense, ‘X’s assertion’ refers to 
something done by X at a particular point in time. As such, the assertion cannot be 
duplicated by Y. If ‘the same assertion’ were taken to mean the same act, it would 
not mean the very same act, for part of the identity of the act would be its agent. 
At most it would mean the same sort of act. When we say that X and Y made the 
same assertion, we generally mean that X and Y asserted the same thing. So, if 
(8) There is an assertion 
 really exhausts the meaning of 
(9) Something is asserted 
then the occurrence of ‘assertion’ in (8) does not have the simple sense of an act. It 
has either the sense of object-other-than-act, or a hybrid sense or composite sense: 
an act of asserting something. In other words, to say that (8) and (9) are no more 
than notational variants of one another, is effectively to concede that ‘assertion’ is 
ambiguous. That, however, is hardly a revelation. As many philosophers and 
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linguists would agree, ‘assertion’ swings quite freely between an act-sense and an 
object-sense.93 Bernard Williams puts it as follows:   
‘Assertion’, like ‘belief’, has an act/object ambiguity: it may refer to what someone 
asserts (the content of the assertion), or to his asserting that content. (Williams 
2002: 67)  
What I am calling the paragrammatic object could be said to correspond to the 
object sense of ‘assertion’: what someone asserts. However, it is an unsatisfactory 
way to make the distinction. For one thing, it would suggest that we could talk with 
clarity about asserting an assertion. Searle (1968: 422) discusses just such a 
formulation, with regard to statements (see §34 below).  The fact that we feel 
some reservation about talking of assertions of assertions is because the word does 
not have these two sharply distinct meanings. Because our language has the facility 
to refer to acts as objects, we see an act-object ambiguity in many words for acts 
when what we are really seeing is an ambiguity in the word ‘object’. The point of 
introducing the notion of the paragrammatic object is in part to resolve the 
ambiguity by revealing that this is its source. I return to the ambiguity in some 
detail in §33. First, however we need to examine the other common linguistic form 
by which we apprehend assertions, namely reference.  
 
32. Referring to assertions 
It was noted earlier that, in addition to reporting acts, we can locate nominalised 
expressions for acts in the position of grammatical objects. For example, we can 
say: 
(10)  Sam made an assertion. 
But (10) means no more than that Sam asserted (something). Thus, whilst the noun 
phrase ‘an assertion’ completes the sentence syntactically, there is no particular 
object to which it refers: no individual act, nor anything specifically asserted. Using 
a Fregean distinction, we can say that in the context of (10) the phrase ‘an 
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  As well as Williams, see Searle (1968); Haack (1976); Alston (1996). 
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assertion’ at most indicates an object. An expression that merely indicates an 
object can fill an argument place without necessarily saturating the function whose 
argument it is. McLeod (unpublished: 17):  
For Frege, a sign which only indicates an object confers generality upon any 
semantically complete sentence in which it occurs. When, in a semantically complete 
sentence, a first-level concept word has its argument place filled by a sign that only 
indicates an object, the first-level concept is doing the saturation, rather than being 
saturated.  
 ‘An assertion’ is a concept name, but because what is nominalised by it is a strictly 
transitive verb – viz. ‘asserted (...)’ – it necessarily stands in need of completion by 
a term for what is asserted. From the necessity for such completion, I have argued 
that there is a paragrammatic object corresponding to what is asserted, typically, 
though not exclusively, the referent of a that-clause.   
 
When we refer to a particular assertion, we are still referring to an act, but to an 
act that by its nature incorporates an object, for example, 
(11)  Sam’s act of asserting that the tide was out.  
But this is equivalent to  
(12)  Sam’s assertion that the tide was out, 
which, as well as being an act of Sam’s making, may also be a subject of 
predication, the subject of a sentence such as: 
(13) Sam’s assertion was a mistake.   
From the above, we can see that the nominalised form, ‘assertion’, has both a 
simple and complex meaning. The complexity is in turn the source of the ambiguity. 
We can refer to an assertion under either meaning. In the simple, detached sense 
the term is an abstraction: it is just what an assertion of x, an assertion that p, an 
assertion that q, an assertion by S, an assertion made yesterday, etc. all have in 
common. Under the object sense – at least according to Williams – it is whatever is 
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asserted. But being an object in that sense entails being asserted, giving a third 
meaning of the order of ‘asserted object’: a synthesis of act and object.  
 
Synthesis 
Under this complex meaning, an assertion is an individual act (with a spatio-
temporal location) composed of the act and the asserted object, such as the state 
of some tide. An object such as the state of a tide is not an assertion, although that 
would appear to be contested by Williams and others, if the statement above is 
taken in a strong or literal sense. A state of the tide is, however, what is asserted 
when some speaker asserts it; and so it is an element in a complex relational object 
of the form: 
(14) S’s assertion of w   
where S is the agent, assertion an intentional act, and ‘w’ what is asserted, namely 
the paragrammatic object.94 The nominalised form of (14) permits assertions to be 
spoken of as objects (or subjects) of comment or criticism as in (13) or, for example 
in: ‘Sarah was persuaded by Sam’s assertion to cross to the island’. I can make 
reference as well to Sam’s assertion with or without specifying what Sam asserted 
as in (13). If someone were to ask which assertion I meant, I could say: ‘His 
assertion that the tide was out’, which may or may not individuate it, for that 
would depend on whether Sam had asserted the same thing more than once on 
different occasions. That is one answer. But alternatively I could say: ‘The assertion 
that Sam made standing right here at midday today’, which would individuate the 
act without the object’s being specified.  
 
But nominalisation has another effect, too, as we have seen. It merges the act with 
its (grammatical) object, into a singular but complex denotation, meaning the act 
                                                     
94
 A more standard form of referring is: ‘S’s assertion that p’,. but that presupposes that all asserted 
objects are referents of that-clauses. It would preclude for example the asserting of a right. (14)  
covers both. If it so happens that the object of an assertion is a proposition that p, then (14  is just 
‘S’s assertion of (the proposition) that-p’.  
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and its object combined: a complex object (of reference). The point could be shown 
symbolically as a synthesis of act and object– for example: 
(14’)  w-assertion 
Analysis 
By contrast, a sentence like (4) gives us the basis for analysis by reporting the act. 
The verb form ‘assert’, from which ‘assertion’ derives, represents a detachment of 
the act from the object. Consider the way sentence structure is analysed by 
branching tree diagrams: 
 
Fig. [1]  
        S 
 
 
    NP1    VP 
(4)       Sam    asserted  that the tide was out 
(5)       Sal     broke the window  
 
 
   V    NP2 
             asserted   that the tide was out 
           broke           the window 
 
The higher-level analysis reflects the relation between the agent, and the act as a 
whole. It is a subject-predicate analysis, and it is this relation which is nominalised 
(synthesised) in expressions like (12), which refer to (rather than report) intentional 
acts. Only in the deeper level of analysis given by the lower branch is the act-object 
relation exhibited. What the ‘VP’ in (4) refers to is the act of assertion performed by 
Sam with respect to the state of the tide – its being out. In (14’) it is the ‘w-
assertion’. What the ‘V’ refers to is the act in detachment from the object, ‘NP2’, 
the paragrammatic object. The same analysis can be given to (5), where the 
paragrammatic object is a window, broken by an act performed by Sal. Whilst it 
would be absurd to suggest that something asserted and something broken are 
qualitatively alike, the point being made is about the structural relation. What the 
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second branch of the tree diagram represents is the detachment of the act from 
the object leaving nothing, as it were, in between. That is what I mean by the claim 
that the relation is direct. The act engages with the object in such a way that there 
is no effect upon it other than its being asserted. The change is simply in that 
before the assertion the object was not asserted; afterwards it is. But it is the same 
object that it would have been if not asserted, or if asserted by someone else, or by 
the same person at another time. These two features of the relation are of the 
utmost importance in understanding what is referred to by a complex denotation 
such as (12).       
 
The efficacy of (4) as a guide is that it assists analysis and disambiguates the term 
‘assertion’ as it features in a complex denotation like (12). The subject-verb-object 
structure of sentences which report individual acts – including the reporting of 
speech acts – has a separate word or phrase for the act and the object.95 The verb 
maps discretely on to the act, the object term on to what is asserted. In Davidson’s 
words: ‘Sentences in indirect discourse’ (of which (4) is an example) ‘ ... wear their 
logical form on their sleeves’ (Davidson 1968: 142).96 Whether Davidson means this 
to have quite the same import as I take from it, it makes the point nicely: an 
analysis based on the basic S-V-O structure of a report-sentence such as (4), 
provides a model of an assertion. 
 < S, ASSERT, w > 
The analytical question of what an assertion is divides into two questions: What 
does S do? – assert – and: What does S assert? – w. When it comes to the question 
of which of these is ‘the assertion’, the answer cannot be the latter alone, although 
ordinary usage would suggest otherwise. Reference to acts and objects of 
assertion, or to assertions and their contents, are notoriously ambiguous. Many 
philosophers accept and accommodate the ambiguity, without detriment to their 
arguments. But for present purposes that is not an option. The act-object ambiguity 
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 Presumably this is what Russell  meant in the footnote to the passage quoted at the head of this 
chapter.  
96
 See further discussion on this point, and Davidson’s analysis of reported speech in §37 below.  
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– whether it pertains to argument or to assertion – cannot be ignored or left 
unresolved. Before I can proceed to the arguments in the concluding chapter, 
where acts of argument are defined in terms of assertion, a careful examination of 
the ambiguity is required.  
 
33. The ambiguity thesis  
It was seen in the foregoing chapters that ‘argument’ has a form of ambiguity 
between the act or practice of arguing, on the one hand, and the complex of 
sentences (or propositions) which we refer to as an argument, on the other. That 
ambiguity, it was seen, largely resolves itself into the mass sense of the noun, by 
which we refer to the activity of arguing, and the countable form which much more 
commonly means the individual argument, or arguments. So the distinction 
between an act of argument and an argument is quite transparent. What we refer 
to as ‘an argument’ is not usually what the proponent of an argument does, but 
what he or she propounds. The only regular exception is when ‘an argument’ 
means a dispute, and even then it is not really a reference to an act. In sum, the 
prevailing sense of ‘an argument’, ‘this argument’, ‘X’s argument’ is an object 
sense.  
 
‘Assertion’, as we have seen, has a different and more divisive ambiguity. It, too, 
has a mass sense which relates to the act of asserting. But unlike ‘argument’, it 
does not lose that sense when used as a countable. As we have seen, ‘an assertion’, 
and ‘an act of assertion’ mean broadly the same thing. Even when coupled with 
what is asserted, as in (12) the primary reference is to the act. Sam’s assertion is 
what Sam performed with respect to the proposition. However, what a speaker 
asserts is also routinely referred to as ‘an assertion’, ‘S’s assertion’, etc. in much the 
same way as what an arguer propounds is referred to as ‘an argument’. Whilst I 
take the object-sense of argument to be the correct one, the object-sense of 
‘assertion’ is problematic.  
 
176 
 
 
 
The act-object ambiguity is not confined to ‘assertion’. Ulrich (1976: 112), who 
contests the ambiguity, introduces it as follows: 
According to a tempting and widely held view, the nominalizations of what might be 
called ‘illocutionary verbs’ (verbs which stand for illocutionary acts) are 
systematically ambiguous between alleged ‘ act’ and ‘object’ senses.... I will call this 
the ‘ambiguity thesis’. 
I shall follow Ulrich in referring to the view that ‘assertion’, ‘statement’, ‘claim’, 
etc., properly have both these senses, as the ambiguity thesis (AT). Proponents of 
the thesis, as we have seen, include Williams, Searle, Haack, and Alston. Some of 
these focus on the ambiguity of ‘assertion’, some ‘statement’, but the issues are in 
all relevant respects the same for both words.   
 
As I have argued previously, the act-sense of ‘assertion’ is unobjectionable. 
However, there is also a prima facie case for the object-sense, insofar as people 
routinely identify statements, assertions, beliefs, etc., by their content and not by 
the act they perform in asserting something. Consider the question, 
(15) ‘What was Sam’s assertion?’  
The most natural response is: ‘that the tide was out’. It is not ‘the uttering of a 
sentence.....’. The latter may be correct but by conversational norms it would be 
regarded as the wrong answer, because it would misinterpret the question. If all 
that the claim of act-object ambiguity rests upon is this, then there is no question 
that it obtains, for in that context the word ‘assertion’ may indeed refer to what is 
asserted. It would not be much of an objection to say that this is just a form of 
words, or a manner of speaking, for it is manners of speaking and differences in use 
that create ambiguities.  
 
We speak of resolving ambiguity by identifying a context in which one particular 
meaning is exhibited as opposed to another. Some predicates ascribed to an 
assertion imply that the subject is an act, and some the asserted object. William 
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Alston (1996: 14), makes the case as follows, beginning with practically the same 
statement as Williams:  
Suppose I assert that the tree is dying, and you respond: “That’s very true.” What is 
the antecedent of your ‘that’ – my act of asserting that the tree is dying or what I 
asserted, namely that the tree is dying? Clearly the latter. A natural way of spelling 
out “That’s very true” is “What you said is quite true”, or “Yes it’s true that the tree 
is dying.” While “Your act of asserting that the tree is dying is true” doesn’t have any 
ready interpretation. Note that the availability of “Your assertion is quite true” 
doesn’t help to make the choice just because of the ambiguity noted above; “your 
assertion” could be either your act of asserting or what you asserted.  
‘Your assertion that the tree is dying is true’ does have a ready interpretation, since 
assertions, like propositions or sentences, are judged on the basis of their truth or 
falsity. That is the basis of the ambiguity. What is the antecedent of your ‘that’ 
when you say ‘that’s true’ in response to an assertion that p? The right answer is 
what you asserted, since an asserting is not something of which truth or falsity can 
strictly speaking be predicated. It may be qualified adverbially as, say, truthful or 
sincere (i.e. truthfully or sincerely performed), but that is a different judgement, 
because the act could arguably be ‘truthful’, and certainly ‘sincere’, without the 
content’s being true, if it was what the speaker believed.  
 
Williams, too, introduces the ambiguity in the context of the relation of assertions 
(and beliefs) to truth. Given that assertions are subject to truth norms – they are 
‘expected’, ‘supposed’ etc. to be true – it is clearly a fair objection to an assertion 
that it is false. But it is not the only objection, even if it is the most fundamental or 
basic objection. According to Williams (2002: 67), an objection can be raised against 
an assertion because it is ‘rude, tactless, or reveals a secret’. On each of these latter 
counts the objection is against the act of asserting. But whilst it is true that 
rudeness etc. can be conveyed by adopting a particular tone or manner, there are 
certain items of content, too, that are inherently rude or tactless to assert. Hence, 
even though it is for the act of asserting that a speaker is held responsible, what is 
asserted can also determine whether or not the objection is fair. It might be brave 
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to assert p, cowardly to assert q, deceitful to assert r, and so on. Galileo’s assertion 
that the earth moves was a brave (or perhaps reckless) act, but neither description 
would be apt without the content that made it so. Williams acknowledges this 
interplay. 
 
‘Assertion’ belongs to a general cluster of nouns, which have the same broad 
duality of meaning. ‘Belief’ as we have seen is one such. So too are ‘judgement’, 
‘thought’ – even ‘proposition’97. We equate a thought with what a thinker thinks, as 
well as with the mental act of thinking. I might speak of ‘sharing thoughts’, ‘having 
the same thought as someone else’; even of ‘a thought that hadn’t occurred to 
me’, clearly distinguishing between a thought as an inner process, and some 
distinct object (propositional or otherwise) that may or may not have been the 
product of the thinking, or what the thinker had in mind. On this score, it may be 
argued that ambiguity just comes with the nominalisation of transitive verbs: a 
price paid for the convenience of being able to refer to, and assign predicates, to 
acts. Nor is the ambiguity confined to speech acts, mental states, etc. (Ulrich 1976). 
Most if not all English verbs may be transformed into nouns for the purpose of 
reference: ‘collection’, ‘selection’, ‘invention’, ‘discovery’, ‘arrival’, ‘shot’, 
‘placement’, ‘building’, ‘reference’ are all nouns that derive their meaning from 
verbs. In cases where there is no special cognate form or affix available, the verb 
itself may often double as a noun: ‘a good catch’, ‘a steep climb’, ‘a lucky find’, ‘an 
easy read’, ‘a quick drink’. 
 
It is interesting to note that the predominance of one sense over the other varies 
from case to case. There is no hard and fast rule for nominalised verbs in general. 
‘A collection’ can mean the act or process of collecting, but is more commonly used 
for the set of collected objects. ‘A departure’ on the other hand, or ‘a shot’, seem 
to have the stronger connotation of acts. Less clear-cut are ‘catch’ and ‘climb’. 
Primarily, as nouns, they denote acts; but a boatload of fish might be referred to as 
                                                     
97
  In the non-philosophical sense a proposition can be both an act of proposing and what is 
proposed.  
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‘a good catch’, or a sheer rock face as ‘a difficult climb’. Then again, ‘climb’ is not 
standardly a word for a rock face, or ‘catch’ for a quantity of fish. But ‘collection’ 
standardly is a word for a set of things that are or have been collected. Compare 
‘The collection took most of the year to complete’, with ‘The collection is now on 
display at the local museum’. Compare also ‘The building fell behind’, with ‘The 
building fell down’. ‘Assertion’, it would seem, carries the two senses in more or 
less equal measure. 
 
Interpreting the thesis  
There are two ways in which a reader could take Williams’ statement of the 
ambiguity thesis.98 The words ‘may refer to...’(or Alston’s ‘can be...’) could be 
construed either strongly as legitimising the use of ‘assertion’ to refer to what is 
asserted, or weakly as a mere fact about usage: an observation that speakers 
commonly use  the word ‘assertion’ to mean what is asserted. If what Williams 
means is just the latter, then the case is made, as the examples under the first 
point show. Two assertions, for example, might be referred to as ‘the same 
assertion’ if they have the same content. But if all that is implied by the ambiguity 
thesis is that people routinely say one thing to mean another, its whole import is 
philosophically uninteresting. It would leave the thesis open to the objection that 
the use of ‘assertion’ to mean the content of the assertion is no more than misuse 
or shorthand: that the phrase ‘the same assertion as...’ really means ‘an assertion 
with the same content as ...’; and the sentence, ‘S’s assertion was false’, really 
means that what S asserted was false. It would be surprising if the ambiguity thesis 
claimed no more than this. On the other hand it would be much more puzzling if it 
was intended literally and without qualification. For then it would simply be wrong. 
In the following passage Williams himself effectively rules out the stronger 
interpretation:  
                                                     
98
 To re-quote the extract: ‘“Assertion”, like “belief”, has an act/object ambiguity: it may refer to 
what someone asserts (the content of the assertion), or to his asserting that content.’ (Williams 
2002: 67).  
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Falsehood is certainly an objection to an assertion; intuitively it seems to be a more 
basic objection than these others, .... It might be thought that there is a simple 
explanation of why it is more basic: falsehood is a property of the content and not of 
the act, and therefore the objection of falsehood is an objection to the content, not 
to the act. But this would be a straightforward mistake. What A asserts, the content 
of his assertion, may equally be what B supposes or C denies; it is just a content, 
what Frege called ‘a thought.’ If it is false, it is false in all these connections or 
presentations, but its falsehood is an objection only in A's case, not in B’s or (least of 
all) in C’s. Though the objection to A's assertion is grounded in a fact about its 
content, the objection is to his asserting it. Equally, we cannot say that the other 
styles of objection to someone's assertion are objections only to his act of assertion 
and are not grounded in its content – it is the content, after all, that makes it in the 
circumstances offensive, tactless, or whatever. (Williams 2002: 67–68) 
This passage cuts the ground from under a strong reading of the ambiguity 
statement that Williams has made just a line or two earlier. What A asserts, B 
supposes, and C denies are the same object, but only the first is the content of an 
assertion. So, as Williams rightly points out, only the first is open to objection as an 
assertion, for the obvious reason that only A’s utterance is an assertion. How then 
can what A asserts be an assertion – i.e. the referent of any phrase denoting an 
assertion – given that what A asserts is identical with what B and C suppose and 
deny respectively? Let’s say A asserts that the tree is dying, and as Williams 
suggests, C denies it. We cannot say that what C denies is ‘a denial’, even for C, if it 
were also ‘an assertion’ for A, for that would make it a different object in respect of 
each act. Nor is what A asserts a supposition, even for B. In fact the whole notion of 
sameness becomes incoherent if the object-sense of ‘assertion’ or of ‘denial’ or of 
‘supposition’ is thrown into the mix, alongside the act sense. A necessary condition 
for the sameness of the object of all three acts is their being wholly detached from 
the acts, each of whose (identical) object it is. Whatever the object of an assertion 
is – a proposition, or as Williams suggests a (Fregean) Thought – it is quite distinct 
from the act; detachable from the act without loss of identity.  
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The ‘straightforward mistake’ to which Williams refers also has echoes of Geach’s 
treatment of what he (Geach) calls the ‘Frege point’:  
A proposition may occur in discourse now asserted, now unasserted, and yet be 
recognizably the same proposition. This may appear so obviously true as to be hardly 
worth saying; but we shall see it is worth saying, by contrast with erroneous theories 
of assertion. (Geach 1965: 449) 
Geach considers the point in connection with a valid argument, say, an instance of 
modus ponens. There a sentence, p, occurs twice, once as a simple premise, and 
again as antecedent of the conditional. But in only the first of these does p have the 
force of an assertion. As the antecedent of the conditional it is not asserted but 
supposed. If the argument is propounded, therefore, p is asserted once and 
supposed once. But what is asserted is identical with what is supposed because, as 
Geach points out, the validity of the argument depends upon the uniformity of 
meaning between occurrences of the same term. But whereas p is both what is 
asserted and what is supposed, ‘the assertion (that p)’ and ‘the supposition (that 
p)’ do not mean the same. So what is asserted cannot be a complete meaning of 
‘assertion’, as it would if Williams’ formulation of the AT were taken literally.  
 
One way to reach a resolution, as already suggested, is to locate the ambiguity in 
the meaning of the ‘what’ of ‘what is asserted’ rather than simply in the meaning of 
‘assertion’ itself. Putting it another way, the expression ‘what is asserted’ is 
ambiguous between the strong reading and a weak reading of Williams’ statement 
of the AT. On the strong reading, the ‘what’ clause is grammatically equivalent to a 
relative clause, namely: ‘that which is asserted’. But that which is asserted on one 
occasion may be supposed or denied on another, preserving the complete 
detachment of the object from the act. But ‘what is asserted’ (or Williams’s ‘what 
someone asserts’) can be construed with the grammatical form of an indirect 
question: i.e. with ‘what’ as an interrogative pronoun (McDowell 1977: 163).99 The 
                                                     
99
 ‘A phrase of the form “the reference of x” can be understood as equivalent to the corresponding 
phrase of the form “what x refers to”, either (i) in the sense in which “what” amounts to “that 
which” (which yields the official Fregean use of “Bedeutung”) or (ii) in the sense in which “what” is 
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distinction is a fine one, and disguised in English. It is more clearly marked in 
classical Latin because after the relative pronoun the dependent verb takes the 
indicative but after the interrogative pronoun the verb is subjunctive. So, applied to 
speech acts, id quod dicitur means: ‘that thing which is said’ – the strong meaning – 
whereas quid dicatur, means ‘what is said’ (by someone). ‘What is said’ in the latter 
sense gets its meaning from its being the object of the act.100 We can extend this to 
assertion. It is constitutive of what is asserted, in the ‘quid dicatur’ sense, that it is 
the object of an act of assertion. The act ‘enters into the object’, so to speak; and 
so it cannot be identical with what someone else supposes or denies, although the 
propositional content may remain the same in each case.101 So when Williams 
(2002: 67) states that the word ‘assertion’ may refer to what someone asserts the 
charitable interpretation would be that he is using ‘refer’ in the latter sense, given 
that otherwise he would be taking up two contradictory positions in quick 
succession.  
 
In considering these two interpretations – the strong and weak readings of the AT – 
we can see the alleged act-object ambiguity of ‘assertion’ passes over into an 
ambiguity of ‘what’, and accordingly of ‘object’. What is asserted is one object – the 
simple, paragrammatic object. The synthesis of act and object is another, complex 
object 
(16) S’s assertion of w 
We have a choice whether to construe ‘w’ as that which S asserts (but others might 
deny) or as just as what is asserted in S’s assertion which cannot therefore be 
identical with what is denied in someone’s denial.   
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
an interrogative pronoun. In this second sense, “what x refers to” gives the form of an indirect 
question, something suitable to follow “know” where knowledge of truths is what is meant.’ 
100
 I am indebted to Richard Gaskin for this suggestion. 
101
 See also Gaskin (2008: 160-62) 
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Object and content: a further note 
In the preceding sections, ‘what is asserted’ has mainly been taken to be the object 
of an assertion (in the act sense). But the same object, as already remarked (§29) is 
often referred to as the ‘content of the assertion’. Williams blurs any distinction 
there might be by saying that ‘assertion’, in the object-sense, ‘may refer to what 
someone asserts (the content of the assertion)’ and in the act-sense, ‘to his 
asserting that content’ (Williams 2002: 67). On that score ‘the object’ and ‘the 
content’ are indeed co-referential. Moreover, the same ambiguity applies to 
‘content of the assertion’ as to ‘what is asserted’, since the content of an assertion 
on one occasion can be the content of a denial on another – and so on. It has been 
acknowledged that in referring to what is asserted by one term rather than the 
other, there is arguably a different sense given to ‘the assertion’ – act in relation to 
its object, complex object in relation to content. On the other hand, the use of 
‘content’ to mean what can be asserted (and not just what is asserted) is so 
standard in philosophy that little significant difference, in use or meaning, can be 
driven between it and ‘object’.102  
 
34. Searle on structural ambiguity  
Another take on the AT comes from Searle (1968). Searle holds the ambiguity to be 
‘structural’, meaning grammatical:  
The word “statement” is structurally ambiguous. Like many nominalized verb forms, 
(‘statement’) has what traditional grammarians would call the act-object or process-
product ambiguity A modern transformational grammarian would say that it is 
structurally ambiguous as it has two different derivations from (phrase markers 
containing) the verb “state”. ... “Statement” can mean the act of stating or what is 
stated. (Searle 1968: 422) 
                                                     
102
 Frege, for instance, wrote: ‘Not every content can be turned into a judgement. [...] The content 
of what follows the content-stroke must always be a possible content of judgement’ (Frege 1879: 
§2). 
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Here, for reasons connected with the aims of his paper,103 Searle’s focus is on 
statements, rather than assertions. I shall talk about statements, too, for the 
purpose of my response, but on the understanding that what applies to stating 
applies in equal measure to assertion.  
 
There are two arguably conflicting claims Searle makes in this paper. The first is the 
recognition that such ambiguity as there is is grammatical in origin rather than 
lexical. This is an important observation: it distinguishes the act/object ambiguity 
from that of words like ‘bank’ and ‘bank’, which are ordinary homonyms with no 
cognate form in common. By contrast ‘state’ – and likewise ‘assert’ – do not each 
have two meanings, one from which the act-sense, and another from which the 
object-sense, derive. The source of the lexical meaning of ‘statement’ is a verb that 
has no ambiguity. The fact that the nouns ‘assertion’ and ‘statement’ can function 
as the subjects of different sentences, and have various things said about them, 
does not by itself generate ambiguity. After all, we can use the gerundial form, 
‘stating’ (‘asserting’) in exactly the same syntactical role as ‘statement’, without any 
ambiguity. For example: 
(17) Sam’s stating that p was foolish. 
That gives both phrases an object-status in the grammatical terms Searle describes, 
but does not confer a change of meaning on ‘statement’, any more than it does on 
‘stating’. Yet, as we have seen, Searle concludes, quite explicitly and as strongly as 
Williams, that ‘statement’ can mean either the act of stating or what is stated.  
 
Searle’s argument for the object sense rests on the following examples of contexts 
or situations which, he claims, distinguish the two meanings:  
  
                                                     
103
 The title is ‘Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts’. In the paper Searle is challenging 
certain aspects of this distinction, arguing that it does not cure all the deficiencies of the constative-
performative distinction. Statements are therefore more germane to Searle’s argument than 
assertion would be, since assertions more obviously have (assertive) force. Still, on the issue of 
structural ambiguity, this difference does not come into play. 
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(a) The statement of our position took all of the morning session.  
(b) The statement that all men are mortal is true.104  
To emphasise the difference between the two occurrences of ‘statement’ he claims 
that you cannot say: 
(c) The statement that all men are mortal took ten seconds.  
But you can say:  
(d) The statement of the statement that all men are mortal took ten seconds, 
adding that what (d) means is that it took ten seconds to make the statement, or 
that the act of stating (that all men are mortal) took ten seconds to perform. On 
the basis of these examples he then invokes the distinction between the 
‘statement-act sense’ and the ‘statement-object-sense’ (Searle 1968: 422). 
 
If this is an argument for a strong object sense of ‘statement’ it is a poor one. It is 
all very well to stipulate and give names to senses in order to explain why you can, 
allegedly, say one thing but not another, but that does not establish that you can 
say one and not another. Such rules as there are to permit or prohibit certain 
utterances are not set in stone. Searle infers that there are two senses of 
‘statement’ from the assumption that you cannot say (c) but you can say (d). But 
that premise depends in turn on there being two distinct senses of ‘statement’ – 
otherwise all the speaker of (d) is doing is repeating himself. At best this is a weak 
abductive argument; at worst it is circular.   
 
Searle introduces the ambiguity to challenge Austin’s distinction between 
locutionary and illocutionary acts, and in particular what he calls Austin’s 
‘discovery’ that statements are illocutionary acts as much as any other more 
                                                     
104
 Searle numbers these 1 and 2. I have avoided confusion by changing to letters for Searle’s 
examples. For reference purposes I have also extended the lettering to (c) and (d) in what follows.  
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obviously performative utterances. The discovery holds for the act sense but, he 
argues, not for the object sense. 
The failure to take into account the structural ambiguity of ‘statement’, however, 
had very important consequences for certain other parts of Austin's theory of 
language. For since statements are speech acts, and since statements can be true or 
false, it appears that that which is true or false is a speech act. But this inference is 
fallacious, as it involves a fallacy of ambiguity. Statement-acts are speech acts, and 
statement-objects (as well as propositions) are what can be true or false. [...] 
Propositions but not acts can be true or false; thus statement objects but not 
statement acts can be true or false. (Searle 1968: 423) 
This presumably is the explanation for the prohibition on saying (c). The statement 
that all men are mortal is a ‘statement’ of the sort that can be true or false. So, 
being neither an act nor an event it cannot be said to have a time-location, or 
duration. What is certainly true is that propositions do not have duration. We 
cannot say that a proposition took ten seconds. But a proposition is not a 
statement, nor is it an assertion, as Searle has no choice but to concede. We might 
say that a proposition took a certain amount of time to express – that is to state. In 
other words, what is stated may take time to state. But isn’t ‘what is stated’ 
precisely one of the meanings that Searle allots to ‘statement’ under the structural 
ambiguity claim, (just as Alston and Williams both take ‘what is asserted’ to be one 
of the meanings of ‘assertion’)? Of course ‘statement’ is used conversationally with 
the strong sense of what is or can be stated, i.e. a proposition or assertible. (It is 
also used to mean a declarative sentence.) But in the precise philosophical context 
in which Searle is writing it is simply imprecise to rest any strong assignment of 
meaning on this usage. A statement is not a proposition, except in the sense of a 
stated proposition. Since there are two perfectly good terms to hand to mark the 
difference, it seems an unnecessary confusion to countenance the stating of 
statements.  
 
Searle is evidently aware of the danger of conflation. Echoing Geach on the Frege 
Point, Searle (1968: 424) says: ‘Of course what is stated, a proposition, can also be 
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the content of a question, of a promise, the antecedent of a hypothetical, and so 
forth. It is neutral to illocutionary force, so “statement” is not synonymous with 
“proposition” ...’  
But what is Searle’s ‘statement-object’ if it is not a proposition; or its equivalent, 
what is stated? To extricate his account from the problem posed by this question, 
Searle spells out the two senses he gives to ‘statement’, qualifying them as follows:  
The statement-act  
= the act of stating.  
  = the act of stating a proposition. ... 
  = the act of making a statement-object.  
The statement-object  
= what is stated (construed as stated)  
  = the proposition (construed as stated).  
But this does not sit well with his strong ambiguity claim, especially with respect to 
the posited statement-object sense. Searle admits that in the characterisation of 
the statement-object, he is obliged to add the phrase, ‘construed as stated’ 
parenthetically to ‘what is asserted’ and likewise to propositions. But as soon as his 
definition of the statement-object has to be qualified in this way, the claimed 
distinction between act and object sense is weakened. To say that the statement-
object must be construed as stated comes uncomfortably close to saying that it 
must be construed as a statement in the act-sense, or with some act-sense added. 
Drawing on the discussion in the previous section, either the statement-object is 
just an object – that which (id quod) someone states or it is already what (quid) 
someone states, and needs no construal as such. It would seem that in order to 
distinguish between a proposition and statement-object it is necessary to attach 
the statement-object to the act in some way – or subordinate it within the complex 
object of which it is (merely) the content. On the other hand, if we allow that the 
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object can be construed as stated but still remain conceptually distinct from the act 
of which it is construed as the object, then it is hard to see how the object differs in 
essentials from a proposition. Searle identifies the object sense of ‘statement’, but 
seems confused over the status of the object, sometimes implying that it is 
independent of the act of stating (so can be denied etc), sometimes that it is not so 
independent. But the right position is that ‘what is stated’ is ambiguous between 
these two senses, so that we should recognize both, just keep them clearly distinct. 
 
If what is stated (a proposition) is not a statement when it is not stated – as when it 
is the object of some other speech act, or of none – then nor is it a statement when 
it is stated. It is merely what is stated; and would be the same thing, ex hypothesi, if 
it were unstated. Neither stating nor not stating changes it. But the same goes for 
an object construed as stated, since it could alternatively be construed as promised, 
or as asked, or denied, or as the antecedent of a hypothetical, and so on, all 
without change to itself. Construing the statement-object ‘as stated’ makes no 
more alteration to its identity than actually stating it does. The object remains a 
proposition, but now a proposition expressed, or rather construed as expressed, 
with the force of a statement. The force is no part of the object, but is supplied by 
the context of utterance, or by the sentence in its context of utterance.  
To maintain its status as the object of the act, with the bare sense of ‘what is stated 
(asserted)’, it is necessary to conceive of the proposition in complete detachment 
from the context of utterance. 
 
In summary 
The act-object ambiguity, on examination, is as much an ambiguity of ‘object’ – in 
the context of the ambiguity thesis – as of ‘assertion’. It resolves into a distinction 
between, on the one hand, the simple detachable object that X asserts (but Y may 
deny and Z may suppose) and, on the other, the act-involving sense where what is 
asserted takes its sense in part from the act whose object it is. What is important 
for the present thesis is the recognition that there is a detachable sense, distinct 
from the act-involving sense. Earlier I termed it the paragrammatic sense, the sense 
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mirrored by the verb-object relation in report sentences. The act-involving sense is 
important because it allows an assertion to be referred to in respect of either its 
content or its performance, so that we can say both: ‘The assertion was true’ and: 
‘The assertion was reckless’, without misuse in either case.  
 
But what is important for this thesis is that there is an object-sense under which 
what is asserted is, so to speak, its own object; independent of its act-involving 
sense. The importance of this will emerge in Chapter 6, when the acts and objects 
of argument are re-examined in the light of acts of assertion.  
 
35. Assertions of what?  
We are accustomed to generalising the form of assertion as  
(A) S’s assertion that p, 
casting what is asserted as the referent of a that-clause. But in keeping with the 
characterisation of the act-object relation as direct, and the object of the act as an 
independent unit, it is arguably more perspicuous to refer to the whole as:  
(16) S’s assertion of w   
This has already been proposed.105 (16) has the further advantage of 
accommodating objects of assertion that may not have propositional form. It is 
therefore a broader characterisation than (A). With this in mind Robert Brandom 
(1983: 640) makes the following observation: ‘In the usual sense, one asserts that 
the circumstances expressed by a declarative sentence obtain. But one can also 
assert one’s authority or rights. This broader normative usage will be invoked here 
to explain the narrower linguistic one.’ It could be argued that examples like 
Brandom’s are untypical of what we mean by ‘assertion’; or that asserting a 
proposition is the paradigm case, and any other application of the word ‘assert’ 
should be seen as derivative, even figurative. It could also be objected that 
                                                     
105 See §32 above: item (14).   
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asserting one’s right or authority is just equivalent to asserting that one has a 
certain right or some authority, so as to restore the primacy of (A) as a 
representation of the act-object relation in assertion. However, it would seem that 
one can assert a right without saying anything and, in particular, without saying 
anything explicitly declarative. But then so can assertions ‘in the usual sense’ be 
made without saying anything, for instance by nodding one’s head, raising a hand, 
or ticking a box. We can still construe acts like this as assertion, in suitable 
circumstances, and do not say that what is asserted is a nod or a tick. A person 
could be described as having asserted his right to remain silent during an 
interrogation by conspicuously refusing to speak: folding arms, pursing lips, etc. In 
other words the right is asserted, and the person is asserting it. But equally a 
person’s pointed refusal to speak may be interpreted as an assertion that he or she 
has the right to stay silent (if that is the person’s reason for behaving in that way). 
Actions are sometimes said to ‘make a statement’, in this sense. Likewise if I utter 
the sentence ‘I do not have to say anything if I don’t want to’ then, on one 
interpretation at least, I have asserted that I do not have to say anything, but on 
another I have asserted the right directly.  
 
In the extract from Lord of the Flies (at the head of Chapter Two) Ralph asserts his 
authority by ordering Jack to let Piggy speak. He asserts that he has the authority 
by asserting that he is chief and that he was chosen. Likewise an employer might 
assert her authority to dismiss a member of staff in an explicit manner, by saying: ‘I 
have the authority to dismiss you’, or implicitly by saying: ‘You’re fired.’ To say to 
an employee ‘You’re fired’ is to assert in plain terms that the person being 
addressed is dismissed. But the authority that is asserted is not the same object as 
the meaning of ‘You’re fired’. If the speaker has the authority, then that authority 
has been asserted by the act of saying the sentence assertively. It is the 
perlocutionary force of the utterance that effects the dismissal. The illocutionary 
force is the asserting (exercising) of authority. These overlapping ways to describe 
what is going on are not going to settle the question of whether the broader usage 
is explanatorily prior to the more ‘usual’ one, as Brandom is suggesting. But, since 
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there are expressions other than that-clauses that we meaningfully use to denote 
some objects of assertive acts, their significance should be accounted for. 
 
Rights are perhaps more illustrative of the relevance of the broader use. Compare 
the following two reports: 
(18) Carla asserted her right to appeal. 
(19) Carla asserted that she had the right to appeal. 
There is little to be achieved by contesting which of these reports features the 
‘correct’ description of the object that is asserted. If (18) and (19) are different acts, 
there is no question to answer. But if, as we are supposing, they report the same 
act, then both contain a reference to the same (asserted) object. In (18) the object 
may be identified as Carla’s right of appeal; in (19) the object is the meaning of 
clause, ‘that Carla had the right of appeal’. On the paragrammatic account the 
object is just what is asserted and is the same object however represented or 
described. So whether we call what is asserted in (18) and (19) the object Carla 
asserted, or the content of her assertion, we refer to the same thing. But there is a 
confusion arising from the use of these terms interchangeably. For whilst Carla’s 
right of appeal sits well with the designation ‘object’, it does not sit well with the 
notion of content. If we ask ‘What was the content of Carla’s assertion?’, we find a 
more natural answer in (19), because embedded in (19) there is a  an expression of 
what she asserted. ‘Asserting a right’, by contrast, does not necessarily translate 
into any sort of expressive performance. In other words,  
(20) an assertion of w 
is not necessarily reducible to 
(21) an assertion that p  
For although we can and do speak of the assertion of a right, etc., we do not 
normally refer to anything as ‘the assertion that a right’. Once it is seen that there 
are objects of assertion that can be referred to other than by a that-clause, the 
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question can be expanded to the more general one about the content of 
assertions. How does the object, w, equate to what Carla asserted as reported in 
(19), namely 
(22) that she (Carla) had the right to appeal  
This, it is reported, is what Carla said in making the assertion, and thus would be a 
reference to the content of her assertion that she had the right, etc., as well as to 
the object of her asserting. (22) is not, of course, what Carla said verbatim. Nor 
need it bear any linguistic resemblance to what Carla said in order to fulfil the 
function of referring to the right that she asserted. She might have said the words, 
‘I have the right to appeal’. But alternatively she might have said: ‘See you in court’. 
Hence (18) reports what Carla asserted, more or less regardless of how the 
assertion was expressed, and (22) refers to what she asserted likewise. Indeed, the 
phrase, ‘what Carla said’ would refer to the expression she gave to the act. The 
phrase, ‘what she meant’ would be a reference to the content. That is effectively 
what it means to say (as in §33 above) that ‘the content’ and ‘the object’ of an 
assertion refer to the same thing. But at the same time it reveals some of the 
difference in sense, or in the perspective from which one term is more or less apt 
than the other.  
 
I think that the value of Brandom’s observation is not so much that the ‘broader 
normative usage’ is more explanatory, but just that it is more inclusive. Both a right 
and a proposition can be asserted directly. The complete assertion in either case 
can be referred to as in (20): ‘an assertion of...’. Despite some awkwardness, this 
also includes: ‘an assertion of that-p’, if that-p is what is asserted – i.e. if a 
sentence, s, is uttered assertively to mean ‘that-p’. On this analysis the word ‘that’ 
is relegated to a grammatical marker, without semantic significance. It will be 
argued in the final chapter that a similar treatment can be given to ‘so’ as the 
marker of what is inferred, deduced, or argued for. 
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Other putative objects of assertion  
There is another class of objects that feature in reports of assertion. These fall 
under the broad heading of states of mind or propositional attitudes, notably 
belief. We also speak quite naturally of asserting opinions, views, preferences; and 
more. MacFarlane (2011: 2), for instance, cites ‘expressing an attitude’ as one of 
four generally accepted definitions of assertion. It is true that in most if not all 
cases these putative objects may also be transposed into statements. ‘X asserted a 
preference for...’ may just be a way of reporting that X said that she liked some 
particular thing better than another. Also, it can be argued that expressing an 
opinion is not asserting an opinion, but asserting something that happens to be 
what, in someone’s opinion, is the case. (It does not even need to be one’s own 
opinion: X may assert an opinion expressed by Y.) But usage is not decisive. It is a 
moot point whether ‘asserting an opinion’ (or a belief) means quite the same as 
asserting the object of the opinion or belief. For one thing, the ambiguity applies to 
‘belief’ and ‘opinion’ as much as it does to ‘assertion’.  
 
Interesting as it would be to examine these ‘objects’ on a case-by-case basis, it 
would be neither practical nor relevant in the present context. I shall therefore 
confine the discussion to a single case study, namely belief, and more particularly 
to the role Appiah (1985; 1986) gives to belief in his definition of assertion.  
 
36. Assertions of belief  
Appiah (1986: 3), under the chapter heading, ‘The Essentials of Assertion’, sets out 
his case as follows: 
Assertion is the speech act by which we communicate our beliefs, ... the means our 
language provides us for letting other people know what we believe.... In this case, 
of course, the fellow creatures are speakers of our language, and the action is 
utterance. We can call the belief whose communication is the purpose of standard 
utterances of a declarative sentence, the belief that sentence ‘expresses’. Then, 
since to know what a sentence means is to know how it is used, we can say that 
people know what a declarative sentence means in a certain language if they know 
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what belief an assertoric utterance of that sentence in that language expresses, 
whether uttered by them or by others.  
Should we take this to mean that in a particular act of assertion the object of the 
act – what is asserted – is a belief held by the speaker? The relation may not be 
quite as direct as that: Appiah says that acts of assertion communicate beliefs. The 
act itself, Appiah is clear, is an utterance, with which there is no quarrel. Its object – 
what is uttered in a standardly expressed assertion – is a declarative (assertoric)106 
sentence. It would follow from this that the uttering of a declarative sentence is 
also ‘the means our language provides’ for communicating our beliefs. (Of course, 
uttering sentences is a means to other ends besides that of asserting beliefs.)  
 
If Appiah is right, then Sam’s belief, at the time of Sam’s utterance, that the tide 
was out, is what his utterance (provided it was assertoric) communicated. The act is 
given expression in the standard way by Sam’s uttering the sentence:  
(23) The tide is out.  
Does Sam do something else then, besides uttering the sentence when he makes 
the assertion? Yes and no. On the one hand Sam uses the words with a certain 
force, which would not be present were he merely mouthing the words, or using 
the sentence for some other purpose than asserting something. So asserting that 
the tide is out is a different act from, say, uttering (23) as an example of an English 
sentence. On the other hand, if Sam wishes to communicate his belief that the tide 
is out, then isn’t it the case that all he needs to do is say, in ordinary tones: ‘The 
tide is out’, and the conventions of the language will do the rest for him? So, by 
socio-linguistic convention, an audience hearing or reading a declarative sentence, 
without any accompanying indication to the contrary, is entitled to expect that the 
speaker at least believes – arguably knows – the sentence to be true.  
 
                                                     
106
 Appiah’s choice of ‘assertoric’ over ‘declarative’ may be said to make the point more trivially; but 
then ‘declare’ and ‘assert’ are not so different in meaning.  
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In the above extract Appiah might appear to be taking this line by speaking of the 
belief that the standard utterance of a declarative sentence ‘expresses’. He rightly 
hedges his remarks with the cautionary quotation marks around ‘expresses’. He is 
less careful in the following extract (Appiah 1985: 147)  where he says:  
In English it is relatively trivial to say what belief a sentence expresses. Where a 
sentence contains no token-referential expressions, we can usually pick out the 
belief that it expresses by calling it the belief that S. ‘Snow is white’ expresses the 
belief that snow is white. [...] For sentences containing token-referential expressions, 
the problem is a little more difficult.107 
I do not think that the main problem here is with token-referential expressions. The 
root problem is the deeper issue of the act-object relation embodied in the concept 
of belief, just as it is in assertion. If Appiah’s basic tenet is correct, that a belief is 
what is expressed in a typical act of assertion, then the belief is an object in what I 
am terming the paragrammatic sense of ‘object’. But belief is also an act (or state) 
of believing. And ‘believe’ in turn takes a direct object whose referent is what the 
speaker purports (and/or is understood) to believe when asserting something. In 
short, an assertion is an act of expressing a belief that such and such is the case. 
(This is quite close to what Searle implies in his schema representing assertive 
speech acts:  |– ↓ B(p), to which he adds: ‘...the psychological state is Belief (that 
p)’ (Searle 1979: 13).108  
 
But this structural analysis leaves ‘belief’ ambiguous in just the way that Williams, 
Alston, and others say it is (along with ‘assertion’). Appiah does not address the 
question of the ambiguity either of ‘belief’ or ‘assertion’, but his account runs into 
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 Appiah (1985: 149) adds: ‘I am developing the view that assertion is the expression of belief’. 
There he is clearly using ‘expression’ in the sense of expressing. He reaffirms this view in no 
uncertain terms (1986: 11): ‘Assertion, to recapitulate, is the expression of belief’.  
108
 However, Searle is not quite saying that a belief is asserted. His is more the claim that Belief 
(which he capitalises) is a kind of accompanying state to the act of asserting, which is characterised 
also by a commitment to the truth of a proposition. He adds that ‘belief’ (and ‘commitment’) ‘are 
intended to mark dimensions ... so to speak determinables rather than determinates.’ (He says this 
because he wants to allow degrees of commitment, and hence degrees of assertiveness.) 
Nonetheless, Searle is unequivocal is his statement that belief is a state; it is the proposition (p) that 
is expressed, and presumably therefore asserted.  
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it, as all must. A belief (B(p)) that is expressed or communicated by assertion is both 
the object of an act of assertion and the act or state of believing (that p). On 
Appiah’s account the object of Sam’s act of assertion would be his belief that the 
tide (at the time) was out. But here is the complication: the content of Sam’s belief 
is the object of Sam’s assertion, with or without the mediation of the belief. The 
question that I would put to Appiah, then, is what exactly the term ‘belief’ refers to 
in the context of its being expressed and communicated. Plainly it is not Sam’s act 
or state of believing that the tide is out. You cannot assert a state of believing, 
other than in the sense of asserting that you are in that state. Sam is not asserting 
that he believes that the tide is out. That would be a different assertion. So, if what 
a speaker asserts is a belief, then what he asserts is what he believes, the object of 
his act or state of belief. To be sure, it would be reasonable on the hearer’s part to 
infer that Sam believes what he says – that he is in that psychological state – or 
even to expect that he knows it to be so (Williamson 1996; 2000).109 But he is not 
asserting his believing or his knowing. He is asserting what he believes (or knows). 
What he asserts is not mediated by his believing it: if what he asserts is what he 
believes, then he believes it and asserts it. But if he disbelieves the same thing, and 
asserts it anyway, what is asserted is none other than what he would have asserted 
if he had believed it. In short it is not Sam’s belief that Sam asserts. 
 
Is it not an objection that ‘belief’ is no less ambiguous than ‘assertion’ and, 
moreover, that ‘what is believed’ has the same strong and weak senses of ‘what is 
asserted’ (see §33), so that what a person asserts is coloured by being what he 
believes (if he believes it)? I think that whilst it is true that what he asserts is 
coloured by being what he also believes – after all, it is a fact about what he 
believes – that is no reason to conclude that what he asserts is his belief, even if he 
does believe it and asserts it in the belief that it is true. In short, we assert 
propositions, not beliefs. 
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 See the normative account of Williamson (2000: 238) in which assertion is defined by the 
constitutive rule: assert p only if you know p.   
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There are question marks also over the view that expressing beliefs is characteristic 
of assertion, since assertion is also the means by which we very often express what 
we do not believe, including what we positively disbelieve. This does not even 
require the speaker to be lying. Many acts of assertions have no connection to 
belief. This is the case, for example, when someone is asserting something he or 
has been told to assert, but might not wholeheartedly believe: a ‘party line’ or 
official doctrine. It also happens, in a different sense, when a person knows 
something, especially by direct acquaintance. Sam observes that the tide is out and 
asserts what he observes as a reason for setting off to the island. The passing on of 
a fact or item of knowledge does not require any intervening or concomitant act of 
stating a belief. Knowing the tide is out is a different state from believing that the 
tide is out. Sam may have arrived at the sea-front believing that the tide was out – 
let’s say on the basis of what someone had told him – but then seen for himself 
that it was indeed out. Had he asserted that the tide was out just before acquiring 
the knowledge, and again just after, his assertions would have had the same 
content, but would have been made on the basis of different mental states. We 
may think of knowledge and belief alike as states of mind. But whereas knowledge 
is a factive state, belief is a propositional attitude. (See discussion in Williamson 
2000: 21–23). But what is believed or known respectively – the content – is no 
different on that account. Both states relate to propositions. A state of belief 
obtains whether or not the proposition is true; whereas a state of knowledge 
obtains only if the proposition is true. But it requires an objectively situated 
informant – someone who knows the truth value of the proposition – to make the 
distinction.  
 
Do we say then that the object of the assertion – what is asserted – is in the one 
case a belief and in the other an item of knowledge? Or, alternatively, that when 
what is asserted is knowledge, it is also a belief – just a true, and/or fully 
warranted, belief? People do say these things. The question is whether such a form 
of words can be taken literally: whether a belief or state of knowing something can 
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actually be asserted.110 What we are once more seeing is the confusion that follows 
from failing to maintain a strict distinction between acts (states, attitudes), on one 
side, and their objects on the other. To assert is an act; to believe and to know are 
states. Propositions are their objects – or among their objects.111 Thus I may assert, 
know, and believe or disbelieve (that) p, without affecting the independent identity 
of p. To say that someone is ‘asserting knowledge’, or ‘asserting a belief’ is a 
colloquial way of saying that the person is asserting what he or she also knows, or 
believes (disbelieves); not that he is asserting his state of believing it. Conversely, to 
say that someone believes what he asserts does not literally mean he believes his 
asserting of it, but that he believes it.  
 
An adverbial account of asserting belief  
The sentence, 
Sam asserted a belief that that the tide was out  
has a superficial subject-verb-object form, with the belief as the object. For 
example:  
(24) X asserts [X’s belief [that p]]   
But a model like this could be taken to represent, not X’s asserting that p, but X’s 
asserting that X believes that p, which as noted earlier is a different assertion 
altogether, having a different object from that of the assertion that-p simpliciter. 
What is wanted is a model that would show unequivocally that Sam asserts what 
Sam believes, not that he believes it.  
 
Consider the following situation, which is parallel in certain relevant respects, in 
which X has been told what to assert by someone else, for example by a head 
                                                     
110
 In fairness to Appiah, it must be repeated that he does not say baldly that people assert beliefs, 
but rather that, e.g., they communicate them by asserting. On that I am in agreement with Appiah, 
but would argue that the effect of breaking the direct connection is to sideline belief (as suggested 
in the next section).  
111
 I add this because I am largely ignoring applications such as knowing of or about, and knowing 
how, or believing in, and so on.  
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teacher, to inform the students, that the school will be closed the next day. X may 
simply say to the class:  
 (25)  The school will be closed. 
But he or she might alternatively say: 
(26) The head has told me tell you that the school will be closed.  
This is obviously a different assertion from (25), although the message embedded 
in it is the same. The message is that the school will be closed, which  
is a proposition, and the same proposition whoever asserts or instructs others to 
assert it. But there are other more contextualised descriptions that can be given 
retrospectively to what the teacher asserted, and hence other more contextualised 
ways to report the act of asserting. As well as  
(27) X asserted that the school will be closed, 
one could report that 
(28) X asserted what the head teacher had told her to tell the students.  
The object of the assertion ‘that the school will be closed’ is the same object as 
‘that which the head teacher told X to tell the students.’ We are back, therefore, to 
the source of confusion that we have repeatedly seen obstructing analysis of 
expressions referring to the objects of acts – that is, between stronger and weaker 
readings of ‘what X asserts’; and we see it replicated in descriptions like, ‘what X 
believes’ and, analogously, ‘what X was told to assert’. There are qualitative 
differences between expressing or asserting what one believes, and expressing or 
asserting what one is told to say. But the parallel is easy to draw and more 
interesting than the differences. Being in a state of believing that-p compares with 
a state of being under instruction to say (something), in that both are circumstances 
or conditions under which an act is performed. The confusion enters when the 
circumstances are implicitly absorbed into the reference to the object. What a third 
party knows about the circumstances will naturally influence the way he or she 
describes the object: ‘what X thinks’, ‘what X knows’, ‘what X has been told’, ‘what 
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X concluded from the evidence’, etc., whilst the referent may be identical under 
each description. Hence the reference to X’s belief in (28) will remain ambiguous.  
 
I suggest that the ambiguity can be resolved by referring to the belief tangentially – 
i.e. adverbially – leaving the object, as it were, exposed directly to the verb. If X 
believes that the tide is out, the tree is dying, or snow is white, these are the 
objects of X’s believing, so that in asserting one of them X would, in Appiah’s 
words, communicate X’s belief. Amending the form of the description to  
(29) X asserted what X believed 
is no solution. Instead we can employ the form 
(30) X [in the circumstance of X’s believing that p] asserted that p. 
Likewise: 
(31) X [in the circumstance of being told to say that p] asserts that p. 
The common factor is that X asserts that p. Moreover, (30) eliminates any lingering 
act-object ambiguity; and allots each element in the complex its proper category – 
act, direct object, and accompanying circumstances respectively. The circumstances 
are notes in the adverbial phrase in the square brackets. This, I suggest, captures 
the customary meaning of the commonplace form of words: ‘X asserted his/her 
belief...’  
 
With some adjustments this analysis could be applied quite generally. Sam may 
assert that the tide is out in the hope that it is so. That is clearly different from 
asserting his hope – i.e. that he hopes the tide will be out. A person may assert 
something in the belief that it is so, but at the same time hoping it is not, without 
either attitude having any impact on what, per se, is asserted. The states of mind 
modify the act, rather than qualifying the object.  
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In conclusion 
Contrary to the way we often report some acts of assertion, asserting does not 
have states of mind or attitudes as its direct objects. Assertions have as their 
objects the same objects (contents) that certain states of mind and attitudes have; 
but it is the object of the attitude which we assert, and not the attitude we have 
towards it. What a speaker asserts is that p, not a belief that p, or knowledge of p; 
nor is it a perception or realisation that p, nor a hope or wish that p, nor any other 
attitude towards p. In the case of a hope or wish or fear etc. it is very obvious that, 
whilst these mental states may accompany the making of an assertion in some 
instances, they are not its object; nor do they mediate between it and its object. 
Since it stands in the same relation to the asserted proposition as any other 
attitude, there are no obvious grounds for making a belief an exception. 
 
Of course an attitude (or attitudes) may be expressed along with the asserted 
proposition. To that extent there is nothing objectionable in Appiah’s basic claim 
that assertion is an expression of belief, so long as ‘expressing a belief’ is in that 
case construed as asserting what is believed. An attitude towards p may be 
expressed without the attitude being asserted; and if the attitude to p is asserted, it 
is no longer an assertion that p. Suppose X asserts that p whilst actually believing 
that p: then X’s belief that p is expressed, obliquely, by the asserting that-p.  
 
Fig [2] 
ASSERTION    B(that-p) 
 
 
          that-p 
     
 
37. Asserting that 
Finally, to complete the investigation of assertion, and the act-object relation it 
embodies, I return to an issue discussed in §35 – namely the role of the word ‘that’ 
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in the most usual manner  of reporting acts of assertion: asserting that. Take, for 
example,  
(32) S asserted that the tree was dying 
This reports what S asserted, though not necessarily what S said. In fact there is no 
requirement at all for a reporter or commentator to employ the words spoken by S, 
in reporting what S said or asserted. If S said (assertively) ‘Der Baum stirbt’, then 
(32) would not be false. S might even have pointed at the tree with one hand and 
drawn a line across his throat with the other, without (32) being any less apt a 
report of the act of assertion, though not so apt a report of the saying involved in 
making it.  
 
‘That’ has the effect of reducing what follows it to a structural description of the 
content of the assertion. However, traditional grammatical concepts are not helpful 
here. In (32) the word ‘that’ is hard to classify satisfactorily, not obviously 
functioning as a determiner, nor as a relative pronoun, nor obviously a relative 
adverb. The New Oxford Dictionary of English settles on conjunction, in other words 
a sentence-connective. But no connective is required between a verb and its direct 
object. The act, as reported, engages directly with the object. How, then, should we 
interpret the function of ‘that’ in reports of individual assertions? 
  
An answer is famously proposed in Davidson (1968): ‘On Saying That’.112 Here 
Davidson is referring to indirect discourse generally – that is saying – rather than 
assertion in particular, although he extends the account to assertion at the end of 
the paper. His general analysis is based on the statement: 
(33) Galileo said that the earth moves. 
First we assume that there is an expression that Galileo uttered such that, if I said 
‘the earth moves’, Galileo’s words would make him and me ‘samesayers’. We need 
not be bothered by any envisaged problems of translation, since we take the 
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 Reprinted as Essay 7 in Davidson (2001).  
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premise on board ex hypothesi. It is plausible anyway that two people who speak 
the same or each other’s language, can for the most part restate in their own 
words what the other has said. Then if I say ‘The earth moves’, followed, or 
preceded, by the sentence, ‘Galileo said that’, I will have picked out what Galileo is 
reported to have said in (33), and added that Galileo said it (Davidson 1968: 141–
42). Thus the function of ‘that’ is broadly that of a demonstrative pronoun, 
replacing what Galileo said with a singular object term. This is obviously a welcome 
proposal from my perspective, since it chimes clearly with the essential directness 
of the act-object relation.  
 
Reports like (33), according to Davidson, effectively divide into two separate 
sentences: 
(34) Galileo said that. The earth moves. 
or 
(34′) The earth moves. Galileo said that. 
 Davidson (1968: 142) summarises the proposal thus: 
Sentences in indirect discourse... consist of an expression referring to a speaker, the 
two-place predicate ‘said’, and a demonstrative referring to an utterance. Period. 
What follows gives the content of the subject's saying, but has no logical or semantic 
connection with the original attribution of a saying.  
The importance of the last sentence here is crucial, and novel, as Davidson 
observes. It is also what is of most significance in the present context. It separates 
the sentence giving the content from the main clause reporting the act. The 
content sentence in (33), namely ‘the earth moves’, is not subsumed in the 
sentence that ends in ‘that’. Davidson refers to the latter as ‘the sentence whose 
truth counts’ (ibid.). I shall refer to the latter as the D-sentence – D for ‘Davidson’ 
or for ‘demonstrative’ (or, conveniently, both). A D-sentence just has the form:  
D: X said that  
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The rather unnatural sequence of sentences in (34) can be explained, Davidson 
suggests, by switching ‘that’ to ‘this’, which has the same demonstrative function. 
Just as we say: ‘This is a joke’, and then tell it, or ‘This is an order’, and then give it, 
we can say: ‘This is what Galileo said’, and then say it, in some appropriate way 
(Davidson 1968: 143). ‘That’ has the same function in (34’).  
 
The analysis is extended, if sketchily, to reports of assertions. Davidson introduces 
the example: ‘Jones asserted that Entebbe is equatorial’, and claims:  
If we parallel the analysis of indirect discourse, (it would) come to mean something 
like this: ‘An utterance of Jones’ in the assertive mode had the same content as this 
utterance of mine: Entebbe is equatorial.’ The analysis does not founder because the 
modes of utterance of the two speakers may differ; all that the truth of the 
performative requires is that my second utterance, in whatever mode (assertive or 
not) match in content an assertive utterance of Jones. (ibid)113  
What I take from this is as follows: first, we can extract an analysis of assertion 
from the form of indirect discourse; second, that (33) should not be analysed as a 
complex sentence, with the sentence after ‘that’ cast as a subordinate clause. (33) 
is a sentence with S-V-O form, reporting an assertive utterance whose object is 
whatever is asserted, however it is paraphrased or referred to. The D-sentence has 
the same structure whatever is asserted. Indeed, as proposed in §30, it has the 
grammatical structure of any sentence reporting an act: breaking a window, 
climbing a tree, and so forth. On Davidson’s analysis the latter might be reported 
as:  
(35) Here is a tree. X climbed that.  
 
That-clauses 
It would appear that Davidson’s analysis eliminates that-clauses, by removing the 
‘that’ from its relational position, and assigning it the role of direct object in the D-
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 Here Davidson uses ‘this’ in the way he says is functionally equivalent to ‘that’. 
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sentence announcing the act: ‘S said that’. The elimination of that-clauses, 
however, leaves some loose ends, especially when applying Davidson’s analysis to 
more challenging examples than his own somewhat selective ones. Take: 
(36) S asserted that the tree was dying, 
as a supposedly accurate report (by a reporter, R) of S’s corresponding act of 
assertion. How are we to proceed with this? Not, without qualification, as 
(37) The tree was dying. S said (asserted) that, 
for (36) is ambiguous with respect to tense. The most natural assumption to make 
on hearing (37) would be that S has said: ‘The tree is dying’, which flies rather in the 
face of samesaying. By the time of R’s reporting the assertion, there may be 
changed truth conditions: the tree may have finished dying, and be dead. If ‘the 
tree was dying’ was what S said – suppose, for example, he was vindicating himself 
for having cut it down – the correct reference to the object of the reported act 
would be: 
(38) that the tree had been dying. 
Again, however, this would not translate into the ‘that’ of a D-sentence if the 
requirement for samesaying were applied literally. Arguably this could be set aside 
as trivial or superficial. It’s just a peculiarity of English that the tense of the main 
verb influences that of the subordinate verb. 114 In the deep syntax the report is 
generated as ‘He said that the tree is dying’. All the same the opacity of reference 
in indirect discourse is a well-recognised problem for notions such as samesaying – 
and for other reasons besides tense. Samesaying, for example, would require that 
the tree referred to by S be the same tree that R has in mind when specifying the 
referent of his ‘that’. ‘The tree is dying’ is a type-sentence, applicable to any tree 
that may or may not be dying.  
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 It doesn’t arise in German, for example, where the present tense is retained (though in the 
subjunctive) as (e.g.): er sagte, der Baum sterbe, or in the vestigial English subjunctive: ‘X said that 
the tree be dying’. (We even see, in a slightly different form: ‘The tree was said to be dying.’) But in 
modern English, the tense of the subordinate verb gets changed when we move to utterance, just as 
a quirk of the language.  
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These difficulties do not arise in respect of Davidson’s examples because what 
Galileo said, and what Galileo is reported as saying, are both expressed 
conveniently in the continuous present. Moreover, the subject term of Galileo’s 
actual utterance, and Jones’s assertion, are proper names – the earth, Entebbe – so 
that there are few if any problems of indexicality to compromise the success or 
failure of samesaying. Galileo says the earth moves, in one or other form of words; 
the reporter says the earth moves, in another. They are samesayers almost trivially. 
Davidson should be aware of these issues. They are too obvious to miss, yet he 
does not venture an application of his analysis to examples in which they surface. 
Instead he remarks, rather mysteriously: 
We would do better, in coping with this subject, to talk of inscriptions and 
utterances and speech acts, and avoid reference to sentences. For what an utterance 
of ‘Galileo said that’ does is announce a further utterance. Like any utterance, this 
first may be serious or silly, assertive or playful; but if it is true, it must be followed 
by an utterance synonymous with some other. The second utterance, the introduced 
act, may also be true or false, done in the mode of assertion or of play. But if it is as 
announced, it must serve at least the purpose of conveying the content of what 
someone said. (Davidson 1968: 143) 
I cannot see how this would address the issue, since what is uttered or inscribed is 
a sentence. S does not say (or assert) an utterance. S utters a sentence whose 
meaning, in the context of the utterance, is what S says, and what R refers to as 
‘that’. The solution, I would argue, is not to be found in shifting the focus from 
sentences to utterances, which would set an even more exacting criterion of ‘same-
uttering’. However, Davidson paves the way to a much simpler expedient in the last 
sentence of the quotation: ‘The second utterance ... must at least serve the 
purpose of conveying the content of what someone said.’ This makes no mention of 
samesaying. It might be argued that conveying the content is all that samesaying is. 
If I say, ‘It’s raining’, and you say, ‘Es regnet’, then, provided the utterances are 
indexed appropriately (a very important proviso, obviously) we are samesayers. I 
can say to you: ‘That’s exactly what I said’; and that would be true. However, 
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synonymy between different languages is an idealised example, practically as 
idealised as samesaying itself. My utterance (in English) and yours (in German) are 
a case of samesaying not merely because they have same content, but because 
your sentence and mine are presumed to mean the same. Conveying the content of 
what someone said need not involve uttering a synonymous sentence. A 
description of the content may serve the purpose just as well, if it fairly answers the 
question:  
‘What did S say (assert)?’  
Without the requirement of samesaying, this question may be answered with the 
phrase: 
(39) that the tree was dying,  
understood now as a description of what S said at the time. This does not stray far 
from Davidson’s basic strategy. We could then restate (36) as follows: 
(40) S asserted this: (that) the tree was dying  
The ‘that’ is omissible, hence the brackets. Either way, ‘the tree was dying’ is 
situated in apposition to ‘this’, and represents descriptively what S said (in the past 
or present tense) at the time of the original utterance, because the tree was 
allegedly dying (or had been dying) at that time. If ‘The tree is dying’ was true when 
S said it, ‘the tree was dying’, is true now, when R says it; and, as we have seen, 
‘The tree is dying’, might not be true now. However, to recap, ‘The tree was dying’ 
might not be what S said, so that prefixing it with ‘that’ is a way of making 
reference descriptively without necessarily laying claim to synonymy. (39) identifies 
the object of S’s assertion whether S was speaking in the past or present tense. 
 
This revision may seem inimical to Davidson’s project, since it appears to reinstate 
‘that’ in its original position in indirect discourse, and therefore to defeat the object 
of the exercise. That would be a mistake. As Davidson himself makes clear, the 
‘that’ of indirect discourse is interpreted in his analysis as a demonstrative, and can 
thus be expressed as well by ‘this’ as by ‘that’. So long as the object-expression is 
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understood, not as an utterance but as a description of its content, the crux of 
Davidson’s account is preserved. That the tree was dying is structurally the object 
of the act, and ‘the sentence whose truth counts’ is true, as required, if what is 
juxtaposed with it does correctly describe what S asserted. The device of 
samesaying may then be seen as an heuristic, rather than an actual procedure 
(which is quite possibly how Davidson intended it anyway). For it remains the case 
that if the reporter, R, could – in the ideal or paradigm case – paraphrase what S 
said sufficiently to establish ‘samesaying’, as in Davidson’s somewhat selective 
examples, then ‘S said that’ would be true. In any case, what is said by S may be 
apprehended just as squarely by description. There is more than one way to 
apprehend the object of the assertion (or, more generally, of saying): one is to say 
it, as the speaker does, by uttering the sentence in direct speech; the other to 
describe it as the reporter does.  
 
I say ‘describe’ rather than ‘name’. The difference does not have great significance 
in the present context, but it has some. It is a fairly common view that that-clauses 
name propositions; or, that that-clauses are names for the objects of propositional-
attitude verbs. Either way, ‘that the tree was dying’ designates what S asserted, 
and what R reports S as having asserted. Prefixing a declarative sentence by ‘that’ 
effects its transformation into a name (Cresswell 1985:73). But there are different 
ways of apprehending or designating the object (content) of an assertion. 
According to King (2007: 128–29), there are at least three ‘linguistic devices’ which 
would serve the same purpose, namely of designating the object of an assertive 
act, state of belief, etc. Adapted to the present example these might be rendered:  
a)  ‘the dying-state of the tree’;  
b)  ‘the proposition that the tree was dying’;  
c)  ‘that the tree was dying’.115  
                                                     
115
 King’s examples are: ‘logicism’, ‘the proposition that arithmetic reduces to logic’, and ‘that 
arithmetic reduces to logic’.   
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The first of these King classes as a name, the second a description; the third a that-
clause. As I have already noted, there does not seem to be a great deal hanging on 
these distinctions, but following King we can at least agree that objects of an 
assertion or belief etc. may be designated in various ways. What King classifies 
above as a name, for instance, is close to what Russell (1903) termed a 
propositional concept.116 None of the above is a paraphrase, let alone synonym, of 
the sentences which the respective speakers would have uttered. I propose, 
therefore, a modified Davidsonian analysis whereby the requirement of samesaying 
simply be replaced with a criterion of same-designating, or adequately describing, 
what is asserted when an act of assertion is performed. The designation, as we 
have seen, can be highly indeterminate. All that is necessary for same-designation 
is that the corresponding D-sentence be true. If all R knows is that S asserted 
something about some tree, he is still entitled to report that that – something 
about a tree – is what S asserted. As Davidson happily accepts, there is practically 
no limit to the degree of indeterminacy that a designation of what was said or 
asserted may have in a true report of the act in question:  
What follows the verb ‘said’ has only the structure of a singular term, usually the 
demonstrative ‘that’. Assuming the ‘that’ refers, we can infer that Galileo said 
something from ‘Galileo said that’; but this is welcome. (Davidson 1968: 144.) 
 
38. Concluding remarks 
What is welcome to Davidson in the above account is welcome here, too. It puts a 
seal on two important points that I take forward to the next chapter: first, that acts 
of assertion relate to the objects directly; second that the objects of assertion are 
detachable from the acts whose objects or contents they are. Davidson’s insight 
helps to establish a clear and unambiguous separation between the act of assertion 
and its object. We can refer to the object of an assertion without necessarily 
specifying what its content was. We can name the object in various ways and with 
                                                     
116
  ‘If we consider, say, “Caesar died”, what is asserted is the propositional concept “the death of 
Caesar”.’ (Russell 1903: §478
 
). 
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varying degrees of specificity, right down to zero – that is, with a pronoun. If there 
is shared knowledge between speaker and audience of what someone said or 
asserted, the object can be referred to anaphorically as ‘that’. But even if not, it 
follows from someone’s having performed any act of assertion that he or she has 
asserted something. We know that much through our understanding of the nature 
of the act and see it reflected in the structure of sentences reporting particular 
acts. 
 
The above discursus on assertion does not stand on its own. Its purpose is to lay 
the ground for the concluding chapter in which the acts of argument are re-
examined in the light of their essentially assertive character, which in turn throws 
light on what arguments are – that is, objects of assertion. It turns out, on the 
account I propose, that the objects of acts of argument are just what the logician 
designates as objects of evaluation – sets of propositions, ordered and indexed for 
assessment as valid or non-valid. What are extracted on interpretation from the 
texts of ‘real’ arguments are the same propositions with the same designations, 
and amenable to the same criteria of appraisal.  
 
In the short concluding chapter I make three proposals which claim this 
equivalence between the objects of the assertive acts of argument and the inert 
objects of evaluation.  
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CHAPTER SIX:  Assertion and argument   
 
39. Proposals 
‘Argument’ covers a wide range of speech activity and discourse, under which fall a 
number of more particular acts, including, but not limited to, reason-giving 
(premising) and concluding. These have been referred to as ‘acts of argument’ in 
that they contribute to argument, but also because their objects are the 
constituents of arguments. This takes us back to Searle’s point (1979: 13) that 
concluding, inferring, and deducing are speech acts belonging to the class of 
assertives, but distinguished from simple assertives by the relation they bear to 
other elements in the context, or the rest of the discourse. That relation is the 
crucial element in the account that follows. 
 
It should be added that these acts are not speech acts exclusively. Inferring can be 
conducted without speaking, and without doing anything that would amount to 
articulating or propounding an argument. For an argument I need a premise (or 
premises), and to argue – to advance an argument – I need to give (assert) the 
premise(s). Reason-giving is the force of argument. Without it there is no 
argument. There is even a sense in which we can refer to the premise(s) of an 
argument as the argument, for example when asked the question, ‘What’s your 
argument for (against) such-and-such?’ What we give in reply is a reason or 
reasons:  
(1) My argument for C is that A117 
C is what is concluded, but A is what makes C a conclusion rather than a plain 
assertion. It would be less natural to say: ‘C is my argument from A’. However, it 
would not do to make too much of this asymmetry, for ‘reason’ and ‘premise’, too, 
                                                     
117
  Note that ‘A’ here is an abbreviation of the conjunction of premises A1,...,An . In other words ‘A’ 
represents a premise which is either non-conjunctive or a conjunction of premises (finite in 
number). 
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are relative terms. There must be something for which a reason or premise is given, 
even if it is not asserted. No speech act is a premise in its own right. 
 
Premising 
To give something as a premise is to assert it. As Brandom says, asserting is a 
warrant for further assertions. But I can assert something without its being a 
premise of any argument. Either way it is the same assertion with the same 
illocutionary force and the same content whether or not I make a premise of it. 
Premising in that respect has the plain force of assertion. It lays ground for 
inference, but the inferring of something from it doesn’t alter either its assertive 
force or its content.118  
 
As noted in Chapter 4, Hitchcock (2007: 107), drawing on Searle’s taxonomy, 
defines a simple argument as  
a sequence of three objects: a speech act c of any type concerning some proposition, 
an illative such as the word “since” (in its inferential sense), and a set P of one or 
more assertives. 
Hitchcock argues that reason-giving must be an assertive act in just the sense 
Searle gives to the classification, which Hitchcock abbreviates to: ‘expressing ... a 
commitment to the truth of a proposition’ (ibid.). His justification for the claim that 
reason-giving is essentially assertive is a somewhat selective application of the 
‘therefore’ test, allegedly showing that non-declarative sentences do not make 
good sense in the premise position. But the test is unnecessary, given that in any 
actual argument premises are purportedly true. On the principle of charity a critical 
audience will assume (unless they have reason to think otherwise) that a person 
propounding an argument at least believes, if not knows, that the premises are 
                                                     
118
  In anticipation of the objection that some steps in an argument are not assertive, but 
suppositional, I am referring here to direct reasons, and not indirect ones such as assumptions made 
for reductio. If, in an argument from the assumption ‘not-p’, it is concluded that p, the premises – 
qua reasons for ‘p’ – can hardly include ‘not-p’.  If ‘not-p’ leads to absurdity it is the assertion that 
‘not-p’ leads to absurdity that establishes ‘p’.  If it is still objected that indirect premises are 
nonetheless premises, which is a fair point, then I restrict my claim, that premising is essentially 
assertive, to direct premises.  
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true. Indeed, if the purpose of propounding an argument is to establish the truth of 
a conclusion – or to persuade others that it is true – the premises must have a 
truth-purport (even if in fact they are false). Whilst the logician is concerned only 
with validity, for which the condition of truth of premises is not necessary, the critic 
of actual argument will approve only sound arguments – one of the reasons why 
Hamblin (1970: 224–52), wrongly in my view, questions the value of logic as a tool 
of appraisal for natural-language arguments.  
 
If the speech act of premising is asserting – and I follow intuition in concurring with 
Hitchcock that it is – then the standard expression of a premise is a declarative 
sentence, its meaning a proposition. So the first of my three proposals may be 
summarised: 
P1 The act of premising (reason giving) is an act of assertion. Its object is 
a proposition, A  
Note that from here onward, ‘A’ will represent either a single premise or a 
conjunctive premise (A1,...An).  
 
Concluding 
Hitchcock, as already noted, does not make the same stipulation for concluding. He 
says (above) that concluding is a ‘speech act of any type concerning a proposition’, 
but not necessarily an asserting of it. Concluding, he suggests, may consist of 
expressing admiration (e.g. for a painting) or, in another example, of suspecting 
something, the correctness of a theory, say.119 Concluding on that count would be 
any expressive act and among the objects expressed could be feelings, suspicions, 
etc., as well as judgements. But it is a long step from there to claiming that 
concluding can ever be non-assertive, especially if, as Hitchcock concedes, it must 
                                                     
119
 Hitchcock (2007: 107) claims that these acts – i.e. arguments – can be schematised as follows: 
<express admiration for Picasso’s Guernica, since, {assert that Picasso’s Guernica brings home in a 
vivid way the horrible consequences for the innocent of aerial bombing in contemporary warfare}> 
<suspect that Goldbach’s conjecture is correct, since, {assert that mathematicians have found no 
counter-example in 200 years of trying}>. 
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still ‘concern’ a proposition. I am not sure how one would express admiration 
without an assertion being implicit in the expression – something equivalent to or 
conveying the same content as: ‘...(therefore) I admire the painting’. Even then, it is 
questionable whether ‘I admire x’ could be counted as the expression of a 
conclusion that follows from premises. Feelings can be had without any need of 
reasons. What would follow, in the proper sense of what the reasons support, 
would be that the painting is admirable for the reasons given. But that is plainly an 
assertion.  
 
However, Hitchcock is right to note a difference between reason-giving and 
conclusion-drawing – premising and concluding – and it is this that I take him to 
mean by saying that concluding concerns a proposition, without necessarily 
asserting it. His mistake, I think, is to locate the difference in the act, rather than in 
its object. Concluding, I would argue, is no less assertive than premising, but there 
is a difference in what is asserted in each case. What is asserted in an act of 
premising is, straightforwardly, a premise. But, in an act of concluding, what is 
asserted is not the conclusion – not directly. It cannot be just that. For if, in the 
wake of the asserted premises, all that were required of concluding were the 
asserting of the conclusion, the form of the propounded argument would be 
indistinguishable from that of a mere conjunction.  
 
Our long-running example,  
(2) The tide is out and we can get to the island,  
is true if both conjuncts are true, but it cannot be judged either valid or sound on 
that score. This is no surprise since (2) is not an argument. The compound sentence 
cannot be assessed for soundness or validity without some indication that one of 
the sentences is claimed or supposed to follow from the other. The standard way to 
give such an indication is to insert ‘so’ (or some equivalent marker) in front of the 
sentence that is claimed to follow from the others: 
(3) The tide is out; so we can get to the island. 
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However, given that in the actual propounding of an argument the premises are 
asserted, the ‘so’ does not replace the ‘and’ but augments it. The importance of 
this was intimated in Chapter 1, and now it can be seen why. In any actual act of 
argument two things are said (and done). To make that explicit we say: 
(3’)  The tide is out and so we can get to the island. 
The inclusion of ‘and’ might be considered no more than stylistic, for which reason I 
have sometimes placed it in brackets. A punctuation mark has the same logical 
import, and (3) is no less conjunctive than (3’). However the ‘and’ emphasises the 
conjunctive form of a propounded argument and, at the same time, signals that (3) 
is truth-bearing. (3) is true, as a whole, if and only if the argument it represents is 
sound. To establish that, however, the ‘so’ must be understood not as a sentence 
connective – as it is often classified in textbooks – but as a marker, signalling that 
what follows it is not just asserted but asserted as following from whatever has 
been asserted before it. A plain act of assertion can be reported by saying: 
X asserted that-A. 
An act of concluding (inferring, deducing) can be reported by saying that 
X asserted that so-C. 
which, though ill-formed grammatically, makes the point that C is asserted, not 
flatly, but as a claimed consequence of the asserted proposition, A. In that sense 
‘so’ is adverbial, modifying the assertion by indicating the relation within which it is 
made. Again ungrammatically, we might say: 
X asserted C so-ly.120 
With this in mind, the key point is that so-C, not just C, is what X asserts. That-C is 
what X concludes (infers, deduces) from whatever has been given as premise(s). 
The whole compound assertion can then be reported: 
X asserted that [A and so-C] 
                                                     
120
  A similar idea was discussed in §36 with respect to asserting a belief.  
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In other words, in propounding an argument, X makes a number of assertions, 
whose objects are propositions A(A1, ..., An) and an assertion to the effect that C 
follows from A. I say ‘to the effect that’ rather than saying simply that X asserts that 
C follows, because X does not actually assert that C follows from A. Preceding a 
sentence with ‘so’ expresses the relation; it doesn’t assert it. (A similar point was 
discussed in Chapter 1, §2, with respect to conclusions being ‘claimed to follow’.)  
The argument is valid if C does follow, and sound if, in addition, A1, A2, etc. are all 
true. But what X asserts is a conjunction which is true if and only if the argument it 
represents is sound. This can be seen if we parse the example (3) as follows: 
(3′′) [The tide is out] and [so we can get to the island] 
We can now see why the act and expression of argument is assertive in character, 
but without the conclusion itself – i.e. what is concluded – being asserted directly. 
What is asserted is what is meant by ‘so we can get to the island’. But this is an 
incomplete expression, unless the premise to which the conclusion is implicitly 
related by ‘so’ is specified. When specifying what the conclusion is we can omit the 
‘so’, or replace it with ‘that’, upon which it is simply assertible, independently of 
the reason(s) from which it may have been inferred in some act of argument. If we 
ask what is asserted, therefore, in the act of concluding, inferring, etc. we need to 
produce something equivalent to the conditional formed from the premise(s), as 
antecedent, and the conclusion, as consequent: 
(4) If the tide is out we can get to the island.  
Needless to say, (4) is not an argument, nor is asserting (4) the same as asserting 
(3), which is an argument. Nonetheless, (3) and (4) have much in common, to the 
extent that if (3) is valid, then (4) is true (and vice versa). This is the basis of the 
deduction equivalence, or deduction theorem.121 ‘Equivalence’ does not imply that 
asserting a conditional is the same act as propounding an argument – a confusion 
                                                     
121
  Read (1988: 21) expounds the theorem as follows:  B follows from A1, . . . , An, A  iff  (if A then B) 
follows from A1, . . . , A. Read claims the theorem leads to invalid arguments coming out as valid. 
But that debate is beyond the remit of this thesis. Here the equivalence between the validity of a 
simple argument and the truth of the corresponding conditional is taken as intuitively obvious.  
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that Hamblin (1970: 232–33) appears to make when he claims that deductive 
argument is (objectionably) ‘hypothetical’. (See §16 above.) Where Hamblin was 
correct was in saying that ‘If A then C’ was not a real argument, but at best a 
hypothetical one (ibid.).122 That, however, is because ‘If A then C’ is not an 
argument at all, but just a part of one: the part where it is said that if the single 
premise, ‘A’, is true, then so is ‘C’, which, in the argument, is expressed ‘...so-C’. The 
second, albeit provisional, proposal that I make is then as follows. (I will state it first 
and then offer a clarification, before moving to the third proposal.)  
P2 An act of concluding is an assertion equivalent to asserting a 
conditional: If A then C.  
 
An anticipated objection 
The idea that in the act of propounding an argument the conclusion is not asserted 
– or asserted conditionally – might seem counter-intuitive. Surely, when I argue I 
don’t assert that C follows from A: what I assert is that C, the proposition that is 
claimed to follow from my premises. That C is asserted would seem almost a self-
evident objection in the case of a complex argument, where the intermediate 
conclusion of one argument is also the premise to a further conclusion. So, for 
example, the conclusion that the banknotes I am tendering are forgeries, inferred 
from the observation that they have duplicate serial numbers, may in turn be 
asserted as a reason for a charge of attempted fraud. Now being a premise, the 
intermediate conclusion must be asserted for the purposes of the further 
argument. But in any case, the objection might run, neither argument is fully 
propounded until the conclusion has been asserted, albeit on the strength of the 
premise. Another way to press the objection might be to say that in the many cases 
where an argument is expressed without any explicit inference indicator (‘so’, 
‘therefore’, etc.), the conclusion apparently carries the same assertive force as the 
                                                     
122
  I have substituted ‘A’ and ‘C’ for Hamblin’s ‘P’ and ‘Q’.  
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premise(s), especially when the conclusion is expressed first, ahead of the reasons. 
Take, for instance, 
(5) These notes are forgeries; they all have the same numbers.  
We also find arguments in which the inference indicator123 is prefixed to the 
premise(s): 
(6) These notes are forgeries since they all have the same numbers. 
Surely, one might think that, in these cases, as in many others, the conclusion is 
straightforwardly asserted, and its object is the asserted proposition. 
 
Response 
I do not deny that concluding is assertive. What I do deny, and see no way to avoid 
denying, is that asserting a conclusion is all that there is to concluding. For, as 
already observed, an argument is more than a plain conjunction, and propounding 
an argument is more than asserting a plain conjunction. Two things are asserted, 
but one at least must be asserted with respect to the other, or there is no 
argument. That is the force of ‘so’ in (3), and, for that matter, of ‘since’ in (6), for 
the relations they indicate are the converse of one another, not two different 
relations. The question is therefore: how can both positions be accommodated? 
How can concluding C be equated with asserting C without reducing arguments to 
mere conjunctions? 
 
The answer, I now argue, emerges from the previous chapter. It does not lie in 
differences between the acts of asserting and concluding – I am committed to the 
claim that concluding is a species of assertion (in the act sense) – but in how we 
refer to their objects. In short, ‘what is concluded’ can have the same kind of 
                                                     
123
 In critical thinking syllabuses a distinction is often made between ‘reason indicators’, (‘because’, 
‘since’, etc.) and ‘conclusion indicators’, like ‘so’, ‘therefore’. Collectively these are ‘argument 
indicators’ (Fisher 2001:23). ‘Inference indicator’ is potentially ambiguous. I use it like ‘argument 
indicator’, i.e. to indicate where inference is going on rather than exclusively as a prefix to the 
conclusion.    
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ambiguity as was seen in ‘what is asserted’. (See §33 above.) What is concluded can 
be understood as ‘that thing which X concluded – but which Y might have asserted 
as a premise, or Z denied altogether’, and so on. That would be a bare object-sense 
of ‘the conclusion’, i.e. what was termed the paragrammatic object in §31. But as 
with assertion generally, there is also a qualified, act-involving sense where ‘what is 
concluded’ has its identity, at least in part, from being the object of a specific act of 
concluding. On that basis, then, I do not simply assert the bare object (the non-act-
involving object). I have concluded that-C, by asserting it as a conclusion – i.e. as 
conditional upon the premise(s), A. 
 
Of course, if I assert (A) and (C if A), I am committed to C. But that is a different 
matter, and proposal P2 is not incompatible with that. What P2 proposes is that 
giving expression to the act of concluding is equivalent to asserting, that if A, then 
C. In that respect concluding does not involve asserting C, but it does commit me to 
C. It also warrants my subsequent asserting of C on the strength of the argument – 
for example as a premise of a further argument. But by then the first act of 
argument itself is complete, and any subsequent assertion of C is a separate act. 
 
The whole act: propounding an argument  
The above account of concluding falls into line with the standard definition of 
argument given by Copi and others (§1), in which one proposition is ‘claimed to 
follow’ from the other(s) in the set. An act of concluding is the asserting of one 
proposition in relation to another (or others). We also call it drawing a conclusion 
or inferring. Concluding, as proposed in P2, reduces effectively to asserting a 
conditional whose antecedent has already been asserted in the act of premising. 
So, from P1 and P2 it would follow that the act of propounding an argument is a 
complex assertion, its object a complex proposition, basically a conjunction, 
standardly expressed  
(7) A (and) so C 
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The import of P2 was that what is concluded cannot just be C because that would 
ignore the significance of ‘so’. The import of ‘and’ (though omissible as implicit) is 
that in a real argument the premises are asserted, i.e. given, and not just 
hypothesised. A whole act of argument occurs when the two acts are co-ordinated: 
that is, performed in sequence. Premises are given and a conclusion claimed to 
follow. Reflecting this, the third proposal is:  
P3 The act of propounding an argument is a complex assertion. What is 
asserted is a conjunction of the premises: A, and a conditional: If A, C  
40. The argument as object 
There are three levels on which we encounter argument. One is the act of arguing 
which consists of asserting premises and drawing conclusions. It is an assertive act, 
in part and whole, the whole act being the propounding of the argument. On the 
second level is the text: the sequence of sentences which gives expression to the 
act, and which may rightly be seen to be a product of the author’s making. Third, 
there is the argument itself, or underlying argument – what is propounded (and 
thereby asserted). This last is the object of the whole argument-act. The text, of 
course, is also the object of an act. It will be recalled that for Johnson (2002) the 
text (or discourse) is what constitutes the argument itself, the product (Johnson 
also refers to it as the ‘distillate’) of the act or practice. It cannot really be denied 
that the text of an argument – at least of a ‘real’ argument – is a product or 
creation on some author’s part. At the very least the text represents the author’s 
choice of how to express the argument, and is ‘productive’ in that way. But when it 
comes to the question of what we mean by ‘the argument itself’ we find again the 
ambiguity of ‘object’ hovering over the terms – the ambiguity between the simple-
object sense and the act-involving sense. 
 
Returning to the start of the thesis, it was seen that there was another perspective 
altogether from which to conceive of arguments, namely the critical perspective. 
From that perspective an argument is an object of appraisal. That is not to say that 
there are two distinct meanings of ‘argument’, one for the author, another for the 
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critic – although that is all but the view of those who draw a distinction between 
‘real’ and ‘made-up’ arguments. Obviously what the author propounds (if there is 
an author) is one and the same object as that which the critic judges.  
 
The orthodox line in critical thinking (though variously expressed) is that arguments 
are products of the arguer’s making, and that the extracting of the argument is an 
exercise in divining author-intention, author-meaning. That is why the principle of 
charity plays a crucial role in the interpretation of texts as arguments. If there were 
no author, actual or notional, there would be no relevant part for the principle of 
charity to play in the task of identifying or classifying arguments. What the critic of 
a ‘real’ argument takes to be the object of appraisal is what he or she takes to be 
the object of the author’s act (or acts) of argument. What, by contrast, the logician 
takes to be the object of appraisal need be no more than a set of sentences or 
propositions, ordered and indexed to enable assessment on the basis of validity. On 
that conception there is no requirement for any act of argument, actual or 
notional, to play a part. Understandably, these may appear to be quite disparate 
objects, to which the descriptions ‘real’ (‘natural’) and ‘made-up’ aptly apply. But if 
logic is to play the appropriate part in the theory and practice of critical thinking 
that its claims to rigour require, some point of intersection between the two 
perspectives needs to be found.  
 
The aim behind the three proposals, P1–P3, was to identify an argument – the 
argument itself – as the object of an act. We come to the object, not surprisingly, 
by way of the contributory acts of premising and concluding. These, to recap, are 
assertions. Their objects are propositions, their expression sentences. What is 
propounded is an argument. How it is propounded is assertion. What is asserted is 
a conjunction:  
(8) A, and (if A, C)   (P2) 
This last, of course, is not what is uttered in making the assertion. To assert the 
content of (8) the standard form of natural expression is  
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(9) A (and) so C 
But there is another way to conceive of A and C in relation to the respective acts. 
 
Intersection of the perspectives  
In an assertive utterance of (8), ‘A’ has the act-involving sense: ‘what is asserted’. 
‘C’, on the other hand, has the act-involving sense of ‘what is concluded (from A)’, 
in virtue of its being prefaced by ‘so’. If we go back to Copi’s (logician’s) definition 
of an argument, ‘C’ has the sense of ‘what is claimed to follow (from the 
premise(s))’. And if we place ‘C’ with that sense in the schema 
A ; C 
we have the logician’s object of appraisal: the object of what Sainsbury refers to as 
an argument claim124 (see §3)  
(10) A ⊨ C (or: A ⊭ C) 
or in plainer terms: 
(10’) ‘A ; C’ is valid, (or : ‘A ; C’ is not valid.) 
In (10) A and C have no act-involving sense. They are propositions simpliciter, which 
may be asserted in acts of argument, or not asserted at all. In that bare sense, 
however, they are constituents of the object of appraisal. We have derived ‘A ; C’ 
from an examination of the act of argument by taking from the act the act-involving 
sense, and from there abstracting a non-act-involving sense – the set of 
propositions, one designated as that which is supposed to follow from the others. 
 
When the logician designates a proposition as a conclusion, and the rest as 
premises, he gives them the non-act-involving object-sense they require for the 
purpose of appraisal. What a critic working on ‘real’ argument, or products of 
practice, extracts from a text on the basis of interpretation, is of the same order as 
                                                     
124
  As suggested in §3 ‘argument claim’ has the meaning of an evaluative claim.  
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that which a logician designates as an argument for the purposes of formal 
evaluation, 
 A ; C 
I consider this to be an important result for critical thinking, though not perhaps a 
welcome one for those who persist in the view that formalised, deductive 
argument and ‘real’ argument are chalk and cheese, and need to be processed and 
appraised in markedly different ways. What arguers propound are ‘real’ arguments 
with or without the inverted commas. We come to them from two perspectives 
only to find the same object at both destinations: a set of propositions, one of 
which is claimed to follow (supposed, purported, etc.) from the others. That 
conclusion, as far as it goes, may seem trivial and academic, but it has one very 
important consequence for the method and practice of critical thinking. I contend 
that it paves the way towards the theoretical underpinning of a thoroughgoing 
deductivist approach to the appraisal of natural-language arguments. With that in 
mind, the next section signals a return to appraisal. 
 
41. Appraisal 
One of the key planks of critical thinking methodology is the view that ‘real’ 
arguments – i.e. actual arguments propounded for purposes other than 
exemplification or study – do not lend themselves to appraisal by the standards 
applied in classical logic, validity and soundness. There are understandable reasons 
for this position – though I contest it – not least that most arguments found in 
natural-language discourse are neither valid nor sound, and if those standards were 
applied without qualification, few specimens would pass the test. Conversely, those 
that would past the test without modification would probably not count as ‘real’.  
 
Let us look back briefly to the issues raised by Hamblin and others. Among the 
reasons Hamblin gives for rejecting formal appraisal criteria are these: 1) The 
arguments to which formal criteria apply are ‘hypothetical’, by which he means 
that their premises need not be true – less still known to be true – for validity to be 
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assigned. 2) If the premises are known to be true – as they must be if the argument 
is to have any practical worth – then the conclusion must be known to be true also, 
for validity (and hence soundness) to be determined. But then Hamblin argues that 
knowing the truth of the conclusion prevents the ‘passage’ from premises to 
conclusion from being independently assessed. Therefore, in short, Hamblin finds 
the criterion of validity too weak and that of soundness too strong, and proposes 
instead that the best measure for approval of the premises and the reasoning is the 
dialectical criterion of ‘acceptability’.   
 
There is a long tradition behind the application of dialectical criteria to argument. In 
the Topics Aristotle makes frequent reference to the endoxa, variously translated 
as ‘accepted’, ‘reputable’, or ‘common’ views. The Stoic logicians, too, as noted 
earlier, held premises to be propositions ‘adopted by agreement for the 
establishment of a conclusion’.125 But dialectic is not so much a form of argument 
as a context in which argument takes place, including some that is monological, and 
some that is disputational.126 The strategies for success in persuading others – for 
which acceptability is necessary and at times sufficient – do not, as Aristotle would 
have said, prove anything or lead to knowledge. Adjudicating a debate and 
assessing soundness of reasoning are not alternative ways of evaluating the same 
argument. To be sure, it is a good policy in negotiation and conflict resolution to 
seek agreement on the basic premises, admissibility of evidence, standards of 
proof, etc. But when it comes to the proper evaluation of an argument, it is not 
acceptability by the audience that determines the strength of the reasoning or 
truth of claims but the strength of the argument and truth of claims that determine 
the acceptability of the argument.  
 
Of course there are critical questions that relate to the rhetorical as well as the 
logical features of argument texts. There are also critical questions that concern the 
ways in which simple arguments link with others to form complex chains of 
                                                     
125
  Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Pyrrhonism Book 2: 135. 
126
  ‘Monological’ is used here to mean single authorship, emanating from one source, as in the 
Greek monologos rather than carrying any of the baggage of the modern derivation, ‘monologue’.    
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reasoning, or deal with anticipated objections, or respond to counter-arguments. 
These are among the many superstructural features of argumentation with which 
the critic must deal, and are no less important for being superstructural. But 
because most natural-language argument is complex, much of the work of analysis 
in critical thinking consists of mapping the connections between main and 
intermediate conclusions, and may not penetrate below the surface level of the 
simple arguments.127 A ‘good’ argument must perform well on all levels, of course. 
But complex chains of reasoning, like all chains, depend on each link being sound, 
and they break, as the old adage says, at the weakest one. The truth of the main 
premises in a complex argument ultimately depends upon the warrant they receive 
from other arguments in the chain. The need for rigour in evaluating each step is 
multiplied by this inter-dependence, making it imperative that the standard for 
approval sets the bar as high as possible. It is generally accepted that deductive 
soundness is the highest that the bar can go.  
 
Non-deductive standards 
An apt slogan for the prevailing doctrine in critical thinking (as discussed in Chapter 
2) might be: ‘Non-deductive standards for non-deductive arguments’. Alec Fisher 
(2001) writes: 
We saw earlier that there are different kinds of reasons, which have to be judged 
differently (for truth, credibility, acceptability ...). In the same way different kinds of 
inferences have to be judged by quite different standards. [...] Although, of course, 
every argument aims to provide support for its conclusion, some arguments are 
meant to be more ‘conclusive’ than others. (Fisher 2001: 111)   
Some reasoning, Fisher continues, is ‘meant to be’ deductively valid (ibid.), but by 
no means all. He cites the familiar standard required by criminal law, whereby a 
guilty verdict must be established beyond reasonable doubt. From there we may 
move down through (mere) balance of probabilities, plausible grounds, limited 
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  For examples of mapping exercises, see Copi (1962: 43ff). 
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support, and so on. Bowell and Kemp devote a chapter each to deductive validity 
and inductive force, the one an absolute standard, the other variable in degree.  
 
But how does the critic know, in every case, how conclusive an argument is meant 
to be? Some arguments, of course, are more conclusive than others – although in 
my view, pace Fisher, that means that some are conclusive and some are not. If an 
argument is conclusive that is all the critic needs to say. It is not necessary to add 
that the author meant to argue conclusively as well as doing so! The question of 
what was meant is pertinent only when a supposed argument is found less than 
conclusive, for then the principle of charity comes into play. (See §§ 11-12 above). 
At the extremity the question becomes: How conclusive does an argument have to 
be to be deemed an argument at all? The critic has the option whether to judge the 
argument as a failed attempt to meet a certain intended (meant, agreed) level of 
conclusiveness, or as a qualified success in meeting some lesser but arguably 
acceptable standard. Only in the ideal circumstances where the text of an 
argument plainly exhibits its logical form can it be said with confidence that it 
‘aims’ for this standard or for that. Ennis (2001) acknowledges these problems of 
identifying and classifying, and finally evaluating arguments.128 But acknowledging a 
problem does not solve it. Worse, the acknowledgement undermines confidence in 
the procedure, and respect for rigour and consistency of the discipline. 
 
42. Natural language deductivism –NLD 
There are, however, no similar, compromising pressures on the practice of classical 
logic, for the simple reason that only objects which are amenable to assessment for 
deductive validity are considered for appraisal. Though not the predominant view, 
this has prompted some commentators (e.g. Thomas 1986, Groarke 1999, Botting 
2015) to argue for a deductivist programme for the analysis and evaluation of 
natural language argument (NLD). According to Groarke, NLD is the view that all 
arguments should be understood as attempts at deductive argument.  
                                                     
128
 See also Butterworth & Thwaites (2013: 201). 
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Recall the example discussed in §10 in connection with charitable interpretation :  
(11) These banknotes are forgeries since they all have the same serial 
numbers. 
This argument can be interpreted as an attempt at deduction by assuming that the 
author expected the audience to know that non-counterfeit bank-notes have 
different numbers. The assumption is broadly deductivist because the addition of 
the implicit premise would effectively make the argument valid – or at least 
expressible as a valid argument.129 But even if valid, (11) will not be a sound 
deduction, because the added premise is almost certainly untrue. First – as noted in 
§13 – one of the banknotes might be a genuine one; second the duplicate numbers 
might be the result of a printing fault and not, therefore, a forgery. Critics of NLD 
could say with some justification that whilst (11) is unsound, it is not a bad 
argument. As an abductive argument it is quite strong, given that forgery is a likely 
explanation for defective banknotes. So the maxim of charity would rule against a 
deductive interpretation. Ennis would claim that we should settle for a lesser 
standard than deductive soundness, on that realisation.    
 
Opponents of NLD, notably Govier (1987) and Johnson (2000), claim in more 
general terms that deductivism results in turning all arguments, whatever their 
surface form, arbitrarily into deductions. Thus, to give a rather simplistic example, 
an inductive argument, judged to exhibit the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy 
might be construed instead as a deduction, and judged to be valid by simply adding 
the premise that past regularities will hold in the future. Similarly an argument to 
the conclusion that torture is wrong, since it inflicts pain on another, could be 
covered by the added premise that any practice which inflicts pain on another 
without his or her leave is wrong; and so on. But there are no more grounds on 
which to make these assumptions about the intended form of reasoning than any 
other. It is ultimately speculation.  
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 In practice it is quite hard to formalise (11) as a strictly valid argument. 
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With Groarke, I think the charge of arbitrariness can be met. But more importantly, 
abitrariness is not a defect in NLD, any more than it is in the practice of classical 
logic. The arbitrariness in logic allows the logician to take any ordered set of 
propositions to be an argument, with the last member in the sequence designated 
the conclusion. That is a strength not a flaw. Its ‘great advantage’, say Bergmann et 
al. (2004: 9)  
is that it sidesteps the problem of having to give an account of how plausible a line 
of reasoning has to be to count as an argument, or how likely it is that a given group 
of sentences will be taken to support a designated sentence...  
Logic treats all such sets as deductive arguments and assesses them for validity. 
NLD treats all arguments as implicitly valid, and assesses them for soundness – not 
out of charity, but as a means to evaluation. The procedure is simple – a point 
noted by NLD’s supporters and detractors alike. For any recognisable argument,  
A ; C 
ask the question: What is the minimum logical addition to the premises that would 
be required to make it expressly valid? If it already has a valid, non-enthymematic 
form, the answer will of course be: nothing. But in the usual way of things a 
natural-language argument will require some supplementation, or ‘assumption 
ascription’ to be deemed valid. Groarke considers the following example: 
 (12) Jones is a politician, so he is not to be trusted. 
‘Faced with such an argument’, Groarke says, ‘we have no difficulty recognizing 
that it contains the unexpressed premise “No politicians can be trusted”.’ But, here 
I think Groarke is inviting an obvious objection. Suppose we ask him: ‘Recognised 
on what basis?’ Surely not in order to approve of the argument. On the contrary, 
noting the assumption simply draws attention to the author’s appeal to a dubious 
stereotype. It shows what is wrong with the author’s argument, if treated as valid, 
not what is right. Of course we knew that already, without the manoeuvre. But (12) 
is just an illustrative example. In practice the plausible interpretation of (12) would 
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be that it not a serious argument at all. If the author of (12) were challenged for 
implying an unwarranted generalisation in an attempt to argue deductively, he or 
she might well respond: ‘I wasn’t trying to deduce anything. I was poking fun, 
making a point.’130  
 
I would take issue with Groarke for unnecessarily presenting NLD in terms of 
attempted deduction. The same would go for ‘assumption’ if that means the 
author’s assumption. These manoeuvres compromise the objectivity that NLD has 
the potential to bring to argument appraisal. Objectivity comes with asking what is 
required of the text for validity to be exhibited? That is a different question from: 
‘What is attempted, or intended, or assumed?’, which, so much of the time, cannot 
be answered with any more than an educated guess. The most plausible guess as to 
what a proponent of (12) might be assuming, if arguing deductively, is  
(13) no politician is to be trusted?  
But on what grounds would the critic ascribe this assumption to (13) other than to 
show the argument is unsound? In accordance with the principle of charity, (13) 
should not be assumed. Nothing as strong as (13) is required for (12 ) to be valid.  
 
Groarke very rightly raises this point himself (which makes it more surprising that 
he sees any need to talk in terms of ‘attempt’). He invents a special-case scenario in 
which Jones denies being a politician, so that if he is a politician, he is lying and 
arguably therefore not to be trusted. The point of the scenario, if far-fetched, is 
that a sweeping generalisation like (13) is not needed if the connection between 
the premise and conclusion happens to be of a more particular nature. If we are 
asking what must be assumed for the validity of (12) – the logical minimum – (13) is 
not it. 
 
                                                     
130
  As noted earlier, Hamblin (1970: 225) make a similar point about ‘nailing a fallacy ... The 
perpetrator cannot be convicted of a fallacy until he can have an argument pinned on him. And 
what are the criteria of that?’.  
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The observations Groarke makes in the following extract in my view go to the heart 
of the of the analysis-appraisal problem. For that reason I quote a substantial 
extract:  
In assigning unexpressed premises, we can distinguish different possibilities. A 
‘logical minimum’ is the minimum claim necessary to ensure a valid inference. In 
some cases, it is the most plausible unexpressed premise, but there are many cases 
in which context or common practice clearly suggest that an arguer is committed to 
a stronger claim which is, in pragma-dialectical terminology, the ‘pragmatic 
optimum.’ In the example above [my (13)], the logical minimum is the claim that ‘If 
Jones is a politician, then he cannot be trusted’ – a claim which is not equivalent to 
the claim that ‘No politicians can be trusted’ (the first but not the second is, for 
example, true if Jones has always denied that he is a politician, and this is the only 
reason why he cannot be trusted if he is). In the absence of some explicit indication 
that this idiosyncratic assumption is the basis of the proposed conclusion, it is 
reasonable to assume that it is the latter generalization about politicians which 
drives the inference. It can, therefore, be designated as the pragmatic optimum.  
We can see that it is always possible to deductively reconstruct an argument which is 
not transparently deductive by noting that any arguer is committed to the statement 
that ‘If the premises of my argument are true, then the conclusion is true.’ This 
follows directly from the implications of the speech acts ‘argument’ and ‘assertion,’ 
for an arguer who argues for some conclusion C on the basis of some set of premises 
purports to believe both that C is true and that her proposed premises justify this 
belief. ... In this sense, their argument declares that they believe that these premises 
imply the conclusion, and that the conclusion is true if the premises are true. It is 
perhaps worth noting that they are committed to the latter conditional not merely in 
the sense of material implication, but in the stronger sense that they must believe 
that there is a relationship between their premises and their conclusion which makes 
it reasonable to base a belief in the latter on a belief in the former. (Groarke 1999: 6)  
 
Comments 
Assumption ascription based on basis of the logical minimum (LM) is not a 
charitable interpretation of the text. It is not a judgement, on the critic’s part, 
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about what the arguer is attempting to do, or intends to say. It may coincide with 
what the arguer is attempting, as Groarke says above. But it need not, and should 
not be guided by guesswork. Indeed, it need not be guided by anything other than 
the minimum requirement for validity. Assumption ascription is in that respect an 
entirely arbitrary move. For any argument,  
A and so C,  
the logical minimum requirement for validity is  
LM: If A then C.  
On that principle any enthymeme whatsoever is validated by the rule of modus 
ponens, for example: 
(14)   A:   Jones is a politician.  
LM:   If Jones is a politician he is not to be trusted.  
  C:   Jones is not to be trusted 
What, it might be asked, is the justification for adding LM? The answer is that it 
reflects what is asserted in the acts of premising and concluding, as explained in my 
§§31-40, and endorsed by Groarke in the above extract, where he states that the 
requirement for arguments to be supplemented up to the logical minimum ‘follows 
directly from the implications of the speech acts “argument” and “assertion”’ 
(ibid.).  
 
Here, I suggest, is where any lingering worries about the arbitrariness of NLD can be 
dispelled. The assumption that arguments are implicitly deductive is not 
groundless. What is asserted in the standard expression of an argument naturally 
has the form: 
A, and if A,C  
which – as an argument for C – is valid.  
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NLD and appraisal  
If all arguments are construed as valid, as a matter of procedure, the question of 
appraisal turns on whether or not the argument in question is sound. Can the 
logical minimum for validity be assumed without absurdity, obvious falsity, or 
unwarranted generalisation? These are matters for critical discussion, investigation, 
and ultimately judgement. NLD does not displace these: it merely provides a modus 
operandi for extracting, interpreting ,and reconstructing putative arguments from 
natural-language texts. The hardest aspect of argument reconstruction in the 
orthodox approach to critical thinking is assumption ascription, because it depends 
on first deciding what sort of argument the text contains, and hence what criterion 
or criteria are applicable to its appraisal. As we have seen, some arguments score 
differently according to their presumed classification. The same argument may 
score well as an argument to the best explanation, but fail as a deduction because 
it is invalid. NLD applies one criterion only: deductive soundness, and measures 
arguments by the degree to which soundness can be maintained with validity 
assumed. Critical judgement is no less necessary; it is simply directed uniformly to 
the objective assessment of the premises, explicit and implicit.  
 
The practical details of applying NLD are outside the scope of this thesis, although 
they deserve more attention in the text-books than they generally receive. The 
objective in the thesis has been to give a clear account of what an argument is, on 
the one hand as an object of evaluation and, on the other, an object of the 
(complex) act of argument. The endorsement that this gives to a deductivist 
programme in critical thinking is a welcome consequence.  
 
43. Summary and postscript 
A deductively valid argument is one whose conclusion cannot be false if the 
premises are all true. The paradigm example is modus ponens: 
MPP: A, (A  B) ; B 
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I have argued that the objects of the two acts that constitute the act of 
propounding an argument– premising and concluding – are equivalent to the 
premises of MPP, presented earlier as  
(8) A, and (if A, C)   (P2) 
expressed in various ways but standardly as  
 (9) A, and so C 
But this is no coincidence. The form of expression that argument can take in natural 
language discourse has unlimited variety. It must also be said that the degree and 
nature of the support that ordinary everyday argument provides for the conclusion 
– and/or is expected to provide – varies significantly. Deductivist reconstruction 
does not make all arguments alike; it treats them all alike. But as far as the object 
of the act is concerned, its form is naturally deductive – deductive by virtue of the 
nature of the act.  
 
Asserting (8) – by uttering (9) – commits the author to C. However, like Searle 
(2001), I do not take this to mean that the rule of modus ponens determines the 
nature of the act of argument performed by asserting that A and if A then C. The 
rule of modus ponens – the fact that it is a rule – is as much determined by the self-
evident commitment that asserting (8) gives to C. As Searle puts it: 
The so-called rule of modus ponens is just a statement of the pattern of an infinite 
number of independently valid inferences. ... If you think you need a rule to infer q 
from p and (if p then q) then you would also need a rule to infer p from p. [...] We 
need to distinguish between entailment and validity as logical relations, on the one 
hand, and inferring as a voluntary human activity on the other. (Searle 2001: 19, 21 
[his emphasis]) 
Assertively uttering an instance of 
(7) A (and) so C 
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also commits its author to the truth of the corresponding instance of (8), simply by 
virtue of the nature of assertion. In other words, in the propounding of any 
argument, a proposition with the form of (8) is claimed to be true, which it is (as 
already noted) if and only if the argument itself is deductively sound. Since the 
objects of assertion have a purport to be true, the objects of acts of argument have 
a purport to be to be sound.  
 
In this thesis I have sought to give an account of the act-object relation as it 
pertains to argument. If it is correct on the main points, then it seems to me to 
provide a firm theoretical basis for a deductivist methodology in critical thinking 
and related disciplines whose subject matter is natural-language argument. I have 
approached the object we call ‘an argument’ from two perspectives which between 
them define what arguments are. One perspective relates to the act arguers 
perform when propounding arguments. The other relates to the act that the critic 
performs when appraising arguments. In much critical thinking literature these 
perspectives are seen to conflict, leading to different conceptions of argument, and 
hence varying standards and criteria of evaluation. I claim to have shown that the 
perspectives in fact intersect and yield a definition of argument which in all 
essentials matches the object logicians designate as arguments and assess for 
validity , viz. 
a set of propositions, one of which is claimed to follow (validly) 
from the others.  
For critical thinking this has pedagogical as well as theoretical importance. A 
deductivist notion of argument would open the way to a more prominent role for 
traditional logic in the methodology of analysis and appraisal. For many 
practitioners and commentators working in the discipline that would be an 
unwelcome U-turn. In my view, however, after long involvement in the teaching 
and assessment of the subject, some critical rethinking is overdue. An infusion of 
logical concepts and techniques into the critical thinking syllabus would be a start.   
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